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ABSTRACT
This study proposes a tool which that can be used by researchers and/or policy
makers to measure the intrinsic justice of educational policy documents using the
political philosophy of John Rawls. The proposed tool was directly derived from Rawls’s
two basic principles of justice as fairness that he defines and expands upon throughout his
writings. These two principles have been divided into three arenas of justice for publicly
funded education: justice in the democratic processes, justice in the allocation of
resources, and justice in the goals of schools. Via a series of 14 rubrics to measure the
active levers that work in the policy, the relevant texts is judged on a 5-point scale
ranging from Highly Just to Highly Unjust. The new tool is proved upon Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in its most recent 2001 form (better
known as No Child Left Behind). The tool proved to be effective in drawing out the
individual strands of Rawlsian liberal justice. In the test case of Title I, the proposed tool
found Title one to be Unjust for its undermining of the fair value of the citizen’s voice;
Just for its active material support for the least advantaged students, and mixed on the
justice of end goals. It is concluded that this tool can prove useful to researchers, policy
makers and teachers of educational leadership to identify issues of educational justice.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In this dissertation I seek to offer up an instrument that can be used to judge the
underlying justice of educational policy. In order to do this I demonstrate how basic
philosophical positions inform the debate about the justice of publicly funded education,
and I present common ways in which educational justice is currently defined. To
underpin a proposed evaluation of educational justice, I present the works of John Rawls
as an alternative to the two primary conceptions of educational justice. I also propose an
initial effort at creating an instrument to evaluate federal and state laws and federal and
state Department of Education rules based on the philosophy of Rawls and the methods
of John Tharp.
Purpose of Chapter One
In this chapter I lay forth the reasoning behind the choice of this topic for my
dissertation. I have chosen to take a very high level approach to educational theory,
avoiding almost entirely the actual practices in schools. I have done so in order to clear
away the clutter, the what’s, that seem to fill up the conversation about schools, and focus
as much as possible on the why’s. This is part of what Dunn (2012) calls problem
structuring (p. 67). To meet that end, it was important to clear away the related or
secondary issues. In this case I wished to focus on a root question, “Why do we have
publicly funded schools?” However, that question demanded a more basic question,
“What are the justice demands of education in a democracy?” To get to that goal I latched
on to the creation of a measurement instrument to evaluate the justice of the policy
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documents that currently govern publicly funded schools. This chapter lays out the case
for such an instrument and summarizes how I hope to create one.
Structure of the Chapter
This chapter has two primary components, the first being the explicated
justification for this research in light of the larger frame of educational thought in the
United States. I present two streams of thought on educational policy and how they are at
loggerheads over the most basic meaning of education in the United States. Then I
present the philosophy of John Rawls, as applied to education in this dissertation, as a
possible bridge between the two, after which I present the practicalities of this research
proposal.
My Position
I do not suggest I come to this subject as a table rasa, but rather bring with me an
entire lifetime of position to the topic. This position is both personal and professional.
When I write of justice for those who are born into circumstances less than ideal, I speak
from the position of knowing that I had been “written off” by the educational system. In
1967 my parents were explicitly told that children with my level of learning disability
rarely learned to read and that they should not expect me to finish high school. Only by
my good fortune was I born into a home of parents who had both the commitment and
resources to provide me with the opportunity to achieve beyond what was so earnestly
predicted. Then a generation later, after the world of IDEA was in place I, as a parent,
had to use all my resources and commitment to assure that my learning disabled child
could succeed in the public schools. Had it not been for the social capital afforded to me
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and my daughter, a life of struggles and poverty might well have been our lot. So, when I
write of justice with passion and sometimes with a snarl, it is because I know for every
child who, like me or my daughter, there are many who do not have those resources.
I have no doubt that this foundation is what led me to a career in reaching out to
those who have not been afforded the advantages I was blessed in having. From my
college days doing volunteer work in inner-city Chicago, to my years working with
adjudicated teenagers to my dozen years doing early- intervention educational social
work I have seen up close and personal how educational opportunity is not handed out in
anything like an equitable manner. While children with learning disabilities at least have
the procedural justice of IDEA, there is no such procedural parallel for children of
poverty. I have witnessed the everyday injustices committed on the children of poverty
and have aggressively advocated for those children in my care. And, too often, I have
found that once outside my protection the same children are again subjected to the same
injustices that I fought to remedy. So, though I will attempt to be dispassionate, objective
and scholarly in this dissertation, there is no possible way I can pretend to be neutral.
Explication
There is no clear consensus in the United States about what constitutes justice in
the implementation of our publicly funded K-12 educational system and, by extension,
there is no consensus on the ultimate purpose of publicly funded schools in this country.
This disunity is particularly acute in the conflict between educational policy makers who
have legislated an economic utilitarian vision for publicly funded schools and a social
equality vision for all education promoted primarily by the community of educational
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academics. I propose that until there can be a common goal for education, the educational
system will continue the ongoing conflict between those who govern the schools and
those who prepare teachers and administrators who operate the schools, as it has for the
past dozen years. This discontent has resulted in a virtual stalemate in the progress of real
school reform in the United States.
The position of the Academic Community
Dating back to the 1930’s the social reconstructivist wing of educational
progressivism has sought to redefine the country via education. Stanly (1992) traces the
reconstructivist movement from this beginning into the modern philosophy of critical
pedagogy that my studies have found to be the dominate ideology in educational research
and discourse1, though over the decades there have been philosophical additions that
shifted the progressive education from modernist to postmodernist in epistemology.
Additionally, the influence of the Frankfort School, Freudian theory, Habermas and
Foucault all worked to create the modern critical theory approach to progressive
education (Jenkins, 2000; Morrison, 1989; Weiler, 2006). What is important is that to this
day it retains the core vision of social reform as the prime goal, and measure and equity
has become the prime measure of justice in schools (Evans, 2008). To this day there is a
still a vocal refrain that indeed there is no possibility of a just educational system in the
U.S. while capitalism remains the system of economics (Bowles & Gintis, 2013).
To many educational theorists the primary measure of school justice is the
equality of results of marginalized groups (Ladson-Billings, 1995). The passage of No
1

Though I looked diligently for any research into the dominance of any particular philosophy, I could find
none, so I must rely on my anecdotal evidence in judging from my own dissertation research.
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Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001 was a travesty in many ways to these educators
(Hayes, 2008). Some contend that NCLB by its structure reaffirms basic inequities and
marginalizes groups (Welsh, 2010). Others contend that the testing system forces schools
with low income students to crowd out important content in order to focus on the tests,
thus ultimately providing an inferior educational experience for poor children and for
children of color (Rothstein et al., 2008), and others simply oppose the positivist
conception of learning embodied in standardized tests.
Faced with the onslaught reform driven by the vision described above of an
economic goal for education (Matusov, 2011), the academy has published a continuous
stream of books and articles attacking NCLB (Hursh, 2007). Yet, the criticism from
academia has had no real effect, as it appears to be that both political parties have
embraced this approach to education.
The Position of the Political Community
In 1983 the Reagan administration published “A Nation at Risk.” The opening
sentences staked out the basic position, “Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged
preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological innovation is being
overtaken by competitors throughout the world” (Gardner, 1983, p. 6). The philosophical
position was clear in the pages that followed. The schools’ primary function was to
ensure that the United States remained the dominant economic nation in the world. This
was not a new proposition; the economic function of schools had been argued for over a
hundred years (Spring, 2001, p. 253). This view held that investment in schools lead to
better workers and thus economic growth. Related to this was the idea that social
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efficiency would naturally sort children into their “natural” place in society based on
abilities which for much of the 20th century meant selection based on ethnic background
and/or social class (Spring, 2001, p. 281). Engle (2000) cites a number of theorists and
concludes that since the 1950’s the United States government primarily sees education as
an economic investment. Rizvi & Lingard (2000) notes that “Educational policy is now
often conceptualized as a central plank of national economic planning - the skills of a
nation’s people being an important factor in attracting peripatetic capital to a specific
place”( p.423-424). It is significant this statement was made not just about the U.S., but
about the western world. While academics such as Lipman (2004) agree that U.S.
education policy is indeed about economic competitiveness, she suggest that this process
has the side effect of further widening the inequities between rich and poor, and between
whites and minorities. Indeed this continues today with the 2012 Democrat National
Platform making four different references to education as “investment” with clear
economic ends (Democratic National Committee, 2012).
The move toward an economic utilitarian basis for U.S. education was begun in
the 1994 reauthorization of The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)
entitled “The Goals 2000 Act” (Lipman, 2004; Vinovskis, 2009) which repeatedly
referred to “internationally competitive content and student performance standards” (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1994). Seven years later saw the overwhelmingly bi-partisan
Congressional support that led to passage of the 2001 reauthorizing of ESEA better
known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB) which extended the prior act and added tough
new accountably measures (Hayes, 2008). NCLB has been characterized as representing
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final and official shift toward market oriented educational policy (Hursh, 2007). The
image of President Bush and Ted Kennedy jointly smiling with the passage of the law is
strong in my memory as how the two parties can indeed act jointly to enact the will of the
people. Cross (2004) writes of the open connections between these educational reforms
and the business community and how they were seen as mutually supportive. Both acts
set the agenda for the public schools firmly on a path towards a fixed goal of student
performance as measured by international competition and markets (Hursh, 2007). It is
significant that there continues to be bi-partisan support for NCLB (Vinovskis, 2009) and
that President Obama’s effort at school reform called Race to the Top was included as
part of the economic stimulus package.
All of this to say that the dominant philosophic basis for education today is
market driven need for economic competition, thus educational justice in education is
primarily communitarian and economic in nature. While there are many educators who
oppose NCLB on procedural or practical grounds, the critical theorists oppose it on basic
philosophical grounds, as they believe the act takes the U.S. educational system in the
wrong direction (Hayes, 2008).
While an important segment of the overall educational community in the U.S.
believes that educational equity is paramount, the dominant policy discourse does not
seem to even hear their voices. This is problematic in my estimation because the
community of scholars is a vital component in any successful educational reform effort,
and yet they seem to be talking past one another rather than to each other.
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Rizi & Lingard (2010) describe how the geopolitical events of the 1980’s along
with the rise of critical theory undermined interests in rationalistic policy evaluation from
both the right and left. Thus even the evaluation of policy has diverged into the two
camps. In this dissertation I will present a case that there is indeed a problem with the
defining justice in education as how it impacts economic competiveness, but I will
propose that the case for intergroup equality as the measure of justice is equally
inappropriate as a comprehensive model of educational policy justice. While both have
valid justice concerns, I contend that a larger, more comprehensive vision is necessary.
The values of liberalism have been called the “American Creed” (Stark, 2011, p. 78), for
it is the commitment to the values of individual human rights and opportunity that unify
the two major political parties. It is with this in mind that I propose an evaluation that
measures educational justice based on Enlightenment liberalism as articulated by John
Rawls.
Rawls presents a comprehensive vision of justice that, while not written for
educational policy, is readily applicable to educational policy. Though Rawls’s economic
policies are justly called redistributionist in nature, which on its face runs counter to the
ideology of the political class who support NCLB (Hursh, 2007), the redistributionist
aspects of Rawlsian justice to education is the one thing this study found to be fully
supported in NCLB. Thus, the jump to Rawlsian model of justice might not be as difficult
as it seems for the political class. On the other hand, Rawlsian justice may present a
different rationale for equality than put forth by the critical theorists, yet the bar for
justice presented in this tool is indeed the equitable treatment of all.
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Both the utilitarian position and the critical theory position can be justly called
comprehensive doctrines (in Rawls’s words) or “secular-religions” in common parlance
(Engel, 2000, p. 18; Rawls, 2005, p. 376). What Rawls proposed and what I propose here
does not require either group to give up its core beliefs, but rather to agree to a unifying,
but limited, agreement on the imperatives of a fair and democratic society (Freeman,
2007, pp. 367-368). Since both those who promote an economic, utilitarian approach and
an equality based critical theory approach are teleological in their views of justice, I
propose both groups could superimpose most of their outcome goals on a Rawlsian
procedural approach represented in this proposed tool. Within the Rawlsian pluralistic
framework both of these groups (and other comprehensive doctrines not listed) could
continue to “proselytize” for their point of view while agreeing on the way forward.
Would both groups have to give some? Yes, but would not the value of the ends justify
their joint effort, focusing energy from a war against one another to a joint goal, and be
better than the stalemate of the status quo?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate the viability of using a policy
evaluation instrument to measure the underlying justice of U.S. educational policy. The
political moral philosophy of John Rawls shall not only provide both the general
conception of justice used in this project, but will also be the basis for the delineation and
relative valuation of specific demands for justice in educational policy. In order to test the
practicality and usefulness of the proposed instrument, I will evaluate Title I of
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Elementary and Secondary School Act of 2001 (ESEA) better known as No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) which is the reauthorizing of Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
The next phase of this process is intended to refine the proposed evaluation
rubrics and determine the suitability of the policy evaluation instrument as a whole. Once
all necessary adjustments to the evaluation and the rubrics are complete, I will employ
the final instrument to make evaluations of Title I of ESEA/NCLB. Through this process
I hope to be able to provide a usable and informative tool for future educational policy
evaluations.
Research Questions
Research Question # 1: What constitutes a just educational policy?
Research Question # 2: Does the proposed instrument provide a useful measure of policy
justice?
Research Question # 3: Is Title I of ESEA/NCLB intrinsically just?
Research Plan
I have chosen to analyze Title I, the 2001 reauthorizing of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), also known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB).
In chapter 3, there is the first rendering of the policy evaluation tool. It consists of
the three major components of Rawlsian educational justice as presented in Chapter 2 as
arenas, each of which have four action levers of active ethical impact. Each of the levers
has levels of effectiveness spelled out for the user to provide for consistent evaluation.
For each policy document analyzed, all twelve levers will be assessed and a narrative
summary will be presented.
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The first half of this document (approximately 40K words) was coded and
analyzed using the initial version of the levers. After revisions to the levers based on their
usefulness in teasing out the justice issues, the entire document was recoded and relevant
sections were separated for a second cycle of coding which is recorded in chapter 4.
During the second cycle Title I was analyzed on each rubric, and the rubrics were
analyzed for their usefulness.
Chapter 4 discusses the three arenas of Rawlsian justice. The results from the 14
lever assessments are discussed and conclusions about the justice of Title I are made. In
addition the use and usefulness of the tool is discussed in reference to the research
question.
Conclusion
The intent for this dissertation is explicitly to create a tool with which to measure
the justice of educational policy. However, I have a larger underlying goal. Because I see
no hope for successful educational reform as long as the key players are in such conflict,
I would hope the end of this line of research can eventually help provide a potential
philosophical beginning point by which a path to a more unified vision of the mission of
publicly funded schools can be found.
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CHAPTER 2
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of John Rawls’s theory of justice upon which
the entire project is based. His seminal 1971 book was referred to by his philosophy
students as “The Green Monster” because of its size, the color of the first edition, and the
difficulty of the contents (Pogge, 2007). In this study Rawlsian justice will be asked to
address the serious concerns about the justice, or lack thereof, in the U.S. educational
system. Though I present a case for the measurement of injustice as defined in terms of
educational inequity, I propose that inequity is only an indicator of possible injustice, not
injustice itself. Rawls provides a far more expansive definition of justice, one that goes
beyond what should not be, to a vision of what education should be. Rawlsian justice
provides a clear purpose of education within a pluralistic society. To Rawls education is a
means to the end: a society made of self-respecting individuals who are socially and
politically empowered. This, he believed, was the path to maintaining a healthy
democratic society. This study is ultimately about showing how his vision of social
justice is both relevant and applicable to 21st century educational policy.
Structure of this Chapter
This chapter has three sections. In the first I present a synthesis and summary of
Rawls’s work in a way that that brings to the fore its relevance for this study in
educational justice. In the second part I present the two primary ways educational justice
is conceptualized: equity and adequacy. Specifically I look at the perspective that
differences between groups in schools indicate a lack of educational justice as compared
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with the perspective that educational justice is measured by the need to provide for the
high achievers to better the community at large. I conclude this chapter by looking
closely at three current approaches to measuring justice in education, utilitarianism,
libertarianism and critical theory, as inadequate alternatives to Rawlsian liberalism.
The Use of Rawls in this Study
In this dissertation, I offer the work of John Rawls as a proposed justice
benchmark by which to measure educational policy in the United States. “John Rawls’s A
Theory of Justice (1971) is one of the one of the most influential books in moral and
political philosophy published within the last one hundred years” (Graham, 2007, p. vii).
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice began a dramatic Revival in political philosophy. The
book sold four hundred thousand copies in English alone and translated into
twenty–eight languages has become a staple in North American and European
universities and an inspiration to many in Latin America, China and Japan. It
stimulated distinguished philosophers, economists, jurists and political scientists
to contribute to political theory and has drawn many young people into these
fields to join the debates it began. (Pogge, 2007, p. 1)
John Rawls has been described as “the most significant moral philosopher of our
age” (Partridge, 2004, p. 43) and “the leading political philosopher of the 20th century”
(Putnam, 2005, p. 114). When he published A Theory of Justice in 1971 he broke from
the period’s focus on language and formal logic and brought back the larger concerns of
how to determine right and wrong (Costa, 2011, p. 17; Audard, 2005, p. 157). His work
has provided inspiration and justification for both the right and the left, as well as
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condemnation from both (Graham, 2007, p. 8). Upon his death he was lauded by
philosophers and economists from both the left and the right for his monumental
contributions to philosophy, economics and political theory (Anderson, 2003).
This is not to suggest that he has been well received in all places. Audard (2005),
the Chair of the Forum for European Philosophy, wrote speaking of Rawls’s popularity in
the Anglophile world, “But the situation is very different in Europe, and to appreciate and
understand it is worthwhile to consider the case of France where his influence is certainly
growing, but a vehement resistance, due to the particular intellectual and political history
of the land of Foucault, Althusser has also been found” (p. 157). This rejection has been
based primarily because “Critical theorists, for their part, contend that a theory which
refuses at once to come to grips with social reality and to destabilize common-sense
intuitions condemns itself to impotent normativeism or to ideological apology” (Audard,
2005, p. 157). However, despite these criticisms, I propose to prove that Rawls does
indeed provide a realistic and workable theoretical framework for this study.
At this early point, I must make a qualification in my description of Rawls’s theory
that when I deviate from Rawls’s own writings to those writing about Rawls’s writings I
shall strive to make that change clear. Though both Freeman and Pogge studied under
Rawls himself (Freeman, 2007; Pogge, 2007), the conclusions in their writing about
Rawls are not the same, and those writers who never knew the man such as Graham,
Costa, Lehning and others, come to still different conclusions. This is not unexpected
(Howell & Prevenier, 2001). Thus, I must make a caveat as I write of considering a
“Rawlsian Philosophy”. I am speaking of an education-specific construct that I have
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created by selecting some writings to emphasize or to de-emphasize, for such a construct
is necessary for a first order evaluation of educational policy (Gutek, 1974).
I must note, as a matter of clarification, that although Rawls writes at length about
economic policy, I am not presenting Rawlsian philosophy as a model for economics, but
rather, as a benchmark for measuring U.S. educational policy. This distinction will guide
my choice of topics to address and how completely they are handled. In this chapter I will
first explain the basic concepts Rawls first published in his 1971 book A Theory of
Justice and his subsequent clarifications of these concepts in his later writings. I shall do
so in order to argue for the usefulness of his conception of justice as a benchmark for
publicly funded education in the U.S.
Rawls’s focus on what were desirable ends was neither overly generalized nor
aimed at individuals, but rather on social institutions (Freeman, 2007; Pogge, 2007). On
the opening page of A Theory of Justice, Rawls states, “Justice is the first virtue of social
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (Rawls, 1999a, p.3), thus setting forth, from
the beginning of his work, that his theory is about two things: justice and basic social
institutions. This study is about justice, and public education is obviously a public
institution.
Foundational Concepts in Rawlsian Philosophy
“Rawls’s theory, with its vast scope and intricacies, cannot be simplified without
distortion,” said Rawls’s student and colleague Thomas Pogge (2007, p. x) in the preface
to his book summarizing Rawlsian philosophy. I am not attempting a full review of
Rawls’s philosophy, but rather a targeted review of his work as it applies to an evaluation
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of educational policy in order to argue to for its usefulness in the evaluation of how
justice may operate through educational policy. This will require some background, not at
once obviously related to my inquiry, but necessary to set the stage.
I believe it useful to review the primary influences on Rawls’s thinking before
delving into his theory of justice. Kant, Locke and Rousseau were the most profound
influences on Rawls’s writing (Freeman, 2007; Lehning, 2006) and it is through these
writers he both attempts to reconcile these philosophers to the world in which he lived
and by which he develops his own vision of liberalism and justice for the modern world
(Freeman, 2007; Graham, 2007; Pogge 2007).
Philosophical Influences
Rawls and Kant.
At least as far as his writings and lectures went, Rawls discussed Kant more than
any other person (Freeman, 2007; Pogge, 2007). Pogge (2007) said that Rawls’s
conception of justice had a distinctly Kantian “character” (p. 188) because Rawls both
directly devoted §40 of A Theory of Justice to explaining Kant as inspiration and because
Rawls credits Kant for the basic concept that “moral principles are the product of rational
choice” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 221). Audard (2007) also credits Rawls’s rejection of the
utilitarian idea of group justice over individual justice by saying, “This is a view of
justice obviously inspired by Kant as Rawls recognizes. The priority of justice is
formulated by Kant in Perpetual Peace in 1795” (Audard, 2007, p. 43).
Rawls is often seen very much the Kantian and to be a believer in a strict
categorical imperative; however, this is not quite true (Freeman, 2007, p. 21). Although
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his emphasis, like Kant, is on the respect of persons, Rawls did not make the argument
that respect of the person is a categorical imperative solely based upon reason derived
from natural law (in an a priori sense). He believed the need for the respect of the person
to be born out of practical reason that mutual respect leads to a more stable and civil
society (Rawls, 1999a, p. 297). This is not to suggest that Rawls rejected the concept of a
categorical imperative, for in A Theory of Justice he devotes all of §40 to making his own
interpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative as it relates to human morality, autonomy,
and liberty.
Pogge (2007) however, suggests Rawls specifically attempted to distance himself
from Kant’s view of liberalism, as he perceived Kant’s vision to be too comprehensive in
nature. This was because Rawls desired that his theory be more inclusive in a pluralistic
society (p. 144).
This brings up a point that must be made and fully understood when looking at
the work of Rawls: one errs when failing to recognize that although the words of a
deceased writer might now seem to exist in a permanent state of “now”, they were in fact
written over a period of time and in that time the writer’s views may have changed in
response to events, but the reader remains fixed at the point of publication. Freeman
(2007) points out how “Kant had little influence on Rawls’s initial drafts of A Theory of
Justice in the 1950’s and 1960’s” (p.22), and throughout his book reviewing Rawls’s
philosophy, he notes differences between the 1971 version of A Theory of Justice and the
1990 version of A Theory of Justice. Pogge (2007) suggests that throughout his career
Rawls “continually rethought and reformulated the relationship between his theory and
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Kant’s” (p. 188). This continual adjustment to both the world and specifically to
criticisms by other philosophers (Rawls, 2005, p. 373) help to position Rawls in a stream
of thought that began with Kant, but ended neither with the death of Kant nor that of
Rawls.
Kantian constructivism.
With an understanding of Rawls’s Kantian foundation, a discussion of Kantian
constructivism is in order to understand how the foundation of reason and a personcentered morality is developed. Kantian constructivism is generally understood to refer to
the premise that morality is constructed based on reason, as opposed to supernatural
revelation (Galvin, 2011). A succinct explanation of Rawls’s view on Kantian
constructivism is:
The central role that Kant assigns to such a procedure in his moral theory, Rawls
asserts, reflects Kant’s view that the substance of morality is fixed neither by an
independently existing order of values nor by special features of human
psychology. Rather, that substance is best understood as constructed by free and
equal people under fair conditions. (Kaufman, 2006, p. 2)
This focus on social morality being constructed by free and equal people is
not an end for Rawls but the beginning and justification of his vision on political
liberalism (Rawls, 2005, p. 89). This is the key to understanding Rawls’s vision of
liberalism. Though considered a moral philosopher by many (Galvin, 2011),
Rawls presents the moral philosophy only as an antecedent to his justification for
constructivist political liberalism (Rawls, 2005, p. 89).
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Rawls and Locke.
When considering a historical review of U.S. public policy of any sort John
Locke’s concept of social contract must be considered, as it was significant in the
development of the ideologies that led to the American Revolution (as well as the French)
(Freeman, 2007).
Given that Rawls sees an important connection between moral philosophy and
political theory, it is important to note how Rawls developed these connections and the
implications within. Rawls believed that political liberalism was a response to the
destruction caused by the wars of religion in Europe. He very specifically cites the
question, “How is society even possible between those of different faiths?” (Rawls, 2005,
p. xxiv). In Rawls’s view liberalism as a distinct movement can be seen to begin with
John Locke. Though Locke is most often equated with liberalism as an economic theory,
Freeman (2007) suggests that Rawls was drawn to Locke as a model primarily because of
his conviction that all men are born free and equal (p.43). Rawls also draws on Locke for
his support of the use of a constitutional democracy as the best way to support both
political liberalism and justice (Rawls, 2005, p. 405).
Rawls defended Locke’s concept of social contract with a primacy of individual
rights over the use of contract theory by utilitarian philosophers such as Hume and
Bentham. Rawls believed they wrongly justified prioritizing collective good over
individual rights (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 28-29). Rawls defended Locke’s vision of the social
contract again when he linked his concept of justice as fairness as a background to the
Lockeian idea of social contract (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 96-97). However, Rawls ultimately
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passed over Locke’s social contract in favor of Rousseau’s because Locke’s stipulated a
specific form of government which is something Rawls wanted to avoid (Rawls, 2003,
p.16).
Rawls and Rousseau.
Though Locke’s conception of the social contract was important to Rawls, some
authors suggest that Rousseau’s version was just as, or more, important than that of
Locke (Freeman, 2007; Audard, 2007). Audard (2007) proposes that it was Rousseau’s
The Social Contract of 1762 that most influenced Rawls’s theoretical development in this
area. “As Rousseau said it is the freedom of the parties in the contract that gives
legitimacy to its result and to their decisions because ‘if you take away the freedom of the
will, you strip a man’s actions of all moral significance’ [Social Contract, I, 5]” (Audard,
2007, p. 49). In both Rousseau’s and Kant’s version of the social contract there is a core
similarity:
The idea of a social contract, therefore, brings together two dimensions of justice:
prudent rationality as we cannot agree to harmful or unjust laws, and ethical
rationality as the process of legitimation rests on its universality. It could be
universalized to all human beings and it is respectful of each as an end in herself.
The contract seeks to establish what fully rational people would agree to, each
being concerned to get her due and not being affected by prejudices or her
distorting powers of passion. (Audard, 2007, p. 51)
The contract theory was not an end. For Rawls did not just accept its historical
use; rather, he uses the term to tie his concept of “original position” to the historical use

20

of social contract theory (Rawls, 1999a, p. 14). As we will see later, this concept was
adopted fully by Rawls in his vision of the original position.
In addition to the social contract theory, Freeman describes three important
features of Rawls’s philosophy that were impacted by Rousseau (Freeman, 2007, p. 19).
First was Rousseau’s concept of the natural goodness of man. After his experiences as an
infantryman in the Pacific in World War II, Rawls abandoned the Christian doctrine of
original sin. He came to believe that only a philosophy based on the hopefulness of
human goodness would stave off cynicism and subsequent injustice (Freeman, 2007, p.
11).
The second Rousseauian concept was that “equal rights of political participation
were central to individual freedom” (Freeman, 2007, p 19). In this he went beyond
Locke, though he did not go as far as Rousseau in calling for direct democracy as he
believed it impractical in the modern world. The third Rousseauian concept was built on
the second in that it called civic participation a duty and that consensus decisions be
made based on justice rather than for self-interest. The entirety of §54 of A Theory of
Justice is entitled “The Status of Majority Rule”. In this section he, on one hand, states
that he believes majority rule is the best way to achieve justice, while at the same time
stating clearly that the majority must be constrained by a constitution that clearly protects
the rights of all, including minorities (Rawls, 1999a, p. 313).
Rawls can be seen very much to be in the tradition of thinkers beginning with
Kant who came to be known as liberals. Adopting the Kantian focus on the intrinsic
worth of the individual and Locke’s vision that a society committed to the individual
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rights of all could survive even if it was filled with people with different core beliefs,
Rawls came to the conclusion that the collective good is best served by focusing on the
individual. Add to this Rousseau’s vision of a citizenry that engaged one another in
mutual respect to enact a mutually advantageous governmental system and one can
already see the outlines of Rawls’s theory of justice.
Rawlsian Political Liberalism
From the foundations laid by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Rawls went
on to create his own version of political liberalism. It is from this historical base that I,
via Rawls’s writing, propose an entire epistemology from which I first shall propose a
basic epistemology and then extrapolate that epistemology to the mechanics of an
evaluative instrument.
Rawlsian Political Constructivism.
Rawls (1999c) extrapolated Kant’s conception of moral constructivism to the
political with the foundation that extended constructivist vision of autonomous
personhood to that of a cooperative society (p. 306). Political constructivism is the
rational application of Kantian moral constructivism to a society. Rawls proposed a
rational society should be based on the following four features:
1. The content of constructive political justice is created by reasonable people
(or their representatives) to regulate the basic structure of society.
2. The production of constructive political justice is done based primarily on
practical considerations in the form of a constitutional government.
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3. Political constructions are based on a system of fair cooperation between
individuals and generations that flows from the moral sense of justice and
what is good.
4. Political constructions must flow from reasonable conceptions, judgments,
persons, grounds and institutions; however, this does not equate to “truth” as
to allow for a consensus among people who have different conceptions of
truth. (Rawls, 2005, pp. 93-94)
Tangent to this is that Rawls’s conception of political liberalism is of one that
focuses on the individual’s autonomous freedom to self-govern within a system of
mutually agreed upon rules that protect the freedom of all. In this he privileges the
liberalism of personal autonomy over the liberalism of economic or property-based
autonomy. This brand of liberalism has been branded “high liberalism” and follows from
Kant to Humbolt to J. S. Mill. While the property-based liberalism can be called
“classical liberalism” and follows the writing primarily of utilitarianism economic writers
such as Hume and Adam Smith (Freeman, 2007, p. 45), Rawls privileges certain liberties
over others and firmly rejects the utilitarianism of classical liberalism when he writes of
the “basic liberties.” I will discuss this in some detail later in this chapter as I first
position the role of education in those liberties and then in chapter 3 when I frame the
proposed instrument that both clearly evaluates educational justice and the larger
framework of basic liberties.
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Rawlsian liberalism in a pluralistic society.
This last point is central to Rawls’s idea of a just and pluralistic society. His
conception of political liberalism is one that can operate successfully in a society with a
number of reasonable religious or philosophical systems. Rawls called these systems
comprehensive doctrines. Though political liberalism was conceived to allow different
Christian denominations to live together in peace and harmony, Rawls (2005) is clear to
spell out that these comprehensive doctrines can be both religious and non-religious
doctrines (p. 375).
Rawls defines comprehensive doctrines as one that includes conceptions of what
is of value in life and give life its meaning. Metaphysical decisions regarding the
nature of reality and epistemological doctrines regarding the possibility and
conditions of human knowledge are also comprehensive doctrines, are all
religions. (Freeman, 2007, p.332)
For instance, he believed that Habermas, in his writing, had created a new
comprehensive doctrine as a political theory (Rawls, 2005, p. 376); Rawls made clear that
in his view of political liberalism, political theory should not establish a new
comprehensive doctrine, but rather incorporate the many comprehensive doctrines of the
society. He spells out his “political liberalism as a political conception of justice by three
features”:
a. It applies in the first instance to the basic structures of society (assumed in the
case of justice as fairness to be a democratic society). This structure consists
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of the main political, economic, and social institutions, and how they fit
together as one unified system of social cooperation.
b. It can be formulated independently of any particular comprehensive doctrine,
religious, philosophical, or moral. While we suppose that it may be derived
from, or supported by, or otherwise related to one or more comprehensive
doctrines (indeed, we hope it can be thus related to many such doctrines), it is
not presented as depending upon, or presupposing, any such view.
c. Its fundamental ideas – such ideas in political liberalism as those of political
society as a fair system of social cooperation, of citizens as reasonable and
rational, and free and equal – all belong to the category of the political and are
familiar from the public political culture of a democratic society and its
traditions. (Rawls, 2005, p. 376)
It should be noted, however, that Rawls does not give a carte blanche to all
comprehensive doctrines to be treated equally, for he specifies that to be included in a
just society, the comprehensive doctrine must be “reasonable” (Nussbaum, 2011) and to
be reasonable a comprehensive doctrine must respect the individual. He defines a
reasonable comprehensive doctrine as:
Reasonable comprehensive doctrines do not reject the essentials of a
constitutional democratic polity. Moreover reasonable persons are characterized
in two ways: First they stand ready to offer fair terms of social cooperation
between equals, and they abide by these terms if others do also, even should it be
to her advantage not to; second, reasonable persons recognize and accept the
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consequence of the burdens of judgment, which leads to the idea of reasonable
toleration in a democratic society. (Rawls, 1999b, p. 177)
In specific Rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus proposes that the only
justification to impinge on any comprehensive doctrines is if a doctrine seeks to limit the
liberty of any citizen, including both the believer and the non-believer in that
comprehensive doctrine (Rawls, 1999a, p. 188).
Rawlsian Liberalism in a Stable Society.
Another key to Rawls’s vision of liberalism is the concept of “a well ordered
society” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 397). Rawls envisions that justice is only possible when the
basic institutions are stable. Again citing the opening pages of A Theory of Justice, Rawls
(1999a) posits a society built on both binding rules and social agreement on core liberal
values. “Let us assume, to fix ideas, that a society is a more or less self-sufficient
association of persons who in their relations to one another recognize certain rules of
conduct as binding and who for the most part act in accordance to them” (p. 4). Thus,
Rawls does not glorify anarchy but rather a system whereby all (or most) persons in a
society give up some of their autonomy so as to build a society based on social
cooperation. He sees that stability supports justice and “a society regulated by a public
sense of justice is inherently stable” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 436).
This social cooperation must be understood in light of three things: (a) social
cooperation is not the same as social coordination driven by some central authority;
rather it is the acceptance of an agreed-upon set of social behavioral norms. (b) Social
cooperation assumes “fair terms of cooperation”. This means that no one person or
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individual benefits disproportionality from the group cooperation. This concept is both
horizontal (all people at a given time) as well as vertical (persons of different
generations). (c) Social cooperation assumes that the individual members can see how
their cooperation is beneficial (Rawls, 2005, p. 16).
Rawls goes on to point out that this social cooperation is beneficial both to the
individual and to the society at large. This is not to be taken to mean that this stability is
at the expense of coercive behaviors by government; on the contrary, the stability is
created via a mutual commitment to the respect of all individuals (Freeman, 2007, p.
244). Rawls calls this mutual recognition of respect as good for both self and others the
reciprocity principle (Rawls, 2005, pp. 16, 50). Though this well might be surmised to be
a concept supporting the social contract, Rawls makes no such linkage; rather, he simply
presents that a stable society promotes a just society through community consensus and
expectation. Audard (2007) suggests that this clarification in Political Liberalism (which
was among his last works) was a tacit acknowledgment by Rawls that Kant’s ideal was
too simplistic (p. 195).
Rawlsian Liberalism and Reasoning.
This conception that social stability depends on a society that is already
committed to the basic principles of mutual respect and justice bears directly on the
questions concerning the role of education in a democratic society. For a just society,
Rawls posits a community of adults who are autonomous citizens that possess
fundamental reasoning skills.
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Now all ways of reasoning – whether individual, associational or political – must
acknowledge certain common elements: the concept of judgment, principles of
inference, and rules of evidence, and much else, otherwise they would not be
ways of reasoning but perhaps rhetoric or means of persuasion. We are concerned
with reason, not simply with discourse. A way of reasoning then must incorporate
the fundamental concepts and principles of reason, and include standards of
correctness and criteria of justification. A capacity to master these ideas is part of
common human reason. (Rawls, 2005, p. 220)
This simple but profound concept is that societal institutions must somehow work to
emphasize the growth and development of reasoning skills
Rawls (2005) divides these reasoning skills into two parts: non-public reasoning
and public reasoning (pp. 212-254). Non-public reasoning includes the ability to access
and understand the core governing documents (Rawls, 2005, pp. 222-223) as well as the
ability to determine if current laws or policies are indeed just (Rawls, 2005, p. 222). Nonpublic reasoning also encompasses many associational forms of reasoning, such as used
in churches or private organizations. Though not private in any sense, they are not part of
the public political dialogue, yet they are very important for they form the background
culture. Rawls then takes this a step further when he posits the importance of public
reasoning skills: the ability to understand an argument and make a thoughtful reply. He
contends that the ability for citizens to engage in deliberative democracy as they freely
discuss justice and the common good (Freeman, 2007, p. 403) is important, specifically
saying that “A belief in the importance of public deliberation is vital for a reasonable
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constitutional regime” (Rawls, 1999b, p. 51). This deliberation does not occur on a blank
canvas; to achieve the consensus envisioned by Rawlsian political liberalism in a real and
imperfect society, social institutions are necessary as a mechanism to build a consensus in
expectations (Costa, 2004).
If we are going to consider the use of Rawls as guiding a new rubric to assess the
justice of U.S. educational policy in a historical review, it seems logical that schools
should provide a thorough grounding in applying reasoning skills to civil society, the
constitution and the legal process. Beyond that, the schools in such a society would be
obligated to provide grounding in verbal and deliberative skills. Though these are not
reasoning skills in and of themselves, they are necessary for the adult citizens to
participate in the communal deliberative life envisioned by Rawls.
From the review presented above it is clear that we can understand publicly
funded schools as a community enterprise. As such, in a Rawlsian conception, the
operation and administration of publicly funded schools in a just society must both model
liberal democratic processes and set the stage for a liberal democratic community.
Therefore in chapter 3 when I propose an evaluative instrument for educational policy,
the voices of all in the constituent community must be heard and respected, both internal
and external as a required element of Rawlsian democratic liberalism.
The question remains: how shall an evaluation instrument assess what constitutes
a just society? It is one thing to blithely say that I advocate a just society, but there are
many conceptions of what constitutes a just society, and this entire project would be
meaningless if Rawls did not present a coherent vision of a just society or if I failed to
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present how his vision can be applicable to educational policy. This I shall attempt to do
in the next section.
Rawls’s Theory of Justice
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.”
(Rawls, 1999a, p. 3)
To build a just society one must have a clear idea of what constitutes justice;
Rawls’s writings present a comprehensive vision as to what he believed to constitute
justice. The heart and soul of Rawls’s theory is justice, and that justice is a matter of
fairness to the individual, to each and every individual in a society. “For Rawls, it is
justice and equal respect for persons that overrides other legitimate values” (Audard,
2007, p. 25). Rawls (1999) concludes A Theory of Justice unapologetically stating:
These remarks bring us back to the common sense conviction, which we noted at
the outset, that justice is the first virtue of social institutions (§1). I have tried to
set forth a theory that enables us to understand and to assess these feelings about
the primacy of justice. Justice as fairness is the outcome; it articulates these
opinions and supports their general tendency (p. 513).
“Justice as Fairness” is not only the title of the opening chapter of A Theory of
Justice but also the title of an entire book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2003).
However, that is not saying justice is fairness, but rather pointing out that justice is an
example of fairness, in particular, fairness of social institutions to the individual (Rawls,
2003, p.3). This is important in that it focuses attention back to the basic civic
institutions, of which education is a significant part. In his opening remarks on his view
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of justice, Rawls (2003) begins with a direct assault on the utilitarian vision of collective
justice:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of
freedom for some is made right by the greater good shared by others. It does not
allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of
advantages enjoyed by many. (p.3)
As previously noted, Rawls envisioned a philosophy that focused on the operation
of the basic social institutions and how they should be arranged to provide the most just
system possible. In doing so, he posited the above two basic principles of A Theory of
Justice; however at the time (1971), he noted these principles were provisional in his
thinking. The caveat of the principles being provisional was still present in the 1990
revision of that book. It was not until after his death that a more complete version of the
two basic principles were published in book form, along with a footnote regarding the
reformulation being a response to criticism of the original.2
The two principles of justice (as noted above) are as follows:
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights
and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in
this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be
guaranteed their fair value.
2

This is important to repeat because while Rawls’s writing is being quoted “chapter and verse” for this
examination of educational policy, his thoughts were always in flux and he never intended his words to be
holy writ. I emphasize this because, even before I began this project I knew there were things in his
writing that not only could I not defend, I wouldn’t try.
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b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society (Rawls, 2005, p. 6).
The First Principle
This first principle can be broken down into two basic parts: (a) everybody has the
same basic liberties, and (b) all of these basic liberties are not of equal value (Freeman,
2007, p 45). This falls in line with the earlier note about high liberalism v. classical
liberalism. Rawls lays out a list of what he considers the most basic of liberties in both A
Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1999a, p.54) and Political Liberalism (Rawls, 2005, p.334-40).
For brevity sake, I will use Pogge’s (2007) summary:


The political liberties: freedom of thought and of political speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of assembly, and the right to vote and hold office.



Liberty of conscience and freedom of association, which between them cover
freedom of religion.



Freedom and integrity of the person, which are incompatible with slavery and
serfdom and which also include freedom from psychological oppression,
physical injury and abuse, as well as freedom of movement and the right to
hold property (not including rights to inheritance, right to hold property in
means of production and production of natural resources; Rawls, 2003, p.
114).
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The rights covered by the rule of law: protection from arbitrary arrest and
seizure, habeas corpus, the right to a speedy trial, due process and unified
procedures conducted according to publicized rules. (pp. 82-83)

These basic rights/liberties can be taken as being narrowly defined, like some
approach the constitution in a strict interpretation, or they can be taken as generalizable
rights/liberties as is done with a loose interpretation of the constitution. Though Rawls
never specifically says which one he intends, Pogge (2007) believes he meant the latter
(pp. 84-86). It should be noted that this list (or scheme) is not particularly unique as it is
strikingly similar to the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights (Graham, 2007, p.51). What
is important to understand is that these rights are inalienable, in that they can never be
taken away, sold or even given away. So there is no right to give up these basic liberties
for any reason (Freeman, 2007, p 51). Not only does this mean one cannot sell oneself as
a indentured servant, one cannot agree to employment that infringes on any of these basic
rights. However, one liberty can be infringed on to ensure another liberty in order to
maintain the “fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties” (Rawls, 2005, p.
5). This is important to note because when using the evaluative instrument I propose for
educational justice, there will be some values that will take lexical priority over others.
The Political Liberties.
Rawls (1999a) devotes §36 of A Theory of Justice to explicate his vision of
political liberties as being both substantive and procedural. It is interesting that he doesn’t
even make an effort to expound on most of these liberties by simply stating, “We may
take for granted that a democratic regime presupposed freedom of speech and assembly,
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and liberty of thought and conscience” (p.197). Like in so many points, he later came
back to expound on these basic rights in later works. Though the nuances of his
discussion go beyond the scope of this study, his discussion of the freedom of speech in
Political Liberalism is noteworthy in that his arguments are explained not in universal
terms but in U.S. case law (Rawls, 2005, pp. 340-362). This brings up both a weakness
and strength of Rawls. He is very clearly focused on the application of his theory in the
United States or countries very much like it. While he is justly criticized for this by those
with a global vision (Costa, 2005; Naticchia, 1998), in this study I do not believe this is
an impediment in my work to create a working evaluative tool for use on educational
policy in the United States. I do, however, put significant limitations of the policy
evaluation interment outside of the U.S.
Rawls (1999a) contends that political liberties are guaranteed by means of
procedural justice. Importantly, the heart of that procedural justice is established by a
written constitution as the manifestation of government’s basis structure (pp. 195-196).
He believed that justice is not possible without a scheme of clearly defined basic rules by
which the entire system of society operates in a predictable manner that treats all similar
cases in similar ways (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 47-50).
He deflects the charge of having an overly rosy picture of democracy’s ability to
protect the liberties of all by freely acknowledging that there will be injustices within a
just scheme (Rawls, 1999a, p. 52). He also recognized that in a just scheme there will be
conflict of opinion as how best to achieve justice (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 196 & 314) and that
to come to a consensus is a messy business when he said, “Essentially the fault lies in the
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fact that the democratic political process is, at best, regulated rivalry” (Rawls, 1999a,
p.199). He further brings up that even if the principle of equal representation for all is
achieved, a highly motivated minority might well override the feelings of the majority
(Rawls, 1999a , p. 202). To all these concerns Rawls returns to the conception of a
society with a shared sense of justice, constrained by a constitution that enumerates
highly specific rights that cannot be impinged upon even by a majority. So in the give
and take of the democratic process there may well be bad policy, but policy that creates
serious injustice will be avoided (Rawls, 1999a, § 37). This is why the proposed
instrument measuring educational policy for justice will need a provision ensuring the
procedural justice for all.
A more serious concern about the ability for the long term maintenance of justice
in a constitutional government is that “the fair value of political liberty” has a tendency to
erode over time. Rawls (1999a) saw this process due in large part to the problematic
tendency for political power and wealth to concentrate (pp. 198-199). His answer to this
is two-fold. On one hand he avoids the question entirely by saying that he is not
proposing a political system, so he need not give an answer (Rawls, 1999a, p. 199;
Rawls, 2005, p. 357), and an only slightly more engaged answer of limits on campaign
spending/public financing of political campaigns (Rawls, 1999a, §37; Rawls, 2005, pp.
357-363). On this lack of clarity in how liberties will be fully maintained Rawls has taken
significant criticism by the likes of Habermas, Pogge and others (Audard, 2007). This
brings up the important point that Rawls believed that even the basic liberties, in this case
the freedom of political speech, can be suppressed in order to guarantee the overall
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“scheme of basic liberties” (i.e. the list from the beginning of this section). In this case
his prioritization of equal and fair value of political participation is central to the scheme
of liberties; this justifies his call to limit political candidates’ spending (Rawls, 1999a, p.
201; Freeman, 2007, pp. 52-53).
It was noted before, and I do so once again, that in considering a Rawlsian
evaluation of educational policy, it must include a serious look at whether the policy
supports or inhibits the fair value of the citizen’s voice, especially when compared to the
structural power of the bureaucratic system. The question will need to be asked: Is the
policy fundamentally democratic in nature and execution?
The Liberties of Personhood.
This heading includes those non-political liberties that constitute an individual’s
personal, civic and economic life: freedom of religion, conscience, assembly, movement
and property, as well as freedom from personal harm or oppression. Indirectly, Rawls
also includes privacy and family life (Freeman, 2007, p 210) in these basic liberties of the
person. Of these, some are more relevant for this study than others, particularly those
dealing with religion, family and property.
Religious liberties.
Rawls puts forth the conception of a pluralistic society that is unified by a
commitment to political liberalism; he calls this overlapping consensus. For Rawls,
religion encompasses more than the strict definition of a formal organized and named
religious group; for him it included general philosophical and moral beliefs as well
(Freeman, 2007, p. 47). So in practice, this liberty includes all comprehensive doctrines
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as well as more narrow ideas that cross into the domain of chosen lifestyle. Freedom of
religion does not equate to freedom from religion. Rawls (2005) at once recognizes the
potential threats of religious contention while at the same time recognizing the fact that
religion (and secular comprehensive doctrines) is part of society (pp. 147-149). His
concept of overlapping consensus, based on acknowledged differences with a framework
of agreement on liberal democracy, is his solution (Rawls, 2005, pp. 150-158).
Like the above limitations on freedom of speech in political advertising, so too the
freedom of religions (and other comprehensive doctrines) is constrained in some cases. In
Justice as Fairness, Rawls (2003) gives the example that a church might excommunicate
members for heresy, but they cannot burn them at the stake (p. 11). Later he goes on to
point out that freedom of association would bar a church from retaliation for a member
leaving as much as it bars the state from retaliating for someone joining a church (Rawls,
2003, p. 164).
Though Audard (2007) thinks that the growth of religious strife in the years since
Rawls penned the essays that became the book Political Liberalism have made the
concept obsolete (p. 226), I would beg to differ. I would propose quite the opposite that
civil engagements between those with different comprehensive doctrines and lifestyles
are more important than ever, and for this task the schools are uniquely suited. The
schools have a unique role to play in developing within young people the communicative
and civic skills that are prerequisites for the kind of inter-communal discourse that Rawls
envisions.
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In addition to the communicative skills, Rawls (1999c) wrote that citizens must
have a mutual knowledge of one another’s comprehensive doctrines to understand the
complexity of the society and to strengthen the commitment to democratic institutions (p.
592).
Made aware of this commitment, government officials and citizens are more
willing to honor the duty of civility, and their following the ideal of public reason
helps foster the kind of society that ideal exemplifies. These benefits of the
mutual knowledge of citizens’ recognizing one another’s reasonable
comprehensive doctrines bring out a positive ground for introducing such
doctrines, which is not merely a defensive ground, as if their intrusion into public
discussion were inevitable in any case. (Rawls, 1999c, p. 593)
With this idea in mind, the assessment I propose for educational policy must include a
look into whether policy promotes the diffusion of knowledge and respect for (though not
belief in) the different comprehensive doctrines that make up society.
Liberties of family life.
“Now I shall assume that basic structure of a well ordered society includes the
family in some form, and therefore that children are at first subject to the legitimate
authority of their parents” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 405). Though distribution of material and
emotional resources is inherently uneven and arguably unjust (Freeman, 2007, p. 97),
Rawls (1999c) put forth the concept that the family is one of the basic structures (p.595)
and envisions that this will not change (Rawls, 1999c, p. 587; Freeman, 2007, p. 98). He
does very specifically note in a democratic society that the form of the family is not of
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interest to the state unless it is clearly shown to harm the raising or education of children
(Rawls, 1999c, p. 587).
Rawls (1999c) prescribes a very limited role of the government within the realm
of child rearing. While proscribing things such as abuse, he spells out that there is no
obligation for the parents to teach the children any political principles, a matter he also
covers under religious freedom (p. 598). Moreover, within the home, children are not
afforded the same political rights as an adult would have outside, i.e. three children can’t
“out vote” the parents. (Rawls, 2003, p.165)
However, despite clear limits on societal interest in parenting, he makes it clear
that the basic principles of justice still apply among the adult members and that there is a
societal obligation to ensure gender equality even within homes (Rawls, 2003, p.11). This
is particularly important when dealing with matters such as divorce and child support that
have historically placed a disproportionately heavy burden on women and children
(Rawls, 2003, p. 166; Rawls, 1999c, pp. 598-601)
I have included this discussion on familial liberties for two reasons. One is to
foreground the later discussion of Rawls’s view of society’s role in reducing inequity
between children from rich and poor homes, in part via publicly funded schools. It also
has a direct impact on evaluation of educational policies that might propose to subvert or
supplant parental authority with that of educational professionals.
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Liberties of property.
To Rawls, the right to own and control property is a basic liberty and a basic
social institution that was a prerequisite for both justice and personal fulfillment
(Freeman, 2007; Pogge, 2007, Audard, 2007). He explained in Political Liberalism:
For example among the basic liberties of the person is the right to hold and to
have the exclusive use of personal property. The role of the liberty is to allow a
sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence and self-respect,
both which are essential for the development and exercise of the moral powers.
(Rawls, 2005, p. 298)
This was not to suggest the laissez-faire economic libertarianism. He advocates a
theory first advocated by economist James Edward Meade in 1964 called property
owning democracy (Pogge, p. 133). This he prefers over the more commonly discussed
democratic socialism, though he believes both meet the criteria he sets forth for a just
society. However, at the outset of Rawls’s “Remarks about Economic Systems” (Rawls,
1999a, §42) he makes it clear that his theory is about justice and morality, not about
economics. And although he speaks of economic systems, he does so in very general
terms. He believed that the choice of one or the other would vary from country to country
based on conditions and traditions (Rawls, 1999a, p. xv). On the other hand he states
clearly that laissez-fair capitalism, welfare-state capitalism and state socialism with
command economy all fail to meet his definition of justice. (Rawls, 2003, pp. 137-138)
He describes a property owning democracy as one with a functioning, but
regulated, market economy where individuals are largely free to acquire wealth over their
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lifetime. However, such created wealth cannot be passed down to the next generation so
that each new generation can begin on a level playing field. This concept of each
generation essentially starting with no capital wealth is part of a larger concept of free
equality of opportunity which will be discussed at length later and is central to this
educational policy analysis. This along with a consumption tax is one of the primary
ways that Rawls proposes to maintain equal value of political liberties (Rawls, 1999a, pp.
242-247).
The aspect of Rawls’s theory regarding a property owning democracy most
relevant to educational policy is the fact that the public good demands a system of laws
that enforce public financing projects for the common good though requiring citizens to
give up their property for the common good: i.e. taxation (Rawls, 1999a, p. 236; Rawls,
1999c, p.127). Taxation for the purpose of common education of children is essential to
the preservation of a just society (Rawls, 2003, p. 157; Pogge, 2007, p. 180). In my
proposal of an evaluative instrument for educational justice, one component will need to
deal with adequate financing to carry out the educational program envisioned.
The Second Principle
For the purposes of creating a tool to measure the justice of educational policy
documents, the first principle is often background; however, it merits examination as part
of the evaluative tool. This part of just policy deals mostly with structures inhabited by
adults; the second principle has more application directly to the children in the
educational process. In its final rendition the second principle reads:

41

Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 2005, p. 6)
One thing that stands out immediately is that Rawls (1999a) explicitly allows for
the fact that different people have different talents and motivations and these different
talents and motivations lead to differences in social status and income (§12). The societal
obligation is to provide educational resources necessary for each individual to reach his
potential. Thus, he reasons, that all people with the same talents and motivation can
achieve the same (Rawls, 1999a, p.63). This is very different than saying that schools
have the obligation to provide all children with equal success in life. Rawls clearly
accepts that economic and social inequalities will exist even in a just society. This is a
revised conception of distributive justice, that societal wealth is justly, but not evenly,
distributed in a cooperative manner (Freeman, 2007, p. 87). It is no surprise that those
from the Marxian tradition would respond very negatively to a proposition that it is
possible to do so in a market economy (Rawls, 2007, pp. 356-357; Miller, 1974) and that
Rawls allows for inequalities under the difference principle.
The Difference Principle.
The difference principle is a critical concept of Rawlsian theory that applies
directly to education. In the evaluative instrument I propose in chapter 3, it is fully 1/3 of
the measurement tool, thus I am obligated to discuss this principle. Though Rawls most
directly addresses this principle in economic terms, its application as a measure of social
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justice goes to the heart of using Rawls as a foundation for educational justice. This is the
second part of the second principle: “they (social institutions) are to be to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 2005, p. 6). The principle
can be most easily understood as an application of the Pareto efficiency (Audard, 2007, p.
148). Vilfredo Pareto’s concept of a moving state of affairs to which at least one person is
better off and no one is worse off (Pareto principle) and the point which the most benefit
is accrued with harm to none is called the Pareto optimum and has been widely used in
welfare economics (Rawls, 1999a, p. 58; The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics,
2009). Rawls (1999a) took this idea and applied it in an active formulation in which he
suggests that not only can this principle be used with economics, but also with social
institutions as a whole (p.61). It is with this in mind he proposed that social and economic
inequalities be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society. Rawls (1999a) explained his concept of the efficiency difference principle:
Thus we can say an arrangement of right and duties in the basic structure is
efficient only if it is impossible to change the rules to redefine the scheme of
rights and duties, so as to raise the expectations of any representative man (at least
one) without at the same time lowering the expectations of some (at least one)
other representative man.” (p.61)
In this rendition of the Pareto optimum Rawls expands the conception from
strictly one of economic concern, such as the justice of merging two companies, to
include the operation of the most basic institutions, such as education. Such institutions
could be as broad as methods of voting to environmental regulations to criminal
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sentencing guidelines. School reform efforts would most certainly need to adhere to this
model.
Though Rawls’s difference principle is the subject of a great deal of writing in
economics, that part is only indirectly related to this study and thus I will not go into the
intricacies of that usage. However, the overarching issue is that public policy, including
educational policy, has a goal of Pareto optimality in that inequities may exist so long as
those inequalities continue to benefit those least well off. So in a Rawlsian justice model,
policies are to be arranged to the disproportionate benefit of the least well off. This is
important in the design of a measurement of justice for educational policy; however, it
must be noted that this principle is subordinate to the principle of fair equality of
opportunity (Freeman, 2007, p. 92).
Fair Equality of Opportunity.
I propose that Rawls has an expansive view of government’s role in education.
His concept of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) is promising for an evaluation of justice
in educational policy. It is important to also note that his call for fair equality of
opportunity is tied to the preceding phrase “positions and offices” which clearly sets a
social and political priority (over economic) in the quest for equality of opportunity
(Rawls, 1999a, §16). This is likely because Rawls (2003) privileges a person’s selfrespect in regard to their occupation and personal fulfillment over income (§17.3). This
simple concept of self-respect and personal fulfillment over earning power will have
significant ramifications when we consider the goals of public educational policy in
Chapter 3.
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Rawls believed the best way to understand his concept of FEO was to contrast it
with what he called formal equality of opportunity as is currently practiced in the U.S. In
formal equality of opportunity the laws provide legal access to all jobs based on ability,
but there is no obligation to ensure natural talents are allowed to develop into ability
(Rawls, 1999a, pp. 62-63; Rawls, 2003, §13.2). Rawls decries the fact that in formal
equality of opportunity, the cumulative effect of unrealized natural talents over time leads
to social injustices that erode equality of liberty. In contrast to this passive approach to
ensuring fairness of opportunity, Rawlsian justice calls for an active societal effort to
ensure all citizens have full opportunity to develop their natural talents which brings the
discussion directly to that of the role of schools (Rawls, 1999c, p. 166).
FEO and schools.
Rawls is very clear that it is a basic societal obligation that each and every child is
provided all the support and resources he seeks in the effort to develop his maximum
potential (Freeman, 2007, p. 94). Rawls does not miss the point that it is not just a
school’s academic curriculum and funding that separates the rich from the poor, but it is
an entire social/cultural milieu. “Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should
not depend upon one’s class position, and so the school system, whether public or
private, should be designed to even out class barriers” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 63). Rawls goes
on to specify that in funding education the end is not maximum production (i.e.
achievement) but maximum personal value and social life. Thus there is no justification
in denying educational opportunity just because it does not show economic value (Rawls,
1999a, p 92). Freeman (2007, p. 93) writes that Rawls envisioned a society where there
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was disproportional spending on those from impoverished backgrounds and/or of low
talent; however, Rawls does note that there is reasonable concern about overly
prioritizing resources for maximizing the least talented for their personal fulfillment over
investing in the potential of the most talented in order to adhere to the basic principle of
benefiting the least advantaged (Rawls, 2003, p. 163n). I don’t think this footnote in
Justice as Fairness indicates a retreat on prioritizing the individual over the group, but I
think it is his acknowledgement of the difficulty in knowing where to draw the line in
resource allocation (Freeman, 2007, p.95).
In this consideration of resource allocation, Rawls’s phrase “the school system
whether public or private” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 63) should not be missed. In this quote he
shows he is indifferent as to whether this mandate is carried out by public or private
purveyors. Thus, the reader will notice that I entirely avoid the current controversies of
charter schools and privatization.
FEO and the home.
This brings the discussion back to the issue of families. Rawls (1999a) pointed out
that the entire structure of society built on families will create some inequity (pp. 64 &
265) and although some have concluded that the only way to level this playing field is to
eliminate the entire institution of family (Freeman, 2007, p. 97), Rawls does not do so.
Though Rawls acknowledges the utilitarian appeal of this call, he rejects it on both the
grounds that it would not only be psychologically devastating to children but also that it
would be an abrogation of the freedom of association (Rawls, 1999a, p.64; Freeman,
2007, p. 97).
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Rawls was aware that home environments have significant positive and negative
impacts on children, particularly young children. Related to that is the idea that different
cultural groups value education differently and this in turn may well impact how willing a
young person is to forgo the independence of a career and stay in advanced training. In
more well-to-do families, education tends to be far more important, as it is in some
cultural groups (Freeman, 2007, p. 97-98; Pogge, 2007, p. 123). It is due to these types of
“extra-curricular” inequities that Rawlsian educational justice expands far beyond the 3R’s and into the area of cultural knowledge.
If citizens of a well ordered society are to recognize one another as free and equal,
basic institutions must educate them to the conception of themselves as well as
publicly exhibit and encourage this ideal of political justice. . . . Acquaintances
with and participation in that public culture is one way citizens learn to conceive of
themselves as free and equal . . . (Rawls, 2003, p. 56)
What is of primary importance in my creation of an evaluative instrument for
educational policy based on FEO is the public obligation to ensure that all the assets are
available to prepare every child with the values and skills necessary to take his
meaningful place in society.
FEO and outcomes.
One other important concept of justice that must be noted when considering
Rawlsian philosophy as a benchmark for publicly funded educational systems is that he
makes it clear that even when the FEO principle is perfectly executed, it does not equate to
equal educational outcomes or to equal economic success (Freeman, 2007, p. 93). He
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acknowledges the arbitrary way that talents, circumstance and even luck are given out in
nature’s lottery. Rawls (1999a) does not try to eliminate this natural injustice, but rather
seeks to create systems to mitigate its effect (p.88). He clearly recognizes both the limits of
individual abilities and in motivation; therefore there will inevitably be a division in
earning power as related to the overall value to society (Rawls, 1992, pp. 62-63). To further
mitigate this natural inequity Rawls proposes the difference principle, which I discussed in
previously.
Rawls predicates this financial inequity on the assumption that basic needs and
health care are ensured (Rawls, 2003, §51) to all. As always, he frames the question
‘what are primary goods’ to show how it impacts the person as a social and political
being:
While the list of primary goods rest in part on the general facts and requirements
of social life, it does so only together with a political conception of the person as
free and equal, endowed with the moral powers and capable of being a fully
cooperating member of society. This normative conception is necessary to
identify the appropriate list of primary goods. (Rawls, 2003, p. 58)
Because of this, not only will there be financial inequality, but that inequality
might be perpetuated over generations even in a society with FEO (Freeman, 2007, p. 9798). For this approach Rawls had received significant criticism from both libertarians like
Nozick and utilitarians such as Sandel (Pogge, 2007, pp. 182-183); however, since he
privileges individual freedom over particular outcomes, he presents those remaining
inequities as unfortunate, but not unjust (Rawls, 2003, § 21).
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Now one might wonder how Rawls presents a view of justice that is so
economically inequitable, but it is important to focus on one important concept: the goal
of Rawls’s conception of justice is not economic ends but equal political personhood and
self-respect. Further he sees even equal political personhood as a means to the “most
important primary good that is self-respect” (Rawls, 1999a, p.386). To Rawls, selfrespect has three primary components: (a) a person’s sense of self-value and his
conviction that one’s own plan for a meaningful life can be carried through, (b) a
confidence in one’s own abilities to carry through with that plan, (c) a belief that others
give esteem to one’s deeds (Rawls, 1999a, p. 386). Rawls calls upon the Aristotelian
principle of best use to explain that it is only by the development of one’s talents to their
fullest that a person can achieve full personal satisfaction; however, that implies also that
those with the most talent will require the most effort to train and perfect those talents. It
is via this Aristotelian justice that those who have the most invested in their talents
should justly receive the most reward (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 375-377). This provides the
rational basis for inequitable distribution (in addition to the traditional efficiency
argument).
To make this all happen in a just manner he presents the concept of the difference
principle that ensures that each generation begins their adult life with equality of
opportunity as well as equality of financial resources and that over the course of their
lives the least well off shall have more than in any other practical scheme (to be
explicated in the next section).
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As applied to educational policy, the FEO concept sets a significant task for
publicly funded schools that makes social and cultural equality a higher priority than
even academic parody, because all citizens are expected to be social and political but not
all citizens are expected to be engineers or academics. The priority for every student must
be centered on not simply maximizing the student’s cognitive potential but maximizing
his autonomy and appreciation for the worth of his own achievements. In the evaluative
instrument, this value must be included.
FEO and group justice.
Rawls’s vision for justice for the individual rejects group identity as a means for
justice and focuses on the individual (Rawls, 2003, p. 59n; Freeman, 2007, p. 91). He
explicitly rejects any group identity other than one of financial need:
Note here that in the simplest forms of the difference principle the individuals
who belong to the least advantaged group are not identifiable apart from, or
independently of, their income and wealth. The least advantaged are never
identifiable as men or women, say, or as white or blacks, or Indians or British.
They are not individuals identified by natural or other features (race, gender,
nationality, and the like) that enable us to compare their situation under all the
various schemes of social cooperation it is feasible to consider. (Rawls, 2003, p.
59n)
Rawls’s approach, as seen earlier, comes from the liberal tradition founded in
Locke, rather than the more recent concepts of social justice that emphasize the primacy
of the individual. Curren (2006) describes the first key element of liberalism as “a
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principle of respect for free and equal citizenship, generally associated with the idea the
individuals are bearers of rights and are the sole proper objects of fundamental moral
concern (ethical individualism),” (p. 457) primarily from the critical theory tradition
founded in Hegel and Marx (Crotty, 1998, p. 112). Rawlsian justice is primarily about
creating fairness in the social contract and well-ordered society governed by rules
followed by the populace. This is contrasted with the critical theory social justice that is
primarily about how the use of power among groups is used to oppress one another
(Carspecken, 1996, p. 4) or as Boyd (2011) perceives it to be about primacy of group
identity and the asymmetrical power between groups.
Rawls does not give special attention to issues of race or gender despite their
significant place in debates about justice. The reason for this is that those are just two of a
pantheon of ways by which justice could be denied (Pogge, 2007, p. 124).
Rather, the worst off under any scheme of cooperation are simply the individuals
who are worst off under that particular scheme. They may not be those worst off
in another. Even supposing, for example, that it turns out, as commonsense
Justice as Fairness political sociology might suggest, that the least advantaged,
identified by income and wealth, include many individuals born into the leastfavored social class of origin, and many of the least (naturally) endowed are those
who experience more bad luck and misfortune (§16). Nevertheless, those
attributes do not define the least advantaged. Rather, it happens that there may be
a tendency for such features to characterize many who belong to that group.
(Rawls, 2003, p. 59n)

51

This is not to suggest that he did not recognize that there are historic biases, but
he expects in a FEO society that those biases will diminish. It is interesting that two of his
personal friends, Pogge and Freeman, independently wrote biographies of him. Both state
clearly (in nearly identical words) that Rawls did support affirmative action type
programs as long as they were temporary; yet, neither cited any reference for their
assertions (Pogge, 2007, p. 121; Freeman, 2007, p. 91). I can only conjecture that this
was a topic they had all discussed.
The Veil of Ignorance.
Of all of the concepts that Rawls presents, the one that shows up in the books of
philosophy that I have encountered the most is the concept of the veil of ignorance, or as
Rawls calls it the original position. He saw this “thought experiment” to be directly in the
tradition of Kant, Locke & Rousseau as they presented their social contract ideas (Rawls,
1999a, p. 10; Freeman, 2007, p. 142), and in turn, I might find assistance in creating a
mental framework for conceptualizing a tool for educational policy evaluation.
This concept set forth in §3 of A Theory of Justice is at once a simple mental
exercise and, at the same time, meant to be a genuine abstraction of the social contract
theory. Via the use of the original position, members of a society can help determine how
best to allocate the resources and to ensure rights and liberty as well as to provide the
foundations for self-respect (Rawls, 1999a, p. 54; Audard, 2005, p. 123).
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like. I
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shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or
the special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind
a veil of ignorance. This ensures that none is advantaged or disadvantaged in the
choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social
circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principle to favor his particular condition, the principle of justice is the result of a
fair agreement or bargain. (Rawls, 1999a, p. 11)
In this little exercise Rawls (1999a) is attempting to get at a vision of justice that
is fair to all, and he supposes rational people will generally come up with the same type
of scheme (pp. 12-13). This goes to the heart of the concept of a social contract that
benefits all concerned (Pogge, 2007, pp. 62-63). This being said, Rawls also agrees that
different answers could be generated based on different assumptions about how best to
achieve that Pareto optimum which will provide the best outcome for all (Lehning, 2006,
pp. 32-33). This exercise allows a construct on which the reader might place all the parts
of Rawlsian philosophy mentioned previously so as to produce a unified whole.
In this dissertation proposal, I propose by use of a rubric to assist the user of the
instrument to step behind that veil of ignorance in judging the justice of the policies being
considered. I shall seek to do this by providing a format that is designed to limit the
subjectivity in what is clearly a highly value laden field by narrowing the context of the
questions addressed in much the same way Rawls proposes.
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Conclusion to the Use of Rawls
Rawls’s writings have been shown to provide a strong theoretical foundation that
fits neatly into the philosophical needs of this study on the justice of the policies that
govern public education in the United States. Despite the resistance to Rawls’s
philosophical approach in Europe, his work is well contextualized in the United States
(Audard, 2005) and provides a comprehensive theoretical underpinning for my project.
Although the first principle of his theory, that of basic liberties, plays in the adult world
and provides the background for the parts that directly impact children in schools, the
second principle cuts right to the core purpose of public schools in just society. No
utilitarian argument for efficiency or professionalization, at the expense of citizen access
to the levers of power in their schools, can be justified. With this Kantian deontological
approach foundation, the evaluative instrument I will propose will by nature appear to be
full of just “demands” in the actual policy wording as opposed to the policy intents.
Education and Justice
The perennial question of ‘what is justice’ is ubiquitous. While this study will
take a smaller piece of this question, I feel it is important to first address how others have
attempted to answer the larger question. It is a good question that will be addressed later
in this project; however, at this point, it is important to give a more complete analysis to
consider what others have conceived of as justice in education. By definition this is an
entire field of study and I do not pretend to address any of these ideas to the extent I
addressed Rawls; however, the principle concepts will be recognized. In the literature on
educational policy studies there are two philosophical approaches to the consideration of
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the justice of a publicly funded education system: justice defined as intragroup equity and
justice the quality or adequacy of preparing young people for work (Coombs, 1994, p.
598).
This big question is related to two fundamentals question of justice: what is
justice and to whom is the justice applied? Previously, I established that justice for this
project is defined by Rawls’s principle of fairness, and in particular educational justice
defined by his term fair equality of opportunity. Regarding who is the target of
educational justice has not been made clear yet. Coombs (1994) presented that theorists
have proposed two basic approaches: justice for individual students, or justice to the
collective society as a whole. Either of these approaches could be further deconstructed to
focus on the justice achieved for specific subsets of students or subsets of society. And to
further complicate the issue individuals and groups have different interests and selfperceived needs (Bull, 2008). Thus, what seems at first blush to be a simple question of
either/or becomes fragmented into many possibilities that must be resolved to produce a
measuring tool for educational justice.
In this review of the literature I will be focusing on two conceptions of
educational justice underpinned by two very different visions of justice.3 One group
focuses on the relative status between groups as the primary focus of justice in education.
The other is not concerned about the internal workings of education so long as the net
3

Oddly I have found an incongruity in the surface epistemologies of the how these two visions on justice
is defined and how they are commonly critiqued. The positivistic method of determining injustice by
mathematical comparisons between groups is largely critiqued by constructivists and the constructivist
conception of the most good for the most people is critiqued by positivists. This runs counter to the texts
on policy analysis where the positivists advocate using constructivism and eschew statistical analysis
(Fischer, 2003; Stone, 2002), while the mainstream texts on policy analysis promote a positivist view and
rely primarily on numerical data (Dunn, 2012; Weimer & Vining, 2011) .
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result is good for the society as a whole; in particular, the good result of an educational
system is measured by economic success.
Therefore, in exploring the literature on educational justice I will first take a look
at the current state of justice in education from both the position of unequal educational
outcomes for subgroups and consider the positions of those who promote a sense of
justice that focus only on net “good” to society.
Justice as Equity: The Need for Equality between Groups
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954).
Chief Justice Warren could not have been clearer that justice demands that education be
provided to all children on “equal terms”. What does it mean to be equal? Equality can
be explained simply in mathematical terms; equality is two things being the same. If we
were measuring for the even consistency of a batch of concrete, one could sample from
anywhere in the tub and come out with roughly the same number of rocks per pound no
matter where you draw your sample. Statistical educational equality is just that simple. If
you sample groups of students from any school in the nation, a perfectly equal system
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would yield the same set of skills no matter how those skills are measured. But children
are not concrete, and the nation’s schools and children are not a single bucket of concrete.
However, this simple methodology is the basis for the U.S. Department of Education’s
measure of educational equality (Aud, Hussar, Kena, & Roth, 2012). “Behavioral
scientists use statistics to explain the results of research studies and to provide empirical
evidence to support or refute theories” (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003, p. 2), and this
will be the prime measure of inequality in this section.
I recognize that some will object to this simple numerically based answer.
Espinoza (2007) contends that although equity and equality are most often used
interchangeably, he believes when addressed through a critical theorist’s lens, equity and
equality should not be seen as the same. And Stone (2002), writing of the use of
numerical data, states, “If numbers are thus artifacts of political life, and if they are in
themselves metaphors, symbols and stories, are they ‘real’ in any sense? Numbers are
always descriptors of the world, and as descriptors they are no more real than the visions
of poems or paintings” (Stone, 2002, p.163). However, for this project I shall not be
taking this type of constructivist approach4; I shall be using numbers as real things, with
their value and reliability measured by stated statistical methods.
Thus I will begin by presenting three areas in which there are evident patterns of
inequities of educational outcomes currently in the U.S.: income/class, race, and sex.

4

One should not confuse Kantian constructivism which is limited to the construction of morals with the
larger type of constructivism in postmodernism/post-empiricism (Kaufman, 2006)
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Inequality Based on Income.
There is an endemic problem with poverty in the United Sates. This problem has
direct and massive impacts on educational outcomes. Thus, in any review of the literature
on educational outcome, equality must delve into some issues of poverty, class and
education. However since “most Americans are, in fact, relatively blind to class, having
faith in the upward mobility implicit in a supposedly classless society” (Sacks, 2007, p.
289), it is important to discuss both poverty as a variable issue in children’s lives and
class as a more stable one.
Census figures on poverty rates are derived on an annual basis, meaning it
represents total income over a full year including periods of unemployment. However, in
a discussion of poverty, it needs to be noted that the poor show a more problematic
pattern of employment that might hide “spells” of poverty in a family group that is not
listed in this overall poverty rate (Card & Blank, 2008). Though relatively few children
live in poverty their entire lives as poverty tends to come in “spells” of months or a few
years where the family moves into poverty and out of poverty (Card & Blank, 2008), the
timing of that poverty spell and its duration have lasting impacts on the children, and the
impact on young children is the most significant (Chaikind & Decision, 1985; Mistry, et
al., 2010). The impact of childhood poverty on preschool aged children has been found to
be related to both reduced verbal skills and measured IQ for children that persist into later
childhood (Hart & Risley, 1992; Hart & Risley, 2003). New research in brain
development reveals a biological component to this phenomenon. A recent neural science
study has found “SES accounts for individual variation in the size of discrete brain
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regions that are critical for language, memory and social emotional processing” (Noble,
Houston, Kan, & Sowell, 2012, p. 524). “The research literature on poverty and child
development is saturated with studies that document the native effects of poverty on
children. The overwhelming consensus is that poverty is a consistent risk factor across
multiple domains of development” (Hardaway & McLoyd, 2009). Rawls (1999b) was
referring to this group when he wrote of the “least fortunate” (p. 83), and he firmly
believed that the state has an obligation to organize social institutions (like schools) to
most benefit this least fortunate group. Another way of discussing the long term poor is
via the concept of class.
The tangible result of this and a testament to the failure of current policy to
address these developmental issues impacted by poverty can be seen in a clear disparity
in performance outcomes based on poverty. On the 2011 National Assessment for
Educational Progress (NAEP) in reading, 62% of children eligible for free lunch scored at
or above the basic level, 74% of children eligible for reduced lunch scored basic or
above, while 86% of those on paid lunch scored the same level. This pattern is true for
both 4th grade and 12th grades, though all scores fall by the final year of testing (National
Center for Education Statistics, 2011). This pattern of progressively lower levels of
achievement as the income level declines holds true for all the domains tested by the
NAEP. The NAEP also recorded parental education level, particularly that of the child’s
mother, showing a strong correspondence with the student scores. Only 59% of children
with neither parent a high school graduate made the basic level, while 89% of children
with both parents completing college met that standard.
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This would lend support to the social capital theory of student achievement and
leads to a strong case for social justice to demand, as Rawls would suggest,
disproportionate investment in these least advantaged children in order to achieve fair
equality of opportunity. The social capital theory contends that social class is about social
standing, for children that means the social standing of their parents. Income, particularly
in times of recession may come and go, but status is tied to past educational achievement
at amassed wealth (even relative middle class wealth) which leads to what Hanifan first
called cultural capital in 1916. By social capital he referred to informally learned ways of
interaction that make up a community (Anderson, 2003; Rodríguez-Sedano, Aguilera, &
Costa-Paris, 2009). Bourdieu blended this concept with a Marxian approach to present
cultural capital in a darker, oppressive form. Bourdieu made the leap to link cultural
capital with Marx’s concept of material capital so as to make a Marxian vision where
nearly all interaction and achievement can be seen as human capital (Aguilar & Sen,
2009). For Bourdieu it was not an either/or question, monetary capital or social capital,
but rather he suggested that all capital is fungible, i.e. converted from one form to
another. Thus monetary capital and social capital are interchangeable (Allen, 2011;
Portes, 2000). For Bourdieu it was natural that that fungible capital was used to maintain
hegemony over the rest of society, because, “for Marx, human history is the history of
class struggle” (Allen, 2011, p. 53).
In this conceptualization, children from privileged families learn the unwritten
rules of accessing the leveler of power that translates into a structure that passes from one
generation to the next. Sacks brings this concept to the grass roots level when he points
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out that the well-educated parents in the U.S. possess the foundational knowledge that
their children’s educational experiences translate to better colleges and better jobs, which
is not something readily apparent to low income parents. He further points out that these
same parents know how to press the schools to do what benefits their own children,
pointing out that even if the low income parents know what their children need, they lack
the knowledge as to how to get it (Sacks, 2007).
Though the Marxian interpretation focuses social capital as a tool of oppression,
others maintain not only that social capital can be benign, but it is essential to
communitarian action and societal cohesion (Rodríguez-Sedano et al., 2009). I found the
most reasonable approach that of the middle-ground position taken by Johnson (2006),
when she presented an understanding of both the clear fact that the cultural capital of
well-educated parents led to advantages for their children that lead to an unintended side
effect of putting children of the poor at a relative disadvantage. This position would seem
to be consistent with Rawls’s acknowledgement that familial background has inherent
inequality (Rawls, 1999a, p. 265).
In considering the justice of educational policy the looming and pervasive
inequality in the schools themselves must be considered (Hochschild & Scovronick,
2003; Darling-Hammond, 2010). This is not a new phenomenon; issues of school funding
inequity have been in discussion since Cubberly (1934) wrote of them before World War
II (p. 734). School success on the NAEP varies both regionally and based on population
density (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011). Many authors have documented
unequal distribution of educational resources that negatively impact children’s progress
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(Kozol, 1991; Darling-Hammond, 2010). It must be noted that courts are addressing these
inequalities (Verstegen et. al., 2006; Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). Like the problem
itself, the legal fight to change the inequalities goes back a century (Cubberly, 1934, p.
732). Kozel’s influence books (1991; 2005; 2006) on school inequities were predated by
Wise in the seminal work Rich Schools, Poor Schools (1967), by two and a half decades,
but covered the same issues (if less colorfully).
Thus, a very strong case can be made for the fact that there is a long term pattern
of inequality based on parental income in the educational system of the U.S. This
inequality manifests itself in significantly different educational results for children of
different income groups.
Inequity and Race.
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s declaration in the Brown v. Board of Education
opinion (above) was written about race, but more specifically about the necessity of
educational equality between those of European decent and those of African descent.
Today, however, the discussion of race includes far more than the simplistic construct of
black verses white. Educational racial equity is now much more complex. The 2011
NAEP allows for six distinct racial choices: white, black, Hispanic, Asian American,
Indian/Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander and two or more races.
Issues of unjust treatment are raised not just for those groups with disproportionally low
achievement, but also for those in those groups perceived as achieving above the norm
such as Jewish and Asian students (Diebels & Czopp, 2011; Marcus, 2007; Spring,
1997); however, general issues of racially motivated behaviors are beyond the scope of
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this study and the focus will be on groups with statistically significant underachievement.
This section is particularly concerned with aggregate differences in performance,
particularly of those groupings identified by the Center for Educational Statistics.
It is not difficult to present a case that there is a massive disparity between the
academic performance of African-American children and European-Americans, and that
disparity has been persistent (Aud & Hannes, 2010; Darling-Hammond, 2010).
In 2009, the average reading score of Black 4th grade students was less than that
of White 4th grade students by 26 points: this gap was not measurably different
than the gap in 2007, but it was smaller than the gaps in all other assessment years
prior to 2007. The reading achievement gap between Hispanic and White 4th
grade students in 2009 (-26 points) was not measurably different from the gaps in
2007 or 1992. Scores of White, Black and Hispanic 8th-grade students have all
increased from 1992, yet neither the 2009 reading achievement gap between
Black and White 8th grade students (-24 points) was measurably different from the
corresponding gaps in 2007 and 1992. (Aud et al., 2011, p. 44)
The prior discussion of the detrimental impact of poverty on childhood inequity shows
the nexus between the above report and the fact that in 2011 the poverty rate among
African-American and Latino children was 27.6% and 25.3% (respectively) while the
poverty rate among white children was 10.9% (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2012, p. 13). The
issue of race can be seen independently, or more powerfully, as a multiplier when
combined with the issue of income. Continuing to use the 2011 NAEP 8th grade reading
scores, 53% of African-Americans who received free lunches scored at or above the basic
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level; however, of those children not in the program, i.e. higher income, 72% were at that
level. Similarly, for Hispanic children the rates were 57% to 75% and for Native
American children the span rises to 50% to 76% (National Center for Education
Statistics, 2011). As a consequence, those considering the issue of justice in education
would be well served to keep in mind the intersection of race and poverty.
High School graduation has been expected for public education for nearly a
century in the U.S. (Spring, 2001). However, universal high school graduation has never
been achieved, and until well past mid-century high school graduation was not seriously
considered necessary for minority children (Spring, 2001). Illustrative of the disinterests
in minority education, even among respected educators, Cubberley’s 1934 history of
public education in the U.S. gives just a page and a half to “negro education” and none at
all to Latino education (Cubberley, 1934). It is axiomatic that equity in educational
outcomes is difficult in a societal milieu with such massive and patterned disparities in
income. As a result, the high school graduation rate is an important measure of the
success in both reflecting the performance of the overall educational system over the past
generation of students, and for predicting the future prospects of equity in the educational
system for the next generation, or lack thereof.
Measuring this outcome is difficult since, for instance, the “official dropout rate”
is modified heavily in ways that hides the actual success of students in school (Swanson,
2008). A new measure, comparing the students who finish 8th grade to the diplomas
granted paints a more realistic and grim picture for the U.S. school’s success with
African-American children (Stillwell et al., 2011). There was a 24.5% decline in the
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students (of all races) who began high school compared to those who finished (compared
to the official 4.2% dropout rate). For white students the decline was 18%, the decline for
African-American students was 36.5%, for Latinos it was 34.1%, and for Asian/Pacific
Islanders it was 8.2%. It might be fair to say that a system that loses even the 25% has a
serious problem in completing its assigned mission; however, the pattern of racial
disparity leading to more than a third of minorities who fail to complete the course of
studies indicates systemic inequity problems (Stillwell et al., 2011). This suggests that the
Rawlsian concept to every young person starting their adult life with a fair equal
opportunity to choose their life path based on their own desires and abilities is far from a
reality in the U.S. today. Further, the 18% non-completion rate for whites suggests a
systemic problem that is exacerbated by the racial patterns of poverty and low
performance.
It would be difficult to square this level of systematic pattern of unequal
performance with the ideals proposed by Rawls. Though he does not ever claim to
promote equal outcomes among all people (Rawls, 1999a, p64), because there are so
many factors, he calls it a “natural lottery”. Rawls’s vision of justice is deontological not
teleological (Audard, 2007, p. 21), thus his focus would be the circumstances that led to
the unequal results between racial groups, not the results themselves5.

5

Though Rawls never wrote about affirmative action, it should be noted that is protégé, Freeman, did
write that Rawls said in unrecorded lectures that preferential treatment to remedy past injustices might
be permissible on a temporary basis (Freeman, 2007, p. 90-91)
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Inequity and Sex.
Sex and biological sex differences in behavior and learning continue to be a point
of debate in the academic community. Some researcher believe that girls have specific
abilities that make them more prone to academic success in both language and arithmetic
(Wei et al., 2012), while others cite boys’ special superiority (Ganley & Vasilyeva,
2011), and others still say there is no overall biological advantage to girls or boys, even
while acknowledging girls have a pattern of significantly outperforming boys (Calvin et
al., 2010). The answer to why girls outperform boys has been proposed to lie not in
cognitive functioning, but in behavioral and emotional functioning (Hicks et al., 2008;
Legewie & DiPrete, 2012).
Though the reasons are under debate, the results are consistent across the
industrialized world: there is a meaningful sex gap in education (Legewie & DiPrete,
2012). Returning to the NAEP reading, boys progressively lose ground to girls moving
from a 6 point gap in the percentage of boys at basic level in 4th grade to an 11 point gap
at 12th grade (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011). It might be argued by some
that this difference is not significant; however, if viewed as a multiplier with income and
race, the sex difference takes on a much more serious tone.
Table 1 was generated using the 2011 NAEP reading data set. The cumulative
effect of race, income and sex leaves low income African-American males less than half
as likely to score at the basic level that European-American, middle income females.
Even when race is entirely removed, 45% of low income African-American males score
basic, while 78% of middle-income females of the same race do so, a 32-point gap. This

66

highly significant gap is consistent for other racial groups as well. German researchers
have theorized that boys lag behind due to behavior control issues and that those issues
are magnified in low income homes (Legewie & DiPrete, 2012).
Table 1: Sex-Race-Income Matrix
Sex
Male

Female

Race
White
A/A
Latino
White
A/A
Latino

Paid
86%
67%
70%
93%
78%
79%

Reduced
75%
59%
66%
84%
71%
75%

Free
68%
45%
53%
79%
60%
61%

These differences in educational attainment by sex have not been confined to the
K-12 arena. Female attainment is now greater than male attainment at each education
level. For example, in 1980, the percentages of males and females who had completed at
least high school or equivalency were not measurably different for males (85 percent) and
females (86 percent), but in 2011, the percentage of females (91 percent) was higher than
the percentage of males (87 percent) by 4 percentage points. That same year 21% of
females had attained at least a bachelor's degree, 3 points lower than the percentage of
males (24 percent); however, in 2011 36% of females held bachelor's degrees, while only
28% of males (Aud et al., 2012). The U.S. Department of Education predicts this trend in
post-secondary education will continue at least until 2020, and the gap between men and
women will widen (Hussar & Bailey, 2012).
The patterns of inequality act to highlight the current problems of fair distribution
of opportunity. Like race, sex difference should be seen as a multiplier of underlying
issues of poverty. Rawlsian justice would demand that this pattern lead to extra vigilance
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to low-income boys in general and low income African-American boys in particular. At
the same time it should be a warning about the potential injustice using race or sex as the
determinate of resource allocation.
Conclusion about Equity as a Measure of Justice.
When considering the concept of educational justice, the use of statistical data is a
useful tool in uncovering injustice via group-to-group comparisons. Using Rawls’s
lottery analogy, one could say that a pattern of lottery winners favoring (or disfavoring) a
particular group would indicate the lottery procedures are unjustly rigged, so would a
pattern’s academic success; thus, the corrective action would be fixing the procedures not
the results. From a Rawlsian standpoint it helps the policy maker identify where
interventions are necessary in order to strive toward that goal of fair equality of
opportunity. This short introduction, for instance, would indicate that Rawlsian justice
would require that significant resources should be invested in interventions or to what has
heretofore been treated as the beginnings of state educational obligations, i.e. preschool.
Additionally, Rawlsian justice would also focus more resources on both
compensating for a lack of social capital and in developing the cultural, social, and
political competencies of those children coming from segments of society that
historically have not had adequate access. I have not specifically addressed children with
disabilities because the same principle of providing disproportionate resources to achieve
fair equality of opportunity would apply. Finally, there would certainly need to be
patterns in resource distributions that reflect the patterns of inequality which would
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disproportionately favor certain racial/ethnic groups; however, this is not the same as
providing resources because children are of a certain group.
In conclusion, though differential results based on groups are useful in seeing
problematic patterns of inputs, it is not a sufficiently comprehensive vision of justice.
Under a Rawlsian conception of justice, there could be perfect equity in results in an
unjust education system. The choice here is not between whether or not to use inequality
between groups as an indicator of injustice, but whether or not to use equality between
groups as the measure of justice.
Justice as Adequacy: The Needs of Society for Education
No doubt it is true the good is the same for the individual as for the state; but still
the good of the state is manifestly a greater and more perfect object to ascertain
and to secure. To produce the good of only a single individual is better than
nothing; but to affect the good of a nation or a state is a nobler and more divine
achievement. (Aristotle, trans. 1947, p. 331)
Aristotelian ethics revolved around the cultivation of virtue as a productive
member of the state. Justice in this sense is how well the individual helps the collective
good. The conception of equity never enters into his conception of justice; it is not only
assumed there is a highly stratified class system, but that the lower classes were to be
servile to labor for the needs of those with more capacity. Education is focused on
helping each individual to fill his role in society in the most complete manner possible
(Aristotle, trans. 1947).
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This utilitarian vision of the individual as a means to the end of the good of the
state may not be so explicitly stated by modern writers, but the underlying belief that the
good of the many is paramount remains. The highly influential Committee for Economic
Development (CED) that represents the leaders from the largest U.S. corporations and
universities6 has produced a series of reports that detail solutions to problems in U.S.
education. In each the justification is the communal good, particularly communal
economic good (CED Research and Policy Committee, 2001; CED Research and Policy
Committee, 2002; CED Research and Policy Committee, 2006). Typical of this is the
justification for preschool education as an investment for future economic growth (CED
Research and Policy Committee, 2006). This reflects a view of economic utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism is traced back to Jeremy Bentham in the early 17th century. He
firmly rejected the notion of natural human rights as put forth by Locke. Instead he
proposed that right is determined by what will bring the most happiness (Sandel, 2009).
John Stewart Mill (1879) built on Bentham’s ideas and said:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure, and absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the
privation of pleasure. (p. 9)
6

2012 CED leadership include: President, Roger Ferguson, Jr., President and CEO of TIAA-CREF; Paul
Allaire, Chairman (Retired), Xerox Corp.; Derek Bock, President Emeritus Harvard University; Lee
Bollinger, President Columbia University; Carl Camden, President & CEO, Kelly Services Inc.; John DeGioia,
President, Georgetown University; Mark Green, CEO, FICO; T. Allen, McArtor, Executive Vice-President,
Wells Fargo; Chairman, Airbus of North America; Edward Rust, Chairman & CEO, State Farm Insurance
Companies; John Sexoton, President, New York University; James Thompson, President & CEO, RAND
Corp. (retired); Fredrick Smith, Chairman & CEO, FedEx Corp. (list not inclusive)
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He went on to explain that utilitarian justice is entirely conceived in terms of good for the
whole. Claims of individual rights are of secondary consideration to the collective good
(Mill, 1879, pp. 56-57). Mill’s writing focused on the goal of general happiness;
however, over time other theorists clarified that utilitarianism has developed to economic
consequentialism (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 135) ; “Economic utilitarianism replaces
happiness as the central concept by the extent to which individuals get what they choose
(or would choose, if they had a choice). It is thus able to develop a precise and
sophisticated theory based on real and hypothetical choices and to allocate monetary
values to outcomes; it generates such political and administrative applications as cost‐
benefit analysis” (McLean & McMillian, 2012, ¶ 3). In modern policy usage
utilitarianism is expressed as cost benefit analysis (Weimer & Vining, 2011), which
drives much of modern public policy analysis (Dunn, 2012).
With this belief in the long term good to justify short term expense and a concern
for the large scale economic wellbeing of the society, one can see how the CED was able
in 2006 to make a strongly worded recommendation that the Federal Government greatly
expand federal funding of preschools. They write that “investing in the education of
America’s youngest learners has emerged as one of the most promising ways to help
strengthen the future economic growth and fiscal position of our states and nation” (CED
Research and Policy Committee, 2006, p.1). The report goes on to cite the same kinds of
things that were mentioned earlier in this literature review about the negative cognitive
effects of poverty on young children. Thus it is in the best interest of all to spend a great
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deal of money now even though the payoff won’t be for thirty or forty years in the future
in a wealthy society for all.
This approach is not new in U.S. education. By 1918, “the goal of education was
to serve society as efficiently as possible. Led by such as Thorndike who advocated the
nation move to a ‘new education based on utility’ . . .” (Ravitch, 2000, p. 89). Thorndike
and his colleagues, many in the progressive movement, presented a vision of educational
justice that prepared each child to the maximum of their inherited ability and believed
that ability should be determined early so that the children could be taught in
homogenous ability groups (Ravitch, 2000). This concept was seen as efficient for
society, a linkage from the schools to the workplace. In 1918, the NEA recommended
that as part of the new junior high schools, children should be “divided into differentiated
curricula based on vocations” with specific programs for those who should continue in
academic studies (Ravitch, 2000, p. 125). The belief was that social justice was served by
not wasting money and effort on those who were unlikely to profit from academic
schooling, and industry would benefit from a technical workforce (Cremin, 1961, pp.
188-190; Ravitch, 2000, pp. 100-101). Cubberly (1934) wrote, “The vocational high
school is the most effective agency so far devised for the training of that 70 percent of all
our children who cannot or will not continue in the regular courses of high school” (p.
647). Accompanying this quote was a graph showing the industrial production for
“trained” verses untrained.
The utilitarian linkage from schools to industry is a long one in philosophy as well
as in methods. This approach is not unique to the U.S. The German system of educational
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linkage to industry begins with their secondary school track separation at age 10 and has
been called “the sorting machine” (Schneider & Tieben, 2011). The CED specifically
cited the success of the German program when calling for a similar, though less rigid,
system for the U.S. (CED, 1998).
Though specific methodologies of education are outside the scope of this project,
it is useful to know that the method mentioned above of grouping children homogenously
by ability is still part of the educational milieu. Advocates of this method cite two metaanalyses that suggested ability grouping helps the students with highest ability since
when they are grouped together they achieve greater success than when in groups with
students of varied ability (Kulic & Kulic, 1982; C. Mills & Durden, 1992). The utilitarian
view would be that those high achievers have the most to give back to society, thus
justifying increased outcome stratification. Sacks gave a detailed qualitative description
of how even at a community dominated by self-professed progressives like Berkley,
California, this method is the prevalent and preferred method of ensuring the society
benefits from a separate program for those showing the most potential, just as Cubberley
had said in 1934 (G. Ladson-Billings, 2006a; C. Mills & Durden, 1992).
It is important when concluding a look at modern utilitarianism as a measure of
justice for education to make one final note. Leading utilitarian voices such as Harvard’s
Peter Singer posit that human beings have no intrinsic value as humans, “The fact that
being a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is not
relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather characteristics like rationality,
autonomy and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants lack these
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characteristics. Killing them therefore cannot be equated with killing normal humans”
(Singer, 2000, p 168). From this beginning it is not a far jump to questions of the justice
of investing public moneys into educating those children whose disabilities are severe
enough as to limit their cognitive function and the investment in a broad education for
those who are not likely to benefit from it (Rochester, 2002, p. 44). No matter how
forcefully advocated, modern utilitarianism simply cannot be trusted to provide justice
for children when the end measure is based on societal return on investment.
Rawlsian Responses to AlternativeViews of Justice
Having established in the previous section that justice can be seen as equity of
outcomes or as outcomes that benefit the collective society, I shall first take a look at and
make a Rawlsian response to the most common philosophical positions applied to these
two views of justice. Among the most severe critics of Rawls were influential
philosophers of the late 20th century, utilitarians represented by Sandel, libertarians
represented by Nozick and critical theorists represented by Habermas.
Utilitarianism
“For the most part, Rawls discusses utilitarianism as the main alternative to
justice and fairness” (Freeman, 2007, p. 146) is how Rawls’s protégé and biographer
states it. However, at the same time Pogge (1991) points out that while Rawls rejected
utilitarianism as a foundational philosophy of ethics, Rawls supported the utility of
efficiency in the practice of practical application (p. 40). This distinction is significant as
it is the difference between motive and method.
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Sandel provided a book length utilitarian rebuttal to A Theory of Justice, in which
he succinctly spells out the heart of the conflict between Rawls and utilitarianism and
lays some of the groundwork for my later contrast with critical theory.
Although Rawls argues first against utilitarian conceptions, his overall project is
more ambitious, for justice as fairness stands not only against utilitarianism, but
against all teleological theories as such. As a second-order, meta-ethical claim, the
priority of right means that of the ‘two concepts of ethics’, the right is derived
independently from the good, rather than the other way around. (Sandel, 1982, p.
18)
Sandel (1982) objects to the lack of underlying purpose of a social good in
Rawls’s approach (and all deontological approaches). The lack of a communal good
fundamentally undermines the concept on community itself which, he believes, must be
made up of people with “shared self-understandings” (p. 173). Sandel (1996) specifically
cited Rawls’s statement, “there is not political obligation strictly speaking, for citizens
generally” as evidence that liberalism abandons the communal good in its focus on
individual rights (p. 14).
Liberalism, and Rawls in specific, utterly disregards what is good for society in
the quest to retain individual rights. Utilitarian justice, he contends, is based on a
communal agreement of what is good and desirable, then communally acts upon that
communal sense, and by acting by a communal sense of what is good justice shall be
attained (Sandel, 2009, pp. 260-263). In evidence against such a proposition, one need
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not look further than No Child Left Behind. In his acceptance speech for the nomination
for his party, George W. Bush stated:
Too many American children are segregated into schools without standards,
shuffled from grade-to-grade because of their age, regardless of their knowledge.
This is discrimination, pure and simple -- the soft bigotry of low expectations.
And our nation should treat it like other forms of discrimination. We should end
it. (Bush, 2000)
From this very laudable beginning came a policy proposal called No Child Left Behind.
In a democracy the size of the United Sates, the passage of this bill with overwhelming
majorities, 381-41 in the House and 87-10 in the Senate (Karen, 2008), is the nearest
practical way to prove Sandel’s communal agreement. Yet, the consensus opinion a
decade later is that schools are less just than ever (Darling-Hammond, 2010; Ravitch,
2010). Good motives, it seems, do not necessarily lead to justice. When considering the
good of society in educational policy, the conception of group good becomes hostage to
new ideas, like Thorndike’s sorting by tested IQ or by choosing policy not on the basis of
fairness to the individual but on the economic good of the whole, as is done by the CED.
Though it might fit a conception of Rawlsian justice to promote early educational
intervention based on economics now, should such programs be discontinued if they do
not work out as beneficial to economic growth as planned? And what if the community
consensus does not seek justice for each individual citizen? Certainly it is not hard to
look very far into history (or in current events) to see how the group consensus can easily
utterly disregard the rights of selected individuals or minority populations.
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In the end, I contend that utilitarianism does not provide a sufficiently stable
foundation on which to build public policy because, first, utilitarians base their good on
assumed ends to justify their means and this is not a legitimate assumption; second, in the
real word, community consensus does not reflect or even want to reflect all the
communities’ constituent parts. Rawlsian liberalism, with its deontological commitment
to individual rights first, is a more stable foundation as it relies neither on current popular
sentiment nor on hopeful projections of long term good.
Libertarianism
The second cited critic of Rawls’s conception of justice is Robert Nozick who
offers a libertarian alternative. Nozick draws, like Rawls, on the work of John Locke.
However, Nozick founds his libertarian political philosophy on Locke’s conception of
man in the state of nature. He uses Locke’s term protective associations as the foundation
for the state and builds the case that a just state is simply a protective association that
holds local monopoly on the use of force (Nozick, 1974, pp. 12- 17). He plainly states,
“The minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more
extensive violates people’s rights” (Nozick, 1974, p. 149). He concedes that this minimal
state is functionally closely related to anarchy which at many points in his book he seems
to indicate can operate within the minimal state.
Given the fact that Nozick’s seminal work came out just three years after A
Theory of Justice, it might not be surprising that he devoted an entire chapter to
countering Rawls. Nozick fundamentally rejects the concept Rawls puts forth that the
state is obligated to provide educational compensations to the least advantaged in a quest
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for fair equality of opportunity. Nozick says, “This line of argument can succeed in
blocking the introduction of a person’s autonomous choices and actions (and their results)
only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person to certain external factors”
(Nozick, 1974, p. 214). He goes on to say that by such an approach of compensation
Rawls’s ultimate goal of individual dignity and self-respect is undermined.
Nozick gives an entirely different reason for rejecting Rawls’s call for providing
disproportionate educational resources to the needed based on funding. Wouldn’t
it be better if the person with less opportunity had an equal opportunity? If one so
could equip him without violating anyone else’s entitlements (the magic wand)
should one do so? Wouldn’t it be fairer? If it would be fairer, can such fairness
justify overriding some people’s entitlements in order to acquire the resources to
boost those having poorer opportunities into a more equal completive position?
(Nozick, 1974, p. 236)
Strikingly, after building this argument that communal action is antithetical to justice and
liberty, in the last chapter he appears to reverse course, at least at the local level. “A
nation or protective agency may not compel redistribution between one community and
another, yet a community such as a kibbutz may redistribute within itself (or give to
another community or to outside individuals.).” (Nozick, 1974, p. 321)
Hayek (2011) is not quite so opposed to taxation for schools, but quotes and
agrees with Freeman (2007) that vouchers in most cases are better than the public school
system (Hayek, 2011, pp. 503-504). He states unequivocally that a fully privately run
system with the government only providing funds is preferable. In such a scheme, the
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parents, not the state, is free to determine the goals and methods of education.
Interestingly, in his discussion of disproportionate funding, it is the high achieving
students that he discusses as possibly deserving additional funding. Not a word is written
about compensatory education for the disadvantaged. In the end, he rejects all variations
in funding as unjust (Hayek, 2011).
In considering a philosophical foundation on which to measure educational
justice, I find libertarianism wanting. An argument might be mounted regarding the moral
justice of libertarianism based on what I find is a morally unacceptable disregard for the
previously discussed patterns of inequality. However, it is not necessary for this study
because there is a prima facie case that it is impossible to use a philosophy that rejects the
entire concept of either state or federal government having a substantive role in education
to measure state or federal educational policy.
Critical Theory
In my review of the literature the overwhelming majority of current research and
writing on justice and education comes from the tradition of critical theory. Current
literature presents this epistemological approach as the primary means of critique and
analysis of educational practice. As such it is important that I address why I am
approaching this project in Rawlsian liberal terms rather than critical terms. However,
addressing critical theory is not a simple matter. As Bernstein (1995) states:
Critical Theory is not a theory of society, or a wholly homogenous school of
thinkers or a method. Critical theory, rather, is a tradition of social thought that, in
part at least, takes its cue from its opposition to the wrongs and ills of modern
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society on the one hand, and the forms of theorizing that simply go along with or
seek to legitimize those societies on the other hand”. (p. 11).
The term critical theory was coined by Max Horkeimer in a 1947 article which
was primarily an attack on what he believed to be the falsity of objectivity in the
scientific method, and in specific, he attacked the Cartesian dichotomy of separating the
object and the observer (Bernstein, 1995; Thomassen, 2010). Additionally, as a member
of the Frankfort School, Horkeimer combined this constructivist ontology with Marxian
conceptions of economics, materialism and class domination. Horkeimer said “the
[critical] theory never aims simply at an increase in knowledge as such. Its goal is man’s
emancipation from slavery” (Thomassen, 2010, p. 20). The essential difference between
traditional Marxism and critical theory, however, is not just that the proletariat is replaced
by other groups, but that identity formation of the new sorts of groups does not require
direct action (i.e. revolution); rather, the new group identity requires action in the
political arena (Bernstein, 1995p. 20).
Other German philosophers, chief among them Jürgen Habermas built on the
foundation laid by Horkeimer to continue to develop the critical theory. Habermas
extended and clarified, adding the constructivist ideas of Freud to understand how people
are driven by meanings that are hidden from every day view (Thomassen, 2010, p. 25).
Of particular challenge was to update Marx’s vision of the inevitability of a proletariat
uprising in a world of growing affluence for the working class. Habermas wrote how
wealth and consumerism can lead to what he called alienated leisure, and even a welfare
state itself can be a dehumanizing force as it exercises control (Edgar, 2005, p. 6-8).
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Thus critical theory focuses on unmasking hidden structures and meanings that lead to
oppressions in the tradition of Marx and Freud (Thomassen, 2010, pp. 27-28).
Thus, modern critical theory has many faces and focuses; however, two core
beliefs have defined the philosophy from the outset: a constructivist epistemology and the
duty to uncover and oppose hidden oppression (Carspecken, 1996).
Earlier I addressed the issues of inequalities based on race and on sex. Therefore,
I will, based on Rawls, specifically address my concerns about the appropriateness of
critical theory for this project based on critical race theory and critical feminist theory.
Critical Race Theory.
The first precept of critical race theory is “Critical race theory recognizes that
racism is endemic to American life” (Dixson & Rousseau, 2005, p. 9). This is not
presented as a possibility, but as an indisputable fact. Constructivist, critical race theorists
legitimize such unequivocal “fact” statements based on their constructed reality based on
finding hidden agendas visible only to critical theorists (McKnight & Chandler, 2012).
This core belief justifies critical race theorist Gloria Ladson-Billing to use her position as
President of the AERA, to proclaim that there is not just an achievement gap, but an
education debt owed by European-Americans to be paid to African and Latino Americas
(Ladson-Billings, 2006b). In her address to the AERA, she makes a case that race and
race alone drives achievement and never considers other factors. The justice, or even
factual truth, of suggesting, as she does, that African-American children cannot succeed
because “racism is normal not aberrant in American society” (Ladson-Billings, 2006b) is
simply not considered in her address. Thus, in her vision of critical theory justice the
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white population, including the children in schools today, owes what she specifies as
economic, sociopolitical and moral debt to every child of color, no matter their particular
circumstances (Ladson-Billings, 2006b).
Schouten (2012) strenuously objects to the whole notion that there is a moral debt
owed for education as suggested by Ladson-Billings. Rather she counters with a very
Rawlsian answer that there is a moral obligation to those who are disadvantaged. She
acknowledges that the disproportionate number of low performing African-Americans is
certainly rooted in historical bias and that disproportionate resources are required to
remedy the statistical inequity, a position consistent with the Rawlsian liberal position.
However, the assistance should not be geared to groups based on past injustices, but to
individuals based on current need. She wrote, “They therefore have a claim to be
benefited, as they are themselves victims of an injustice; the injustice of being badly off
(Schouten, 2012, p. 240).
It is important to note, when critiquing the appropriateness of critical race theory
that current statistical data builds a significant case that poverty, not race, may well be the
driving factor in school success. This runs counter to the critical race theory and “treats
race as a defining principle rather than a variable within research” (Leonardo, 2012, p.
430). When class is addressed by critical race theory, it is often in the context of
Bourdieu’s Marxian tradition rather than income, i.e. those who qualify for free lunches.
Nowhere is CRT’s relationship with class analysis more clear than its uptake of
Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital. It is one of the most frequently used and
critiqued class-oriented concepts in the CRT literature on education. There are
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several species of the appropriation. First, in an endorsement of Bourdieu’s
concept, cultural capital is used to explain school biases against more or less
essentialist cultures of color, their family value systems and priorities. Consistent
with Bourdieu’s ideas about class stratification but applied to race, CRT scholars
indict the White standards of learning in schools, from the English forms that are
recognized to the behaviors that are punished or rewarded and the historical
contributions that are valorized or omitted. (Leonardo, 2012, p. 438)
I find it significant that in the current U.S. DOE figures, African-Americans
comprise the exact same percentage in the U.S. undergraduate colleges and universities
(15%) as they do in K-12 and nearly the same rate for graduate education (14%) (Aud et
al., 2012). The data indicates a more complicated situation with Latino students as the
2011 DOE report (Aud et al., 2011) notes that the dropout rate for immigrant Latinos is
over three times that of native born Latinos and further notes that the Asian immigrants
also have the same disproportionate dropout rate. This would indicate that the issue may
well be surrounding the process of immigration rather than race. Even still the Hispanic
college undergraduate population is 14% of the total.
I have presented this line of argumentation about critical race theory to highlight
the underlying problem with the use of critical theory as a guide to assessing justice in
policy. The carte blanche critical theorists appear to give themselves to assign negative
motives to others leads to a systemic acceptance to a forgone conclusion of injustice.
This can lead to conclusions in research that show little but the prior beliefs of the
researcher projected onto the canvas of the subject. Typical for the articles I read for this
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project was a new peer reviewed article on how young African-American college men
worked out race in predominantly white colleges (Wilkins, 2012). Throughout, the
researcher made motive claims with no evident connection to the subject’s statements.
When her subjects made statements that did not conform to the tenants of critical race
theory, the author again assigned negative motive. Thus successful behaviors by the
subjects were negatively labeled and the author condemned her subjects as being
oppressors themselves. The conclusion is brazen in its condemnation of the subjects’
refusal of specific agendas the author believes are required based on race; “But more, by
dismissing both black women and, often, black organizations, as immoderate spaces,
black men abandon their collective responsibility to fight racial inequality, focusing
instead on individual strategies of mobility and leaving the work of fighting racism up to
women” (Wilkins, 2012, p. 57). My readings in preparation for this project indicate that
this type of approach is not an anomaly, but common practice.
This is not to suggest that the profound achievement gap is not important (as
addressed earlier), nor does it suggest that there are not differences in life circumstance
for children that are correlated with race. What this does suggest is that there is little
diagnostic purpose in using critical race theory as the core tool to measure educational
justice as the possibility of an alternate conclusion is simply foreclosed.
Critical Feminist Theory.
Critical race theory is closely related to critical feminist theory in philosophy and
methods with sex being substituted for race when presenting oppression in schools
(Hannan, 1995; Okin, 1994). The intersection of race and feminist theory is common

84

such as in the Wilkins article above, yet it shows a willingness to choose interpretations
of the subjects’ statements to prioritize the researcher’s agenda. It becomes apparent that
critical feminists choose ideology over objective statistical measures on inequality, which
they do use when convenient to support their beliefs. Despite Table 1 and the fact long
term trends shown previously that females are the dominant class in education, critical
feminists continue to search for evidence that girls are disadvantaged in education and to
seek programs to promote girls’ performance (Bianco et al., 2011; Kafer, 2011; U.S.
Department of Education, 2010). Overall the critical feminist response is to downplay
this significant and growing achievement gap (Froses-Gremain, 2006) and, at least in
certain segments of the critical feminist community, there is resentment at the idea of
addressing the growing male achievement gap (M. Mills & Keddie, 2010; Zyngier,
2009).
Conclusion.
Rawls (1996b) stated that it is unjust for a current generation, by use of their
liberties, to create hardships on future generations (pp. 251-253). Likewise, I would
suggest that it is unjust to burden the rising generation with penalties for prior
generations’ behavior (Ladson-Billings to the contrary). Historical injustices to, or by,
others who happen to share some particular characteristic is not a reason to skew resource
availably or the application of fair equality of opportunity of the current generation of
students. Rawls calls for disproportionate resources for those children who are the least
advantaged. Table 1 would indicate that those children in need will likely be
disproportionally racial minorities and male, but this is not the same thing as saying

85

males and racial minorities automatically get disproportionate resources. This distinction
is important when considering the justice of policy.
Conclusions on the Review of Literature
Rawlsian liberalism is clearly focused on the individual child, not society as a
whole or certain sub-groups within society. Justice is not fairness to groups of people, but
rather fairness to each and every individual based on actual present need (Rawls, 2001, p.
59n).
Thus I conclude that in constructing a tool to measure the justice in educational
policy, utilitarianism, libertarianism and critical theory present significant problems as
well as fundamental epistemological problems to my ability to create a tool by which to
measure the justice of educational policy that could be broadly used and accepted.
Having presented both Rawlsian liberalism and the leading competing approaches, I
conclude that Rawlsian liberalism is the best choice to underpin this project.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
This study proposes to present a tool to measure educational policy documents for
their intrinsic justice. The achievement of this end requires a method for identifying the
factors involved, clarifying the goals to be measured, and developing a systematic way of
determining whether the evaluated policies do indeed meet the established standard of
justice. Policy analysis is the broad term given for the field that covers these tasks (Radin,
2000).
Policy Analysis Defined
Policy analysis is the process of multi-disciplinary inquiry aimed at the creation,
critical assessment and communication of policy-relevant information. As a problem
solving discipline, it draws on the social science methods, theory and substantive findings
to solve practical problems (Dunn, 2012).
Radin (2000) gives a total of thirteen different definitions to the term policy
analysis to illustrate the point that not only does the term mean different things to
different people, but the term has changed in meaning over the past 40 years. Still other
authors give different definitions (Alexander, 2013; Bardach, 2012; McCall, 1994). Negel
was quoted as listing the three common elements of policy analysis: causes, effects and
effects of policy alternatives (McCall, 1994).
I have made this point of multiple definitions to highlight the imprecise nature of
the field as well as the flexibility in applying the title of policy analysis. Policy analysis
has been going on as far back as history records, though the modern concept of policy

87

analysis is relatively short. It is important to note for this study that the first formal
civilian use of policy analysis in the United States was done as part of Johnson’s war on
poverty. Via the Office of Economic Opportunity, policy analysis was brought to bear,
from the beginning, on issues of poverty and equity (Radin, 2000). This should not be
surprising given the fundamentally value laden process that policy analysis is (Dunn,
2012). Alexander (2013) states plainly that “policy problems are those conditions that
you do not like and you think can be changed, should be changed and should be changed
using the resources of the collective” (p. 6 ).
Policy analysis is inherently an interdisciplinary field (Dunn, 2012; McCall,
1994). “To investigate problems of efficiency and fairness, policy analysis draws on
normative economics, and decisions analysis, as well as ethics and other branches of
social and political philosophy all of which are about what ought to be” (Dunn, 2012, p.
4). Thus it follows that this project, though conducted by an educational researcher, has
already, by necessity, encompassed more than just simple educational theory, but has
looked more broadly in moral theory and the meaning of justice.
Having established what policy analysis is, I must add that there is another
version of policy analysis that is so different that, if it did not have the same name, it
would be hard to recognize it as the same field. This type of analysis begins with an
epistemological position of post-empiricism or post-modernism that stands in
fundamental opposition to the positivist approach of traditional policy analysts (Fischer,
2003, pp. 11-14). Post-empiricism, Fischer (2003) argues, shifts the discussion away
“from proof to discourse” (p. 130), and the practice of policy analysis turns from science
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to craft, meaning that the policy analyst no longer seeks to assess the quality and use of
data based on the scientific method, but “applies standards derived from his own
experiences, but also reflect the norms of his teachers and colleges” (Fischer, 2003, pp.
133-134).
Despite the difference in basic epistemologies, there is a remarkable consensus
between both these approaches that policy analysis is more a craft or art than a science
(Bardach, 2012; Dunn, 2012; Fischer, 2003; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Radin, 2000).
“Policy analysis is methodologically eclectic; its practitioners free to choose among a
wide range of scientific methods, qualitative as well as quantitative, as long as these yield
reliable knowledge” (Dunn, 2012, p.3).
The Purpose of Policy Analysis
The intention of all policy analysis is to impact future policy. Dunn (2012) said
policy analysis is “a problem solving discipline” in that the goal is to “solve practical
problems” (p. 2). This future orientation does not just have to be for specific future
polices but for creation of new ways of looking at policy. However, this does not just
mean predicting outcomes. Patton & Sawici (1986) give three reasons that policy analysis
is conducted: (a) to project outcomes or future states of one or more proposals, (b) to
describe past policies and their outcomes, (c) to clarify the problem for policy makers, (d)
to guide policy maker’s view of a problem or solution. (pp. 24-25).
The policy cycle has seven distinct phases: (a) Agenda setting, (b) Policy
formation, (c) Policy Adoption, (d) Policy Implementation, (e) Policy Assessment, (f)
Policy Succession, (g) Policy termination, and policy analysts work at many, and
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sometimes all, phases in what is called the policy cycle (Dunn, 2012, pp. 42-43). This
process can be visualized as a circle with feedback loops based on impacts and
assessments often carried out by the policy analyst. In this process, there are five types of
policy questions that policy analysis can answer: (a) Policy problems: what is the real
problem, (b) Expected policy outcomes: what can one expect the policy to do (c)
Preferred policies: which of several policy options is best (d) Observed policy outcomes:
what was the impact of the policy (e) policy performance: how effective was the policy at
solving the problem (Dunn, 2012, pp. 5-6). Dunn (2012) goes on to say that the five
domains are interdependent and transformed by the chosen policy analytic method.
These methods he lists as (a) Problem structuring, (b) Forecasting, (c) Prescription, (d)
Monitoring, (e) Evaluation (p. 5). Using these descriptors, this project shall use the
evaluation method to address both observed policy outcomes and policy performance.
Another way of addressing what policy analysts do is to consider the tasks that
policy analysts are asked to do. “Today’s policy analysts help in planning, budgeting,
program evaluation, program design, program management, public relations and other
functions” (Bardach, 2012, p. xv). In doing these tasks the analyst might perform in three
different roles: (a) “Objective technicians hold analytic integrity as their fundamental
value. They see their analytical skills as the source of their legitimacy” (Weimer &
Vining, 2011, p. 41). (b) “The client’s advocate places primary emphasis on his or her
responsibly to the client. They believe they derive their legitimacy as participants in the
formation of public policy from their clients, who hold elected or appointed office or who
represent policies interests” (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 42). (c) “Issue advocates believe
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that analysis should be an instrument for making progress toward their conceptions of the
good society” (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 43).
What is consistent in these views of the purpose of policy analysis is that the
policy analyst is not the policy maker, but rather someone who provides information to
the policy maker. Radin (2000) likens policy analysts to the traditional court advisors to
kings and other potentates. Thus, in approaching a policy analysis project, I must
consider the end user not academics, as in basic science, but policy makers.
There are alternative approaches to policy analysis however; Stone (2002) offers a
view that focuses on the community or the polis rather than on economic efficiency and
cost-benefit-analysis, while Fischer (2003) and Glynos et al. (2009) write in the
Habermasian tradition of the power of languages and discourse. While Stone agrees in
the primacy of efficiency as the hallmark of policy analysis, her vision is of efficiency as
the best way to increase human potential, rather than the movement of material goods
(Stone, 2002, p. 400). She devotes an entire chapter (pp. 60-85) to her vision of efficiency
which, in effect, challenges market efficiency as a goal of public policy as presented by
Weimer & Vining (2011). To Stone, “policy analysis is political” (Stone, 2002, p. 378),
and the purpose of policy analysis is not “punching in various considerations and
accepting the result”, but rather advocacy of a predetermined outcome based on personal
values (Stone, 2002, p. 385).
Fischer (2003) presents a much more focused and systematic philosophical
treatise on critical policy analysis based on the discursive and deliberative democracy
theories of Habermas and Foucault. Discursive policy analysis, according to Fischer, is
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an alternative to what he calls “mainstream policy analysis” (Fischer, 2003, p. 121).
Though Habermas is inexorably linked to the development of critical theory, it would be
a mistake to link it too closely to the kinds of critical theory described earlier (critical
race theory and critical feminist theory), because Habermas built on Foucault’s work to
create a whole new brand of critical theory based on discourse as the key to
understanding social interaction (Bernstein, 1995, p. 11; Fischer, 2003, pp. 37-38).
“Whereas critical theory seeks to account for the way that subjective knowers come to
construct their worlds, Foucault emphasized the subjects themselves to be the creation of
prevailing discursive practices. Rather than focusing on people making discursive
statements, he emphasizes how discourses make people” (Fischer, 2003, p. 38).
With this different viewpoint, discursive policy analysis contrasts to
“mainstream” policy analysis by focusing only on the policy analyst role of advocate.
The end of discursive policy analysis “. . . means that the ultimate aim of such research
(discursive policy analysis) is not to produce objective facts or causal explanations, but
to articulate well-founded interpretations of policymaking that presume the judgments
and values of the researcher involved” (Glynos et al., 2009, p. 23). This choice of limited
function does not invalidate the discursive approach, but rather it becomes a specific type
of policy analysis with a pointed political point of view and an action oriented focus.
Values and Policy Analysis
All four of the “mainstream” policy analysts texts I reviewed (Bardach, 2012;
Dunn, 2012; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 2011), as well as the education
specific policy analysis text (Alexander, 2013), give some consideration to values in their
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writing; however, the thrust of the books are all quantitative and utilitarian in nature.
Cost-benefit-analysis is presented as the stock and trade of the public policy analyst. The
value of market efficiency, if not directly stated as superior, is presented as the default
position. This does not suggest that this is inherently wrong, but rather that dealing with
markets, taxes and other tangible things is the sea in which the field swims. The
educational policy book largely replaces money with statistical performance data.
Patton and Sawicki (1986) devote six pages specifically to ethical analysis (more
than any other). In this section they discuss both deontological approaches and utilitarian
approaches to policy analysis and suggests that a policy analyst needs to develop a moral
point of view from which to operate; however, the authors relate this not to the policy
analysis itself, but in the analyst’s interaction with the client.
A Rawlsian vision of the goal of social welfare policy is presented as an
alternative in several books (Dunn, 2012; Weimer & Vining, 2011). Interestingly, in both
these texts, when writing of social values in policy analysis, Rawls is contrasted with
Pareto, rather than as embracing and extending Pareto, which Rawls himself does (Rawls,
1999b, p. 58). It appears that policy analysts focus on Pareto when discussing the
operating of the economy and on Rawls when addressing redistribution of wealth.
Weimer & Vining (2011) are particularly harsh in their appraisal that Rawls’s “extreme
redistribution” would reduce incentives and cite studies that suggest that given the veil of
ignorance scenario, people are not as altruistic as Rawls suggests (pp. 135-136).
Dunn (2012) is unique among the four texts as he gives a few sentences in passing
to critical theory referencing Habermas and Dallmayr (p. 314). This might well be due
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both to the focus on efficiency and to the more pessimistic view of human behavior
shown in experiments that indicate that people may desire equity, but are unlikely to give
it freely (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 137). Dunn (2012) also specifically addresses three
normative theories of ethics that would foreground policy analysis: “deontological,
teleological and practical” (p. 318). He correctly describes deontological as being
Kantian (and Rawlsian) liberalism while the teleological approach is described as being
utilitarianism; however, his description of practical normative ethics is rather short and
vague, appearing to be some sort of generic pragmatism. As a whole, the “mainstream”
texts do not seem to take social justice or values as an inherent priority. I propose the
reason for this can be found in the Weimer & Vining (2011) chapter on ethics. They do
not address social ethics but the ethics of being employed to do policy analysis. The
example is given of a policy analyst for the Congressional Budget Office, who over a
career will work for both Democrat and Republican administrations. They discuss the
issue of values conflict between analyst and client (p. 46) but do not suggest one set of
values over another is required for their methodology.
It should not be a surprise that this stands in stark contrast to the critical theory
texts on policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Weiss & Duncan, 1974), or in Stone’s Polis
model (2002) where the values of the analyst are front and center. Fischer, in particular,
makes no attempt to present a value free methodology to be used by differing political
groups. He spells out the critical theory belief that there is no such thing as value-free
methodology (Fischer, 2003) and expounds the discursive model with a fundamentalist’s
certainty of rightness that excludes all other possibilities.
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Radin (2000) traces the use of policy analysis over the past 40 years and makes it
clear that policy analysis has been used by those with many different political goals, each
to their own end. While there are policy analysts, like at the CBO, that genuinely see
themselves as values neutral arbiters of numbers (Congressional Budget Office, 2012), it
is the norm that the explicit values of both the policy analyst and the one commissioning
the analysis are actively part of the process (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 49).
Methods
Having reviewed the literature regarding the philosophy of John Rawls, surveyed
the case that there is a serious question as to the justice of the U.S. school system, and
having presented an overview to the topic of policy analysis, I will in this chapter lay out
a plan by which I will propose to evaluate educational policy. First, I will select from the
choices of policy analysis made earlier based on my goals for the project. In this I will
discuss my subjectivity and the process by which I choose methods and goals. Second, I
will look at policy analysis as a means of measuring justice and look at other models
which might provide example and guidance in this project. Finally, I will present a case
for my choice of model and lay out my proposed tool for measurement of justice in U.S.
educational policy.
Why This Policy Analysis Project?
This project is about justice, justice in education. Dunn (2012) spells out that
while one of the normal key components of policy analysis is to identify and structure
problems, it can equally be used to address issues. He explains that issues are broader in
that they “also reflect competing views of the nature of the problems themselves” (p. 71).
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As there is wide agreement in many quarters that something is wrong with the U.S.
educational system, the challenge for this project is not the identification of a problem,
but in the nature of the problem. Dunn also explains that analysis of both problems and
issues is the analysis of systems that have many parts, but the whole of the system is
larger and more important than the individual pieces. In this case, the overarching
conception of justice is not seen as a single domain, but a series of domains as outlined
by Rawls, each with importance, but none to be equated with the totality of justice.
I might therefore propose this is an issue analysis, but it is not enough to say it is
about the issue of educational justice, there must be a framework for why I am doing this
and for whom I am working. Weimer and Vining (2011) write that academic research is
not policy analysis because it fails the basic definition of policy analysis that “policy
analysis is client-oriented advice relevant to public discussions and informed social
values” (p. 24). In their estimation academic research is “often irrelevant to informational
needs of decision makers” (p.26) and thus is a related field to policy analysis, but is not
policy analysis. Having said that, these authors then come back and write that policy
analysis can be conducted by issue advocates who self-select their clients based on a
shared commitment to an issue and a belief that “analysis should be an instrument for the
good of society” (p. 43).
This project, being a doctoral dissertation, is unquestionably an academic
exercise; however, in order to project the concept of legitimate policy analysis, I will
move forward under the implicit belief that it is being done with a specific, if not defined,
set of clients. I could use Stone’s conception of working for the polis, in that the
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overarching vision of Rawlsian political liberalism as justice as fairness brings forth a
societal Pareto optimum, or the greatest good possible for the community at large.
However, I will suppose my client is not the community writ at large, but those forgotten,
low income children whom I served both in inner-city Chicago and in the foothills of the
Appalachian Mountains.
The role of issue advocate is peripheral to “mainstream” policy analysis (Dunn,
2012; Weimer & Vining, 2011), while it is central to writers such as Stone (2002) and
Fischer (2003). For this qualitative study I have chosen to position myself as an open
advocate of educational justice. The subjectivity of this position of justice advocate is
moderated as I use a deontological approach to the concept of justice, as opposed to the
teleological approach. In this justice will be defined with the sharp edge of Rawlsian
moral judgment based strictly on documents of written policy.
My Subjectivity
In contrast to my claim of limited subjectivity in choosing a deontological
approach, I recognize that the choice of a deontology in general and Rawls in particular is
itself a choice and reflective of a specific epistemology and ontology. It is these basic
questions of the nature of truth and reality that defines who we are and by which we
structure answers to questions like justice.
The thinkers of the Enlightenment have always resonated with me as guiding the
way to both individual and societal answers. Like many of the enlightenment thinkers I
was steeped in Christian religious teaching, but in rejecting dogmatic theology came to
seek a way to reconcile the metaphysics of natural theology with natural philosophy. In
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this, Kant provided the way forward. In Critique of Pure Reason I found I was not alone
in my search to find truth through rational means, while at the same time acknowledging
the limits of reason. This position is called critical philosophy (Shell, 1980, p. 37).
Cartesian dualism between mind and body, between the concrete physical reality
and the ethereal consciousness, was a mainstay of western thought since Plato; however,
though it has fallen into disfavor in recent decades, there are still those who hold that it
possesses a unique power to explain the nature of reality (Dilley, 2004). I agree with
Dilly (2004) that the abandonment of the idea of an independent consciousness means the
abandonment of free will, moral responsibility and independent liberty to loss of
autonomy that determinism implies.
Kant as Foundation
Kant used the, then new, Copernican model of why the sun seems to move and
change to analogize why humans do not share a unified perception of reality. We on
earth have a distorted view of the sun’s reality because we have a constantly moving
point of view from earth; similarly all people have a distorted reality of all things as each
person has a different point of view (Shell, 1980, pp. 40-41). While he proposed that each
person constructs an internal view of what reality appears to be, there is, in fact, a solid
reality that is not created by, nor impacted by, the construction of the viewer, i.e. the sun
itself was not changed by Copernicus. Learning and science is a matter of using empirical
data and using reason to synthesize an approximation of truth (Dudley & Engelhard,
2011, pp. 24-26). By a merging of Cartesian dualism and Kantian critical philosophy, I
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found a strong ontology and the beginnings of an epistemology by which I could evaluate
various philosophies and philosophers.
Kant also appealed to me for his commitment to a rational morality that implied
both a path to personal meaning and a call to duty. As a former minister, I see Kant’s
clear assertion that morality is determined by motive, not effect, and the obligation to act
in a way that treats people as the ends not the means (Kant, 2009; Shell, 1980) exactly
coincided with my interpretation of the teaching of Jesus that in brotherly love to others
is the highest morality (Luke 10:25-37). Kant also presents a world marked by the
selfishness of humans and their struggle for happiness, but not necessarily the
achievement of such, because a headlong commitment to happiness would inevitably lead
to violations of others; thus duty to the right supersedes personal desires (Guyer, 2011).
Again, in this Kant resonated with my conclusions about the reality of the world around
me. This call to duty to suppress self for the greater good had been a mantra as both a
minister and a social worker. Whether this stems from the foundational Christian
doctrine of original sin, or from the equally foundational evolutionary biological law of
self-preservation or even from my experience as both a social worker and bureaucratic
functionary, I am firmly convinced that people are, by nature, self-serving. For unlike
Rousseau and a long line of thinkers since, I do not believe that society corrupts humans,
but rather humans corrupt society; societal improvement will not yield better people but
rather better people will yield a better society.
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Why Rawls?
Yet, Kant alone did not yield a fully functioning epistemology, largely because he
was still a product of his time, is overly rigid, and simply did not provide sufficient
guidance for the modern world. Locke was a good addition to my developing
philosophical approach with his call to both a personal submission of desires to reason
and larger iconoclastic resistance to encroachments on personal autonomy (Schouls,
1992, pp. 208-215).
Thus, when looking for a modern philosophical model I was really looking for a
modern version of Enlightenment liberalism. I found that model in the writings of John
Rawls. Though I have some concerns about the practicality of some of his economic
proposals, and I understand, but disagree with, his belief in the innate goodness of
humans (Freeman, 2007, p. 8), I found his work to be the best modern representation of
the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment as I embrace them. In the end it is Rawls
deontological approach that seems more practical than any of the teleological approaches.
All teleological approaches base the justice of their proposed policies on the assumption
that success will justify their methods, while the deontological approach judges the
justice of methods themselves, regardless of the hoped for good in the outcome. I firmly
believe the old saying that the path to tyranny is paved by good intentions, for no one can
accurately predict the good or evil ends of any proposed policy.
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Project Methods
Policy Evaluation
Earlier Dunn’s (2012) five types of policy questions were presented (pp. 5-6). In
this project I will seek to answer two of these questions: (a) expected policy outcomes:
what can one expect the policy to do, and (b) policy performance: how effective was the
policy at solving the problem. In the first question, the expected policy outcome is
posited to be justice. In some cases it will be narrowly defined as clearly educational
justice, but in others it will be more broadly defined as how the policy promotes or
retards general justice goals. In the second question, the problem being addressed is the
current inequities in the educational system as they were presented in chapter two.
From Dunn’s (2012) list of five uses of policy analysis (p.53), I will be
conducting a policy evaluation. Vedung (1997) defines policy evaluation as “careful
retrospective assessment of the merit, worth and value of administration, output and
outcome of government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future practical
action situations” (Vedung, 1997). Policy evaluation is most readily identified in that it is
conducted post-ante, or after the policy has been in place. Though Alexander (2013)
presents policy evaluation as simply the last step in reviewing the effectiveness of a
policy that is already in place (p. 37), Dunn (2012) and Radin (2000) both posit that
policy evaluation can be approached as a complete type of policy analysis on its own.
Dunn (2011) writes that, above all, policy evaluation asks the question of values.
He gives four characteristics that distinguish policy evaluation from other policy analysis
methods. (a) Values focus; policy evaluation is different than simple monitoring in that it
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asks if the policy is desirable, is appropriate and good, (b) Fact-value interdependence.
Though the values are of primary importance, there must be facts to support the values,
(c) Present and past orientation. Claims of societal value must be made both
retrospectively based on past performance (ex post) and projected to future performance
(ex ante), (d) Value duality. The values used should be both ends and means; they must
be good in and of themselves and they should promote good results (p. 321).
In this study these four characteristics are to be seen throughout. First, justice is a
core value, and justice is central to this study. Second, the study will be seeking specific
facts, documentary evidence from the actual legislation and bureaucratic regulation to
make the evaluation. Third, this study will be looking at how the assessed policies have
impacted justice in the past and how they can be expected to impact justice in the future.
Fourth, just laws and administrative rules are an end unto themselves, while at the same
time, how these laws and rules impact everyday children in their classrooms is equally of
value.
Policy Evaluations and Justice.
Policy evaluations on specific issues of equity are common. The Office of
Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development, U.S. Department of Education releases
studies on an ongoing basis on equity in particular programs (Heuer & Stullich, 2011;
Tanenbaum et al., 2012). The website for this office states:
Policy and Program Studies Service (PPSS) focuses on education policy analysis
and evaluation of programs; analyzes current and proposed education policy;
directs the development of policy for legislative proposals and program
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reauthorizations using policy analysis, performance measures, and evaluation
studies; designs, conducts, and reports on evaluations to describe program
operations and outcomes to promote program improvement; provides technical
expertise in formula development, modeling, forecasting, and trends analysis, and
provides technical and analytic support for special projects both domestic and
international. (Policy and Program Studies Service, 2012)
From the reports generated from the educational policy analysis office one can
follow many important trends that can give clues to justice, but their reports do not
address the basic question about the justice of the policies themselves.
The first major study of educational equity was conducted as a required mandate
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; entitled Equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman,
1966) , it became known as The Coleman Report. This book-length report on racial
inequities in education spells out via tables and charts and over 700 pages that the schools
were very segregated and that there were vast inequalities in facilities, curricular
opportunities, extracurricular opportunities and teacher quality (i.e. inputs) and that there
were wide differences in academic achievement based on race (i.e. outputs). Though the
truth of these differences is a common discussion in educational circles today, this report
was the first time such disparities had been quantified (Viadero, 2006). The larger
conclusion of the report was, however, that socioeconomic factors are the prime drivers
of academic achievement, not that school inequity is the prime motivator of school
achievement differences. The summary stated plainly, “It is known that socioeconomic
factors bear a strong relationship to academic achievement. When these factors are
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statistically controlled, however, it appears that differences between schools account for
only a small fraction of differences in pupil achievement” (Coleman, 1966, pp. 20-21).
The report was quickly attacked on several fronts, most notably for this study
regarding methodology, which would not pass modern levels of scrutiny; however, the
value of the project and the broad conclusions were reaffirmed in a 1972 reanalysis
(Viadero, 2006). A question that directly bears on the point of this current study was
asked soon after the report was published about the relationship between the outcomes
Coleman reports and issues under purview of educational policy makers (Cain & Watts,
1968).
The report was largely ignored by policy makers at the time due both to the fact
the conclusions were so paradigm shaking, and because the War on Poverty was then at
its highpoint and congress had just passed ESEA (Viadero, 2006); however, it was
seminal for educational researchers who found in it a new way to address educational
needs (Massagli & McCullough, 1979). One need only look at popular books by DarlingHammond (2010) or Kozol (2005) to see the importance of Coleman’s work.
The Coleman report also sheds light on the method of both looking at inputs such
as school funding, teacher quality and the larger community, as well as on outputs, i.e.
academic achievement. I would propose that the two views of measuring justice in
education would also reflect epistemological viewpoints. The measurement of inputs as
justice can largely be seen as deontological while the measurement of outputs is more
teleological. Large comprehensive studies, like Coleman’s, do well to address both;
however, from a Rawlsian standpoint, the inputs should take precedence over the outputs.

104

In a final note about the value of the Coleman report to this study, I would
propose that rather than accept the 1966 interpretation of the report that “schools don’t
matter” (Viadero, 2006, n.p.), a more modern interpretation would be that schools will
not matter until intervention to remediate for low socioeconomic status begins earlier and
lasts longer. This would be consistent with Rawls’s position published just a few years
after the Coleman report.
Other Measurement Tools for Education and Justice.
Educational justice, or justice related issues, is measured by many groups and in
many ways. The U.S. Department of Education gives ready access to massive amounts of
data (some already used in this project), by which one could assess both equity and
adequacy of education via performance outputs related to various inputs. The Annie E.
Casey Foundation produces an excellent overview of factors that impact children’s
wellbeing including issues of poverty, educational attainment and child-relevant
community issues. This could easily be a measure of social justice and education. On a
global scale the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD)
produces copious amounts of data on educational issues which are used for proxies to
measure educational justice. All these things are good to consider justice from a
secondary or results perspective; however, none of them can begin to answer the question
directly of the justice of the policies themselves. Like in the Coleman report, the linkage
between the measured results and the actual educational policy might well be confounded
by many unmeasured variables (Cain & Watts, 1968).
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Equity Audits.
Equity Audits are one proposed way of measuring for educational justice at the
local level (McKenzie & Skrla, 2011; Skrla et al., 2009; Skrla et al., 2004). Drawing from
the tradition of using audits to ensure compliance for labor and civil rights laws, the
authors propose a system of evaluation at the local level to ensure all groups of students
receive equitable treatment from school officials. The authors conceded that their model
suggests that equitable teacher quality combined with equitable programming will
achieve achievement equity is simplistic; however, this is presented as a first step “that
people have to begin this work somewhere” (Skrla et al., 2009, p. 24). As their model is
designed for local use, the larger, more complicated, issue of justice in policy is beyond
their intended scope. However, their use of a tool to measure educational justice helps
provide justification for this project.
Health care justice evaluations.
The practice of creating evaluative instruments for healthcare also provides some
guidance in the effort to justify the use of a tool for educational justice. One approach is
in a narrative form. Feldheim (1998) used a narrative approach by addressing the ethical
schools of thought as I did in chapter one and projecting how each ethical system would
structure medical delivery systems(Hoedemaekers & Dekkers, 2003). Another author
took the narrative to the next stage and proposed a specific normative check list to help
prioritize justice issues in the debate over healthcare (Hoedemaekers & Dekkers, 2003).
This checklist offered general topics such as “Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness”
along with sub topics such as “should narrow or broad definitions of health, illness, and
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health risk be used” (Hoedemaekers & Dekkers, 2003, p. 432). In this paper, the
questions were proposed as open-ended and there was no example of use of the checklist
given. Like the Equity Audits, the medical justice evaluation tools show the way forward.
Educational reform evaluation.
John Tharp (2007; 2008) produced in his dissertation and similar subsequent book
an examination of historical school reform efforts, comparing them to the model of
reforms ideals put forth by Seymour Sarason. In doing this he was able to take the
theoretical ideas of a prolific author and compare them to real world educational reform
efforts. This is very similar to my efforts to take the theoretical writings of Rawls and
create a way to measure real policy documents. In that it allows me to take the conceptual
idea of a justice measurement from the idea of Equity Audits and the justice checklist
from the medical justice evaluation and combine them in a way that provides evidence by
which to judge fealty to a theoretical model, I have chosen to use Tharp’s model.
My Proposed Tool to Measure Justice in Educational Policy
Foundations
Like Tharp, I will adopt Gardner’s model and terminology of “levers” and
“arenas” to describe the larger conceptions of Rawlsian justice as “arenas” and the
specific action oriented “levers” as the specific impacts of the policy under evaluation.
As such I will look at how each policy document promotes or retards the three Basic
principles (or arenas) of Rawlsian philosophy as described in chapter 2: (a) Basic
Liberties, (b) Fair Equality of Opportunity, (c) The Difference Principle. I am proposing
that, in a Rawlsian view, schools have specific obligations in each of these arenas in
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order to fill their place in a just society. In order to do so, the governing policy documents
should, at best, require actions that support these social goals and at the least, not hinder
or forbid schools to act in support of these arenas of justice. To create a rubric I will
assign each of these larger arenas action oriented “levers”. Figure 1 illustrates how the
levers relate to the arenas.
The overarching question of this dissertation is dealing with specific educational
policy documents, so the rubric will ask specific questions about the specific policy
document’s relationship to these large questions. Thus the three arenas are more fully
explained as (a) Basic Liberties: Does the policy document provide for all citizens to
exercise equal basic rights and liberties in the design and implementation of publicly
funded education? (Rawls, 1999) (b) Fair Equality of Opportunity: Does the policy
document promote an educational system that provides young people a fair equality of
opportunity? (c) Difference Principle: Does the policy document promote an educational
system that brings the most benefit to those who are the least advantaged?
Each of these arenas is then supported by the levers, or mechanisms by which the
goals are brought to fruition. It is the levers that this study will use directly in the rubric
to measure policy alignment with Rawlsian justice.
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Figure 1: Arenas and Levers: Proposed Version
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Following the example of Tharp I have created a table based rating system, Table
2, to explain and record my findings for each of the twelve levers in each of the policy
documents analyzed. Though Tharp had a one way rating system measuring observable
characteristics, I have created a two-way measure of both supporting Rawlsian justice
and opposing Rawlsian justice.
Table 2: Criteria Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive
Positive
Not Addressed/
Not Applicable
Negative
Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document directly addresses this justice lever in a way
that supports Rawlsian justice
The policy indirectly addresses this justice lever in a way that
supports Rawlsian justice
The policy does not have language that appears to impact this lever
of Rawlsian justice
The policy indirectly addresses this justice lever in a way that
opposes Rawlsian justice
The policy document directly addresses this justice lever in a way
that opposes Rawlsian justice
The Twelve Levers

Each of the twelve levers or action points has its own rubric for measurement.
None of these twelve should be taken in and of themselves as a measure of justice, but
rather as indicators of attention given to Rawlsian justice. Only by assessing for all
twelve do I imagine to give a report on the justice of a particular policy document.
Basic Liberties.
The reader will recall that Rawls’s focus was on basic social institutions and how
they are obligated to both preserve and enhance a whole scheme of basic liberties. The
most basic of these deals with personal independence, self-respect and political inclusion
(Freeman, 2007). Thus, as a nation’s educational system is a prima fascia example of a
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basic institution, a Rawlsian approach demands the educational system to actively
support these basic liberties. For the sake of clarity and to prevent overlapping measures,
this arena will focus not on the liberties of the children but on adult citizens.
Democratic educational system.
The right to democratic participation in the basic governmental structures is
foundational to all other rights (Rawls, 1999a, p. 53); as such, the first characteristic of
educational policy must be its democratic nature. Political access cannot be based on
income, social status or professional status. The larger the institutional size the more
concern must be given to preserving political access; institutional efficiency cannot
justify exclusion (Rawls, 1999a, p. 56). Just policy measures must provide sufficient
meaningful citizen input so as to support the individual’s sense of efficacy.
Table 3: Democratic Education System Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive
Not Addressed
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document explicitly requires meaningful local citizen
involvement in the decision making process, implementation and
review of the policy.
The policy document requires local citizen involvement in at least
one of the processes of decision making, implementation or review.
The policy does not require citizen involvement, nor does it create
bureaucratic barriers to the citizen involvement.
The policy places large portions of the policy decision making,
implementation and/or review out of reach of citizen impact. It is
largely governed by bureaucratic/professional processes.
The policy places large portions of the policy decision making,
implementation and/or review out of reach of citizens or local
elected officials. It is highly governed by bureaucratic/professional
processes.
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Equality of the person.
The equality of the individual when dealing with governmental entities must be
preserved. Basic institutional policy must take steps to compensate for the tendency to
move away from equality (Rawls, 2005, p. 268).
Table 4: Equality of the Person Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Addressed
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document has explicit measures to ensure
representation by all strata of the local community in the decision
making, implementation and review of the policy. The policy
requires active measures to ensure inclusion of traditionally
voiceless groups.
The policy addresses measures to ensure representation by all
strata of the local community in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy indirectly. Inclusion
measures are vague or voluntary.
The policy measure does not address inclusion, nor does it favor
certain groups by education, profession or income.
The policy indirectly favors certain individuals by favoring certain
credentials (education, license or affiliation) or group identities in
the decision making, implementation and review of the policy
process.
The policy document explicitly privileges or excludes individuals
based on credentials (education, license or affiliation) or group
identities in the decision making, implementation and review of the
policy process.

Overlapping consensus.
Basic government institutions, including educational systems, cannot endorse or
inhibit comprehensive doctrines unless they directly imperil basic liberties of citizens
(Freeman, 2007, pp. 328-330). Comprehensive doctrines include both religion and
systematic secular systems that provide an overarching meaning of life and basic
questions of values. These systems cannot invade the educational space by excluding or
privileging citizens in their political access or influence.
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Table 5: Overlapping Consensus Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Applicable
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy actively supports the basic liberties while actively
encouraging a variety of voices from various comprehensive
doctrines in the decision making, implementation and review of the
policy as well as in the operations of the educational system
governed by the policy.
The policy supports the basic liberties while passively encouraging
a variety of voices from various comprehensive doctrines in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy as well
as in the operations of the educational system governed by the
policy.
The policy does not have language that addresses any
comprehensive doctrine.
The policy allows for a particular comprehensive doctrine to be
favored and/or disfavored via a failure to require neutrality by both
the community majority and/or the bureaucratic philosophical
position in the decision making, implementation and review of the
policy as well as in the operations of the educational system
governed by the policy.
The policy explicitly requires or highly favors a particular
comprehensive doctrine in the decision making, implementation
and review of the policy as well as in the operations of the
educational system governed by the policy.

Limitation of bureaucratic reach.
The home and family choices of values are a basic liberty. Just as overlapping
consensus forbids the establishment of a comprehensive doctrine in the school, similarly
the public has reach into the home for only the direst of circumstances (Rawls, 1999a, p.
405). Thus educational policy that infringes on the family and/or undermines the
comprehensive doctrine taught at home is only acceptable if such actions pose a direct
threat to the more basic liberty of self-determination.
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Table 6: Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Applicable
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document explicitly limits the power of the
bureaucracy, educational officials and/or elected officials to use
the educational system to impinge on the basic liberties of parents,
children or families except in clear cases of protection of more
basic liberties. This also forbids the undermining of the parent’s
comprehensive doctrine or culture by school officials, except when
it clearly is in support of basic liberties and support of the doctrine
of overlapping consensus.
The policy document reduces and or places parameters on the
power of the bureaucracy, educational officials and/or elected
officials to use the educational system to impinge on the basic
liberties of parents, children or families except in clear cases of
protection of more basic liberties. This also forbids the
undermining of the parents comprehensive doctrine or culture by
school officials, except when it clearly is in support of basic
liberties and support of the doctrine of overlapping consensus.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy document passively allows the bureaucracy and/or
educational officials to use the educational system to enforce or
suppress a particular comprehensive doctrine. In doing this the
basic liberties of parents, children and/or families are violated.
The exception is in the support of the most basic liberties and of
the doctrine of overlapping consensus.
The policy document directly requires the bureaucracy and/or
educational officials to use the educational system to enforce or
suppress a particular comprehensive doctrine. In doing this the
basic liberties of parents, children and/or families are violated.
The exception is in the support of the most basic liberties and of
the doctrine of overlapping consensus. The most extreme example
of this was the U.S. Government’s efforts to use schools to
eradicate the culture and values of the native Americans.

The Difference Principle.
Under a Rawlsian conception of justice, those children with the least in resources
are due the most support from the school system. Rawls explains (Rawls, 1999a, §14 15) that least favored might be taken to mean many things including social status, income
and abilities. Thus the difference principle as applied to educational policy has broad and
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very significant implications; however, Rawls does not expect equal outcomes, only a
system designed to disproportionally assist those with the most need (Freeman, 2007, pp.
92-93). While the basic liberties arena was cast as being adult centered, the difference
principle in this evaluation will be student centered.
Early childhood preventive measures.
Building on the evidence cited in chapter two of the significant deficit faced by
low income children when they enter school, the difference principle appears to demand
empirically based very early intervention. It is beyond the scope of this study to specify
what type of intervention is most effective, but the acceptance of the social obligation to
intervene must be explicit.
Table 7: Early Childhood Preventive Measures Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Applicable
Negative
Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document explicitly states that the process to provide
equity across the income spectrum begins at birth, rather than
waiting until the age of 5. Specifics might be spread over many
educational policy documents; ratifying the principle of the
obligation of early intervention is what matters here.
The policy document implicitly states that the process to provide
the equity across the income spectrum begins at birth, rather than
waiting until the age of 5. Specifics might be spread over many
educational policy documents; implying the obligation of early
intervention to educational policy is what matters here.
Policies targeted at narrow age targets (i.e. high school) would not
be applicable to this measure.
The policy is broad enough in scope to include early intervention
language, but does not.
The policy explicitly denies the responsibility for early childhood
intervention.
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Ongoing assistance for students.
Early intervention is only the beginning. Students whose progress is adversely
impacted by either internal or external factors have a right to expect assistance
throughout their educational career. Rawlsian distributive justice would say that any child
who is not operating at his/her maximum potential should be given assistance for as long
as needed. This would include not only assistance for both physical and mental obstacles
to reaching their potential, but it would also include low expectations due to class or other
social factors. The measure of success isn’t “average” but rather the maximum of their
ability. For instance a LD child or autistic child should not be dropped from service
because they meet a minimum performance level, but rather only when they are as
functional as they can be, even if that is far beyond a “minimum” or statistical average.
Table 8: Ongoing Assistance for Students Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Applicable
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document requires compensatory assistance is provided
for children who are performing below their maximum capability
due to disability or to socioeconomic status. The policy should
require this assistance to be provided for as long as needed to reach
and maintain that level of functioning.
The policy document requires compensatory assistance is provided
for children who are performing below their maximum capability
due to disability or to socioeconomic status.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant
The policy addresses performance delays due in part to disability
or to socioeconomic status but puts narrow limits on service type
or duration.
The policy document should have addressed children with delays
due in part to disability or to socioeconomic status but did not do
so.
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Compensation for low social capital.
The concern was raised in chapter one that children from low income homes often
do not have parents with sufficient social capital to ensure the system works to their best
advantage. Sacks (2007) showed how parental influence and knowledge of the
educational system skewed the outcomes in favor of wealthier children. Disempowering
the involved parents is not an appropriate way to find balance, thus the just policy must
include measures for child advocacy that mimics the positive effects of social capital.
Table 9: Compensation for Low Social Capital Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive
Not Applicable
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document requires independent advocates for low SES
children and parents with authority to act in loco parentis if the
parent and/or child wish.
The policy document requires schools to provide social workers or
other semi-autonomous advocates for low SES children.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy is determined to be complicated and or otherwise
disempowering to low income parents with no advocate for the
child outside the local school’s zone of direct control.
The policy creates or supports bureaucracy that makes significant
decisions for children without a required parental consultation and
with no advocate for the child outside the local school’s zone of
direct control.

Financial adequacy.
It is axiomatic that if schools are to achieve the compensatory goals envisioned by
Rawls, there must be adequate and equitable funding. Because Rawls valuates financial
liberties as secondary issues, the needs of providing a just education outweigh the
economic liberty rights of citizens, thus paving the way for sufficient taxation to achieve
equity. It could be argued, as the CED does, that provision of adequate funds for just
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education will achieve a net economic benefit (Freeman, 2007, pp. 88-89); however, by
making such an argument the case for the primacy of justice is undermined.
Table 10: Financial Adequacy Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Addressed
Negative
Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
needs of every student and is disproportionally spent on the
children who are the least advantaged.
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
needs of every student and at least as much money is spent on the
children who are the least advantaged as is spent on the most
advantaged.
The policy does not address finance.
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
needs of every student but does not address equality of spending.
The policy document addresses funding but does not require
funding that is sufficient for the needs of every student nor does it
require equality of spending.

Fair Equality of Opportunity.
The concept that the community has an obligation to ensure every child, at the
end of their schooling to have the opportunity to pursue any path to self-fulfillment that
his or her talents and desires lead (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 62-63) provides a clear, albeit
demanding, mandate for publicly funded schooling (Freeman, 2007, p. 90). In this project
I will only look at schooling through the end of high school, though Rawls could be
interpreted to intend public funding to post-secondary education. It should be noted that
the FEO principle takes lexical priority over the difference principle in the same way that
the first principle takes priority over the second (Freeman, 2007, p. 92). Thus, in a
Rawlsian evaluation, it is just for the FEO or the basic liberties to impinge on the arena of
difference principle.
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Compensatory social capital.
This is different than that noted in the last arena where the state is expected to act
in loco parentis to advocate for the child; rather, the thrust here is to provide the
educational and social experiences that are not available to a socially or economically
marginalized child. Rawls argued “Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills
should not depend upon one’s class position and so the school system, whether public or
private, should be designed to even out class barriers” (emphasis mine) (Rawls, 1999a, p.
64). This is as strong as any statement Rawls ever wrote about education. For him the
import- ance of this lies in the fact that the ability to participate in the sociopolitical world
is an integral part of having a fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 54 -55). The
ability to do this is part of social capital, the development of which can be facilitated in
the school setting (Farrell, Tayler, & Tennent, 2004; Terrion, 2006); and in a Rawlsian
system of justice is requisite.
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Table 11: Compensatory Social Capital Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Addressed
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document explicitly acknowledges the value of the
social capital amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic
homes and the communities’ obligation to provide compensatory
experiences to children from low SES homes.
The policy indirectly acknowledges the value of the social capital
amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic homes and the
communities’ obligation to provide compensatory experiences to
children from low SES homes.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy is relevant to compensatory education, poverty or
achievement gap but fails to acknowledge the impact of social
capital.
The policy actively reduces the social capital of low income
children through creating barriers such as financial cost of
participation or transportation to low income students without
addressing and correcting this equality of access issue.

Valuation of non-monetary life goals.
To Rawls, the goal of a just society is first and foremost to have citizens who have
respect for themselves and equal respect for others. Using the Aristotelian concept of
maximum utilizing of talent being the greatest good, a Rawlsian view would see the end
of successful education as the preparation for self-fulfillment. Thus, educational policy
should reflect maximization of self as a goal as an end in itself as opposed to utilitarian
economic goals.
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Table 12: Valuation of non-Monetary Life Goals Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Addressed
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document specifically identifies the student’s selfmaximization as the end goal of the publicly funded educational
process. References to monetary rewards or economic benefit
should only be present in an ancillary fashion.
The policy document gives equal weight to the student’s selfmaximization and monetary rewards/economic benefit as the end
goals of the publicly funded educational process.
The policy does not have language that relates to the goals of the
educational process.
The policy document specifically identifies monetary rewards or
economic benefit as the end goal of the publicly funded
educational process. References to student’s self-maximization are
only present in an ancillary fashion.
The policy document only identifies monetary rewards or
economic benefit as the end goal of the publicly funded
educational process.

Differentiated instruction and testing.
Students with learning disabilities, mental health and/or physical challenges fall
within the “least well off” category and thus a just educational policy must include
measures within the learning environment to ensure these students have equal standing
with other students via differentiated instruction. Educational policy should be written to
allow flexibility to both classroom teachers and to administration so as to allow for
students with special needs to be a full part of the larger school community.
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Table 13: Differentiated Instruction Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Addressed
Negative

Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy provides flexibility in instructional and special
assistance requirements for those students with special needs to
experience full participation in the social milieu of the school.
Testing requirements must be psychometrically valid in method so
as to be both informative as to the student’s real progress in the
discreet subject matter while accommodating for non-subject
disabilities.
The policy provides flexibility in instructional and special
assistance requirements for those students with special needs to
have minimal exclusion in the social milieu of the school. Testing
requirements are flexible enough not to mislabel disabled students
as students who are not learning.
The policy does not touch on any issues related to the needs of
disabled students.
The policy provides limited flexibility in instructional and special
assistance options for those students with special needs that lead to
some exclusion in the social milieu of the school. Testing
requirements have limited flexibility sometimes requiring disabled
students to abide by the same procedural rules as non-disabled,
thus skewing results.
The policy is not flexible in instructional and special assistance
options for those students with special needs that lead to a large
degree of exclusion in the social milieu of the school. Testing
requirements are not flexible requiring disabled students to abide
by the same procedural rules as non-disabled, thus skewing results

Equal social political opportunity focus.
Since the ultimate aim of the publicly funded school is to allow each graduating
student to take an equal and active part of civil society (Rawls, 2001, p. 56), the skills to
do so must be integral to the academic program. Civics, policies theory, rhetoric and
community life would not be “extras” in a Rawlsian system, but have equal footing with
reading skills. The Rawlsian model of liberal democracy hinges on a citizenry that has
the verbal and political skills to engage one another.
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Table 14: Equal Social Political Opportunity Focus Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Positive

Positive

Not Addressed
Negative
Highly Negative

Indicator
The policy document directly addresses the primacy of the
sociopolitical life of citizens. The academic core of curriculum is
in effective citizen production. Systematic coursework that leads to
civic competence are given equal weight with reading and math.
The policy document recognizes the importance of the
sociopolitical life of citizens. Effective citizen production is one of
the prime goals of the academic curriculum. Systematic
coursework that leads to civic competence, including government,
civics and rhetoric are given significant weight throughout the
student’s educational career.
The policy does not address curriculum or goals of publicly funded
education.
The policy that governs curricular content gives little emphasis to
civic education but requires some civic coursework.
The policy crowds out all civic oriented coursework in favor of
dominated-by-business functional classes.
Analytic Method

Each policy document will be coded based on the twelve levers. Using the
methods laid out by Saldaña (2009) I shall use a holistic-attribute coding system. I will be
working through a great deal of text looking for references to any of the specific topics
covered by the rubrics for the twelve levers; this might be expressly stated or implied in
many lines or even pages. Saldaña (2009) describes holistic coding as “an attempt to
grasp basic themes or issues in the data by absorbing them as a whole rather than by
analyzing them line for line” (p. 119) Thus in the first round the approach will be often be
holistic in that I will synthesize the entire policy document into codes.
Once the entire document has been coded for the first time, Saldaña (2009) then
writes that a second round of coding is necessary to conduct “axial coding” so as to place
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the different sections of text somewhere on one of the twelve rubrics. The final phase will
be to synthesize the different codes by both assigning scores for the twelve individual
questions as well as a narrative to both justify the scores given and to make a summary
about the document’s relationship to Rawlsian justice.
Document Selection
Educational policy in the United States is described as being decentralized
(Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003; Tyack et al., 1987) in that there is no one place to find
the governing documents for all U.S. schools. Not only are schools governed by both
national and state legislation, numerous bureaucratic departments also produce their own
rules that govern the operation of publicly funded schools in the U.S. (Davies, 2007).
The primary purpose of this this study is to test the evaluation tool. Thus the
primary criteria for the policy to evaluate were that it was both relevant to current
educational practice and that is was comprehensive in comprehensive scope. Title I of the
2001 revision of the Elementary and Secondary schools Act, better known as No Child
Left Behind (ESEA/NCLB) fit this needs of these criteria.
The original ESEA was passed in 1965 as part of the War on Poverty, at a
moment in history when there was (for a brief moment) a large national consensus that
the United States should and could eradicate poverty (Ravitch, 1983). President Johnson
had won re-elections in a historic landslide and brought with him an overwhelmingly
Democrat congress. Even still the contentious issue of federal involvement in public
education remained a serious concern to many. However, Johnson by tying the ESEA to
the Great Society program was able to rhetorically link ESEA to the recently passed
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Economic Opportunity Act, and thereby give the appearance of this act being more social
than educational (Davies, 2007). Title I was arguably the centerpiece of the legislation,
accounting for $1 billion of the $1.3 Billion allocated to implement ESEA. Entitled
“Financial Assistance to Local Educational Agencies for the Education of Children of
Low Income Families”, Title I brought federal money to no less than 94% of the counties
in the US. The primacy of Tile I funding has not abated with $14.5 billion allocated to the
program in 2011 (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). For the reason of size and
impact, I chose Title I as the policy to test this evaluation tool.
Evaluation Tool Revision
The proposed tool in this chapter should not be assumed to be the tool that will
appear in the final version of my dissertation. This dissertation’s purpose is the creation
of a usable tool. The wording of the tool in this proposal is just the first version and as
such it should be assumed that as the process of aligning current policy with the tool
proceeds, there will necessarily be changes in the wording of the lever questions. The
arena questions will not change as they represent the three general thrusts made by
Rawls, using his terminologies.
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CHAPTER 4
The purpose of this study is to develop and test a tool for the measuring of
intrinsic justice in educational documents. Chapter 2 laid out the philosophical
justification and chapter 3 presented the prosed tool and how it will be used. The purpose
of this chapter is to present the data from the initial analysis of the use of the individual
levers. The structure of this chapter is designed to help the reader see how each lever
stands on its own, before I present how they work in conjunction in chapter 5.
Structure of this Chapter
This chapter consists primarily of the analysis of each of the levers presented in
chapter 3 and two additional levers added during the process. For each lever the revised
explicatory narrative and the revised table of indicators is presented followed by an
analysis of the text of Tile I using the revised lever. The axial themes are presented and
then a summary judgment as to Title I’s justice based on the Table indicators. Following
the Title I analysis I present my notes on the tool development. Changes to the tool are
noted and justified, followed by a summary of difficulties that arose during the process.
At the beginning of each of the 3 arenas I have added a short explication of the arena to
position the subsequent levers within the overall Rawlsian approach to justice.
The order in which the levers in the analysis has been changed from what was
presented in chapter three in order to improve the logical progression of the concepts.
Additionally, I have added questions to each of the arenas in order to further clarify the
overarching question that drives each. The most significant change made in this revision
is to change the base format for the tools indicators. After I had completed all the lever
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assessments, it became evident that both the rating level descriptor words and the
indicators needed to be revised to reflect how they worked in the assessment process.
Table 15 reflects these changes.
Table 15: Criteria Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just
Just
Not Applicable
Unjust
Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document actively addresses this justice lever in a way
that supports Rawlsian justice.
The policy passively addresses this justice lever in a way that
supports Rawlsian justice.
The policy does not have control over this lever of Rawlsian
justice.
The policy indirectly addresses this justice lever in a way that
passively opposes Rawlsian justice.
The policy document directly addresses this justice lever in a way
that actively opposes Rawlsian justice.
Analysis

Basic Liberties: Does the Policy Promote Democratic Process and Citizen Liberty?
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights
and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in
this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be
guaranteed their fair value (Rawls, 2005, p. 6).
This arena reflects the primacy that Rawls puts on the equal access to political
life. Rawlsian liberalism places the ability to not only have theoretical equality of
political voice but in that voice to have “fair value” in real world political situations.
Because Rawls laid out the principle that it is the collective good that necessitates
collective action based on the scale of the need (Rawls, 1999a, p. 83), so too does the
scale of democratic institution need to be scaled to the size of action. I believe this is a
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fair interpretation of Rawls’s concept of distributive justice (Rawls, 1999b). National
issues like the military need national leadership, but local social institutions should be
governed locally. Only by this can the fair value of the citizen be preserved. This concept
of local democracy will color all the levers in this arena.
Lever: Democratic Educational System.
The revised lever.
The right to democratic participation in the basic governmental structures is
foundational to all other rights (Rawls, 1999a, p. 53; Rawls, 2005, p.11); as such, the first
characteristic of educational policy must be its democratic nature. Political access cannot
be based on income, social status or professional status; however, those issues are
addressed in the Equality of the Person lever. The larger the institutional size or political
unit, the more concern must be given to preserving political access; institutional
efficiency cannot justify exclusion (Rawls, 1999a, p. 56). Just policy measures must
provide sufficient meaningful and inclusive citizen input so as to support the individual’s
sense of efficacy.
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Table 16: Democratic Educational System Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just
Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document explicitly requires meaningful local citizen
involvement in the decision making process, implementation and
review of the policy.
The policy document requires local citizen involvement in at least
one of the processes of decision making, implementation or review.
The policy does not require citizen involvement, nor does it create
bureaucratic barriers to the citizen involvement.
The policy places large portions of the policy decision making,
implementation and/or review out of reach of local citizen impact.
It is largely governed by bureaucratic/professional processes.
The policy places large portions of the policy decision making,
implementation and/or review out of reach of citizens or local
elected officials. It is highly governed by bureaucratic/professional
processes.

Policy evaluation.
After reviewing those sections of Title I previously coded to be part of the
Democratic Education System Lever and considering the analytic notes made as I
conducted the second cycle of coding, I developed the following three axial themes:
notification, participation, and control. Each of these directly relate to the scale indicators
in Table 16.
Axial theme 1: Notification.
Sec. 1116 (b)(6)(E) an explanation of how the parents can become involved in
addressing the academic issues that caused the school to be identified for school
improvement; and (F) an explanation of the parents' option to transfer their child
to another public school.
Title I has many references to schools and states providing notification to the
public and to parents. As per Table 16, these notifications are mandatory and very
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specifically place the burden on the schools to provide information “in a language that
parents can understand” (Sec. 1111 (b)(3)(A)(xii); (Sec. 1111(b)(6). Furthermore, there
are requirements of hearings (Sec. 116 (c)(10)(D) and of timelines of the timely
publication of information. All this rates very high on an axial justice rating; however,
though notification is implied in Table 16, it was not listed because simple notification is
lexically inferior to decision making, implementation and review as required by table 16.
Axial theme 2: Participation.
§1001(12) affording parents substantial and meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children.
Parental involvement is promoted throughout Title I. §1118 is even entitled
Parental Involvement, and the entire section is given to that goal. Parental involvement
certainly can be at least partially equated with citizen involvement, perhaps even mostly
so, and “involvement” is specifically called for in Table 16. However, the tool is specific
that this involvement is to be in the decision making process, implementation and review
of policy. §114(b)(2)(B) states the school-wide reform plans envisioned by the legislation
shall be “developed with the involvement of parents and other members of the
community to be served and individuals who will carry out such plan, including teachers,
principals, and administrators (including administrators of programs described in other
parts of this title), and, if appropriate, pupil services personnel, technical assistance
providers, school staff, and, if the plan relates to a secondary school, students from such
school. . .” This would appear to be very strong language tied closely to the intent of this
lever. Furthermore, §1116(b)(3)(B), which deals with corrective action plans for
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unsuccessful schools, requires “feedback on the school improvement plan from parents
and community leaders.”
These provisions meet the criteria for a Just score on this axis; however,
reservations remain in that the policy does not make clear if the “parents and other
members of the community” are to be voting or ex officio members of such a planning
committee; nor does it use language to ensure those persons will be invited at sufficient
numbers to even balance, let alone control, the members representing the bureaucracy.
Axial theme 3: Control.
§1111(b)(2) (A) IN GENERAL- Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State
has developed and is implementing a single, statewide State accountability system
that will be effective in ensuring that all local educational agencies, public
elementary schools, and public secondary schools make adequate yearly progress
as defined under this paragraph. (B) SAME STANDARDS- The academic
standards required by subparagraph (A) shall be the same academic standards that
the State applies to all schools and children in the State.(C) SUBJECTS- The
State shall have such academic standards for all public elementary school and
secondary school children, including children served under this part, in subjects
determined by the State, but including at least mathematics, reading or language
arts, and (beginning in the 2005-2006 school year) science, which shall include
the same knowledge, skills, and levels of achievement expected of all children
§1111 (b)(2)(G) MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES- Each State shall establish
statewide annual measurable objectives, pursuant to subparagraph (C)(v), for
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meeting the requirements of this paragraph, and which-- (i) shall be set separately
for the assessments of mathematics and reading or language arts under subsection
(a)(3); (ii) shall be the same for all schools and local educational agencies in the
State;
Implementation and review of the policy is where Title I veers decidedly away
from Rawlsian justice. §1111 centralizes power in the state bureaucracy with no apparent
role for the local community. It gives the power to stipulate what should be taught and
how a successful education should be measured exclusively to the state’s professional
educational apparatus. In this process the role of the parents is recast into a passive
receiver of information mode.
§1111(d) PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT- Each State plan shall describe how the
State educational agency will support the collection and dissemination to local
educational agencies and schools of effective parental involvement practices.
Such practices shall—(1) be based on the most current research that meets the
highest professional and technical standards, on effective parental involvement
that fosters achievement to high standards for all children; and (2) be geared
toward lowering barriers to greater participation by parents in school planning,
review, and improvement experienced.
Though the words are of parental involvement, this is limited to the local school’s
efforts to achieve the tasks set out by the state. Such a statement can be seen in a negative
light of placing the local community in the position subservient to officials who are
beyond the reach of the democratic process. This eviscerates the fair value of the citizen’s
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voice, in this case, not just a select citizen, but the entire community. The legislation goes
on to describe penalties for failure to meet the state’s assigned goals for two years. In
§1111(b)(8)(B) the LEA is ordered to do one of the following:
(i)

Reopening the school as a public charter school.

(ii)

Replacing all or most of the school staff (which may include the
principal) who are relevant to the failure to make adequate yearly
progress.

(iii)

Entering into a contract with an entity, such as a private management
company, with a demonstrated record of effectiveness, to operate the
public school.

(iv)

Turning the operation of the school over to the State educational
agency, if permitted under State law and agreed to by the State.”

Table 16 defines as Highly Unjust any policy that places large portions of the policy
decision making, implementation and/or review out of reach of citizens or local elected
officials. It is highly governed by bureaucratic/professional processes; thus on this axis
Title I rates Highly Unjust.
Conclusion.
Despite the early positives seen in the first two axes, for Title I, the level of
injustice presented in the last axis trumps the good in the two previous ones. This is due
both the tepid conclusions for the first two axial themes, and the fact that the issue of
control in the last is more critical that the first two themes. I therefore conclude that on
the measure of fostering a Democratic Educational System, Title I is Unjust.
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Tool evaluation.
This lever, as spelled out in chapter 3, is designed to help the evaluator focus on
Rawls’s contention that political rights are foundational to a just democratic system and
that as a basic institution the educational system must be governed in a manner that
preserves the fair equality of all citizens. The idea of fair equality should be addressed on
two fronts: one is broad based access of the community to control basic institutions
(which is what this lever is intended to measure) and the other is fair access for all
citizens irrespective of their social status or other factors that have historically left certain
types of people out of the decision making process (which is addressed in another lever).
The explanatory portion of this lever was modified to make this distinction.
The original rating scale’s indicators (Table 3) were useful in identifying the
sections of the Title I that addressed the relevant issues and did not need clarification on
that point.
Difficulties:
1) I struggled over deciding the difference between the significance in calls for
parental involvement and community member involvement. Table 3 did not
make specific reference to parents, but rather only used the phrase “citizen
involvement”. I then considered changing the wording to “Parent and citizen
involvement”; however, I decided that the lever of Overlapping Consensus
covered the issue of parental control and that the call for citizen involvement
included parents and other family members. Thus I did not make the change.
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2) In the text of Title I, the practical meaning of “local control” became
somewhat difficult to manage in that the text spoke of schools, local
educational agencies (LEA) and of states. As compared to a national law, all
of these can be seen as more local than the federal government, and the term
LEA as defined in §9101 (26)(A) does not necessarily have any requirement
that the LEA be democratically elected or controlled. Part (B) sates, “The term
includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control
and direction of a public elementary school or secondary school.” Thus, much
of the project is hinged on these incomplete terms. However, in reading the
texts, it appeared that the writers did indeed equate LEA with local control.
Their failure to require such mechanisms was noted in the analysis. I did not
change the wording to this lever because it did uncover the weakness in the
legislation in that the LEA was not adequately defined.
Despite the noted difficulties, Table 16 operated as hoped to uncover the strengths
and weaknesses of Title I as it relates to the fostering of a democratic educational system
as a central social institution.
Lever: Overlapping Consensus.
The revised lever.
Rawls describes a comprehensive doctrine as “the culture of everyday life, of its
many associations: churches, and universities, learned and scientific societies and clubs
and teams to mention a few” (Rawls, 2005, p. 14). Civil society relies on an overlapping
consensus, the space where we all agree on basic conceptions of justice (Rawls, 1999, p.
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340). A stable democratic government depends on the mutual agreement that we need
only to have agreement on the most basic conceptions of justice; in all other matters
citizens may reasonably disagree (Rawls, 2005, p. 39).Therefore, basic government
institutions, including educational systems, cannot endorse or inhibit comprehensive
doctrines unless they directly imperil basic liberties of citizens (Freeman, 2007, pp. 328330).
Furthermore, educational policy that infringes on the family and/or undermines
the comprehensive doctrine taught at home is only acceptable if such actions pose a direct
threat to the more basic liberty of self-determination (Rawls, 1999b, p. 596).
Comprehensive doctrines include both religion and systematic secular systems that
provide an overarching meaning of life and basic questions of values (Rawls, 2005, p.
13). These systems cannot invade the educational space by excluding or privileging
citizens in their political access or influence.
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Table 17: Overlapping Consensus Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document explicitly forbids educational officials
and/or elected officials to use the educational system to
undermine the families’ comprehensive doctrine or culture,
except when it clearly is in support of basic liberties. The policy
actively supports the doctrine of overlapping consensus by
actively requiring or encouraging a variety of voices from
various comprehensive doctrines in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy as well as in the
operations of the educational system governed by the policy.
The policy document implicitly forbids educational officials
and/or elected officials to use the educational system to
undermine the families’ comprehensive doctrine or culture,
except when it clearly is in support of basic liberties. The policy
supports the doctrine of overlapping consensus by encouraging a
variety of voices from various comprehensive doctrines in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy as
well as in the operations of the educational system governed by
the policy.
The policy does not have language that addresses any
comprehensive doctrine.
The policy does not implicitly or explicitly limit the ability of
community majority and/or the bureaucratic structure to favor
and/or disfavor a particular comprehensive doctrine in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy nor
does the policy implicitly or explicitly limit the ability of schools
to favor/disfavor a particular comprehensive doctrine in
curricular materials or in providing access to students in
execution of the policy.
The policy actively opposes the doctrine of overlapping
consensus by explicitly empowering the community majority
and/or the bureaucratic structure to favor and/or disfavor a
particular comprehensive doctrine in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy; or, the policy explicitly
favors/disfavors a particular comprehensive doctrine in curricular
materials or in providing access to students in execution of the
policy.
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Policy evaluation.
Title I contains only the most Spartan references to preservation of overlapping
consensus and/or the prevention of a hegemony by any partial comprehensive doctrine. It
well might be that the crafters of the legislation assumed standard statutory provisions of
religion were sufficient; however, Rawls’s expansive view of comprehensive doctrine to
include non-theological systems of life render the current religious provisions
insufficient. This is one of the levers of justice that current policy makers are not
addressing at all. Second cycle coding concluded that this topic only has one clear
citation, that being §1120(a)(2) which applies only to federal funds going to private
schools and stipulate, “Such educational services or other benefits, including materials
and equipment, shall be secular, neutral, and non-ideological.”
For this lever, Title I did not generate sufficient data to create axial themes. The
assignment of the lever indicator Unjust reflects that on this lever the legislation did not
meet the request safeguard to ensure the preservation of overlapping consensus.
Tool evaluation.
This lever, as spelled out in chapter 3, required significant revision on both the
explanatory narrative and the indicators (Table 4). The original version of the explanatory
narrative did not fully justify the principle involved which undermined the power of the
indicators. Additionally, I decided the original version in chapter 3 had an unacceptably
high level of overlap with the lever Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach. These two levers
were both rewritten after approximately 50% of Title I had been first cycle coded. After
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the revisions, the previously coded sections were recoded to correspond to the revisions.
The indicators for this lever were again revised during second cycle coding.
Difficulties:
1) The primary problem in the measuring for overlapping consensus is most
certainly its very definition and what constitutes infringement. Rawls’s
descriptions make comprehensive doctrine look more like culture than a
formal theology or epistemology. In practice, the maintenance of overlapping
consensus might need court clarification; however, for this tool statements of
cultural inclusion such as in §1118(a)(2)(E) or the clear prohibition in
§1118(a)(2) “shall be secular, neutral, and nonideological” provide
justification that this lever is not overly vague.
2) Of potential concern could be the dearth of explicit textual evidence of this
lever. However, the single clear statement in §1118(a)(2) supports the idea
this topic can be addressed and conversely highlights the fact that the rest of
Title I fails to do so.
Table 17 operated as hoped to uncover the lack of safeguards for citizen’s
comprehensive doctrines in Title I.
Lever: Equality of the Person.
The revised lever.
The equality of the individual when dealing with governmental entities must be
preserved. Basic institutional policy must take steps to compensate for the tendency to
move away from equality (Rawls, 2005, p. 268). This lever is best understood as the
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“fair” part in his conception of “fair value of political liberties” (Rawls, 2005, p. 357).
Rawls envisioned an ideal where “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an
equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of
authority irrespective of their economic and social class” (Rawls, 2005, p. 358). Though
the practical effectiveness is predicated on the prior lever which measured the ability of
the public at large to influence educational policy, this lever will operate on the
assumption that the prior standard was met and will measure the efforts to ensure equal
influence on policy by all citizens.
Table 18: Equality of the Person Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document has explicit measures to ensure
representation by all social groupings within the local community
(with an emphasis on the families of children enrolled) in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy. The
policy requires active measures to ensure inclusion of traditionally
voiceless groups.
The policy document has measures to promote representation by
all social groupings within the local community (with an emphasis
on the families of children enrolled) in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy indirectly.
The policy measure does not address inclusion, nor does it favor
certain groups by education, profession or income.
The policy indirectly favors certain individuals by favoring certain
credentials (education, license or affiliation) or group identities in
the decision making, implementation and review of the policy
process.
The policy document explicitly excludes the citizenry in the
decision making, implementation and/or review of the process via
credential requirements (education, license or affiliation) or
requirements of official status.
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Policy evaluation.
This lever is particularly important given the diversity of the US population and
the historical de facto and de jure policies that have prevented the fair equality of the
every citizen’s political voice. In review of the relevant policy sections there were thirtytwo sections that made direct reference this lever. These references formed three themes:
income class, language, and unrepresented groups.
Axial theme 1: Income class.
This axial theme addresses how the legislation deals with equity of
persons of different income groups. §1235(a) addresses this specifically when it
requires inclusion:
(1) as indicated by a low level of income, a low level of adult literacy or English
language proficiency of the eligible parent or parents, and other need-related
indicators; (2) include screening and preparation of parents, including teenage
parents, and children to enable those parents and children to participate fully in
the activities and services provided under this subpart, including testing, referral
to necessary counseling, other developmental and support services, and related
services; (3) be designed to accommodate the participants' work schedule and
other responsibilities, including the provision of support services, when those
services are unavailable from other sources, necessary for participation in the
activities assisted under this subpart, such as — (A) scheduling and locating of
services to allow joint participation by parents and children; (B) child care for the
period that parents are involved in the program provided under this subpart; and
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(C) transportation for the purpose of enabling parents and their children to
participate in programs authorized by this subpart;
(e) To ensure effective involvement of parents and to support a partnership among
the school involved, parents, and the community to improve student academic
achievement, each school and local educational agency assisted under this part —
This section is an excellent example of how legislation can be crafted to meet the
external needs in order to improve the voices of lower income citizens; in particular the
requirement to offer flexible meeting times, transportation and childcare. Furthermore,
the texts explicitly empowers the parents by stating the school “shall educate teachers,
pupil services personnel, principals, and other staff, with the assistance of parents, in the
value and utility of contributions of parents, and in how to reach out to, communicate
with, and work with parents as equal partners, implement and coordinate parent
programs, and build ties between parents and the school (§1118 e 3). This is exactly what
the tool’s language of “active measures to ensure representation” means. However, this
section is limited to Title I, Part B: Student Reading Skills Improvement Grants. It has
no applicability on the rest of Title I. As such, it serves more to highlight what is not
being required in the rest of the legislation than to ensure equal representation of the
poor. The lack of this type of specific proactive language in any of the other seven parts
of Title I leads to a low rating on this axis.
Axial theme 2: Language.
This axial theme evaluates how the legislation addresses issues of language as a
barrier to participating in the educational system.
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§1116(b)(7)(E) PUBLICATION AND DISSEMINATION– The local educational
agency shall publish and disseminate information regarding any corrective action
the local educational agency takes under this paragraph at a school -- (i) to the
public and to the parents of each student enrolled in the school subject to
corrective action; (ii) in an understandable and uniform format and, to the extent
practicable, provided in a language that the parents can understand; and (iii)
through such means as the Internet, the media, and public agencies.
Sixteen times in Title I the phrase “provided in a language that the parents can
understand,” or a similar phrase, appears. This meets the proactive standard of policy
requiring the school system to reach out to those who are cut off by language.
Furthermore, unlike Axial 1, this language is repeated throughout the legislation. Thus, I
rate Title One as Highly Just on this axial.
Axial theme 3: Underrepresented groups.
In the text many underrepresented groups are explicitly addressed such as in
§1232(a)(1) “children of migratory workers; the outlying areas; and Indian tribes and
tribal organizations.” §1411 has specific provisions to require the inclusion of Puerto
Rico. However, these required inclusions are geared for child participation and for
funding formulas, not for parents or other members of these communities. There is, for
instance, no requirement that local schools provide for meaningful input from migrant
families or that Native Americans have control of the educational programs governed by
Title I in their schools. I must conclude that the lack of meaningful directives to include
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any traditionally marginalized groups in decision making deserves an Unjust on this
axial.
Conclusion.
This discussion of the inclusion of groups in the democratic process could be seen
as contradictory to chapter 2 that discussed why this tool would measure individual
justice over group justice; however, calling for the assurances that all strata of society is
included in the political process is consistent with the very Rawlsian position that
political equity is an critical part, but not the whole, of a liberal conception of justice. I
therefore conclude that on the measure of fostering Equality of the Person, Title I has
portions that show how this can and should be done; however, these bright spots of
inclusion are the exception. The bulk of the legislation does not have meaningful
language to promote and maintain the equal voice of each citizen, therefore I conclude,
on the lever Equality of the Person, Title I is Unjust.
Tool evaluation.
This lever was designed to spotlight the parts of the legislation that promoted
equality of the person, and on this point it was very successful. The tool, by spotlighting
the parts of Title I that did an excellent job of inclusion, shows an equally bright light on
the holes in those efforts for inclusion. Only minor changes to the tool were required. The
explanatory portion of this lever was modified to clarify this lever’s subordinate position
to the Democratic Educational System lever. The original rating scale’s indicators (Table
4) were modified to clarify the relationship of children’s families as a privileged part of
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the larger community reflecting Rawls’s view that families are a basic structure of society
(Rawls, 1999b, p. 597).
Difficulties:
1) The largest struggle I had in this lever was the question of how to place the
term “parent involvement” into the larger lever of community involvement
and, ultimately, control. I tried to take in two different considerations, first of
parents being the subset of citizens with the most vested interests in education.
On the other hand, parents are still just a subset of the citizenry, and this lever
is about including all subsets. This is especially true in an era where “parents”
may no longer represent primary caregivers.
In the end I chose to modify the lever itself to specify families (rather than
parents) as a favored subset, but still just a subset of the larger community.
2) The dependency of this lever on the Democratic Educational System lever for
meaningfulness is absolute. If (as in this case) there is not meaningful citizen
participation in the larger policy, then this entire lever becomes moot. I added
a sentence to that effect into the narrative before table 18.
Notwithstanding the noted difficulties, Table 18 operated as hoped to uncover the
strengths and weakness of Title I as it relates to the promotion and maintenance of citizen
equality of political voice. The tool guided the development of the three axial themes and
the themes jointly provided me with a clear answer to the lever’s basic question.
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Lever: Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach.
The revised lever.
The educational system is a basic institution in society, and as such, Rawls’s principle of
participation applies to its management (Rawls, 1999a, p. 196-197). Rawls believed that a
society is a fair system of cooperation among equally empowered citizens (Rawls, 2005,
p. 16-17) and that even expressly guaranteed political rights can lose their fair value by
regulation over which the citizen has no control (Rawls, 2005, p. 358). In some ways this
is the inverse of the Democratic Educational System lever; however, the focus is
different, i.e. the prior lever had a focus on empowering the citizen, but the focus of this
lever is the restraint of power by the bureaucracy. Another way to distinguish the two is
that this lever is concerned with the power vested in non-democratic systems while the
prior lever was about the power vested in the citizenry.
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Table 19: Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document explicitly limits the power of the bureaucracy
to exercise control over local elected representatives, local
appointed educational personnel and private citizens in the
operation of local educational institutions to those circumstance
where such control is clearly required to maintain more basic
liberties.
The policy document implies limits in its authorization to federal
or state bureaucracy to exercise control over local elected
representatives, local appointed educational personnel and private
citizens in the operation of local educational institutions where
such control is intended to maintain more basic liberties.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy document implicitly empowers federal or state
bureaucracies to exercise control over local elected representatives,
local appointed educational personnel and private citizens in the
operation of local educational institutions in order to meet state or
national objectives.
The policy document explicitly authorizes or otherwise empowers
state and local bureaucracy to fully control local educational
institutions without oversight or input of local elected
representatives, locally appointed educational personal and private
citizens.

Policy evaluation.
The axial theme of this lever revolves around the levels of bureaucratic power:
state, federal and local. Title I is composed of hundreds of references to the powers and
obligations of these three bureaucratic systems.
Axial theme 1: Power of Federal Department of Education.
§1111(a)(5)(B)(i) meet all of the criteria in this subsection and any regulations
regarding such standards and assessments that the Secretary may publish; and
§1111(d)(1) The Secretary shall (C) approve a State plan within 120 days of its
submission unless the Secretary determines that the plan does not meet the
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requirements of this section; (D) if the Secretary determines that the State plan
does not meet the requirements of subsection (a), (b), or (c), immediately notify
the State of such determination and the reasons for such determination; (E) not
decline to approve a State's plan before (i) offering the State an opportunity to
revise its plan; (ii) providing technical assistance in order to assist the State to
meet the requirements of subsections (a), (b), and (c); and (iii) providing a
hearing; and (F) have the authority to disapprove a State plan for not meeting the
requirements of this part, but shall not have the authority to require a State, as a
condition of approval of the State plan, to include in, or delete from, such plan
one or more specific elements of the State's academic content standards or to use
specific academic assessment instruments or items.
Title I refers to the Secretary of Education 346 times and in 197 of those case the
reference is followed by the operational words may or shall. Many of these references are
strictly obligations such as in 1119(b)(2)(A) where it states “the Secretary shall publish a
notice in the Federal Register seeking public comment”; however, others as noted above
give enormous discretionary powers to the US Department of Education bureaucracy
with no statutory appeal or oversight.
There are limitations on such authority such as
§1116 (d) CONSTRUCTION– Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter
or otherwise affect the rights, remedies, and procedures afforded school or school
district employees under Federal, State, or local laws (including applicable
regulations or court orders) or under the terms of collective bargaining
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agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other agreements between such
employees and their employers.
However, as the text states, these limits are only imposed externally, not
internally within the legislation. This would achieve the Just rating for Limitation of
Bureaucratic Reach, as the state law is explicitly allowed to trump this federal
legislation. Therefore this axial theme is rated Just.
Axial theme 2: Power of State Departments of Education.
§1111(b)(2)(A) IN GENERAL- Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State
has developed and is implementing a single, statewide State accountability system
that will be effective in ensuring that all local educational agencies, public
elementary schools, and public secondary schools make adequate yearly progress
as defined under this paragraph.
§1111 (b)(2)(I) Each year, for a school to make adequate yearly progress under
this paragraph -- (i) each group of students described in subparagraph (C)(v) must
meet or exceed the objectives set by the State under subparagraph (G).
Title I very explicitly gives enormous power to the individual state departments of
education. This power is spelled out in 352 different references to this bureaucracy. Like
in the federal statutes, there are some cases where the individual state departments of
education are given responsibilities of support or notification; however, as in the above
references, the power vested in the state level bureaucratic system is one of significant
control. Like the above axial theme, §1116(d) explicitly limits the power of this law to
give state regulators power over local schools and communities. This does imply that
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Title I forbids state laws to give state level bureaucracy that control over local schools;
however, that issue is outside the evaluation of Title I. The most local input that Title I
requires in these cases is consultation with local officials such as in §1111(a)(1);
however, this does not appear to be anything more than just that consultation.
As for the content of Title I’s text, I judge it Unjust because although the caveat in
§1116(d) implies some local control, the rest of the document, in its empowerment to set
and judge standards, appears to assume such control is already out of the reach of local
officials.
Axial theme 3: Power of local educational agencies (LEA’s).
§1113(b)(7) A State educational agency that receives a grant under this subsection
shall allocate at least 95 percent of the grant funds directly to local educational
agencies for schools identified for school improvement, corrective action, or
restructuring to carry out activities under section §1116(b), or may, with the
approval of the local educational agency, directly provide for these activities or
arrange for their provision through other entities such as school support teams or
educational service agencies.
Despite the above guarantee of receiving most of the Title I moneys, the vast
majority of the 222 references to LEA’s were not to stipulate their power over their
school systems, but rather to relate the obligations they incur under this legislation. This
is the exact opposite of the state and federal axial themes. Title I clearly envisions the
LEA as subject to the control of state and federal regulatory bureaucracy. The detail and
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level of control over local officials looks very much like the Highly Unjust rating level in
Table 19. Thus for this axial theme I rated Title I as Unjust.
Conclusion.
Table 19 calls for the policy to clearly limit the latitude of the bureaucratic
structure as a measure of democratic justice. Title I does not do this. Though one of the
axial themes rated as just and two as unjust, the overarching pattern of this legislation is
to highly empower unelected officials to exercise enormous and unchecked power over
LEA’s and local communities. According to the indicators on Table 19, Title I is very
problematic in its impact on democratic justice. The indicator for Highly Unjust sates
“The policy document explicitly authorizes or otherwise empowers state and local
bureaucracy to fully control local educational institutions without oversight or input of
local elected representatives, locally appointed educational personal and private citizens.”
I therefore conclude that on the measure of fostering a Democratic Educational System,
Title I is Highly Unjust.
Tool evaluation.
This lever was entirely rewritten. The prior version of this lever was focused on
bureaucratic threats to the overlapping consensus, while the current version is more basic
with a more general concern about the power of the bureaucratic mechanisms. This
change came as a direct result of the review of Title I and the legislation’s empowerment
of both state departments of education and of LEAs.
Difficulties:

151

1) As noted above, once I had evaluated half of Title I, I realized I had problems
with several of the levers in the first arena. There was too much overlap
between this lever and Overlapping Consensus and there was not sufficient
separation between the concept of empowering citizens and the limiting of the
power of unelected officials in the Democratic Education System lever. The
solution was to modify the other two levers and completely rewrite this one in
order to capture the concepts originally envisioned.
2) Of particular concern in the rewrite was the need to separate the intent of this
lever from that of Democratic Educational System. This was done primarily in
the second half of the narrative text that emphasizes the directionality of this
lever.
Table 19 as revised did operate as hoped to uncover the strengths and weakness of
Title I as it relates to the need to limit the reach of bureaucratic systems.
The Difference Principle: Does this policy provide for disproportionate resource
allocation to the Least Advantaged Children?
“Social and economic inequalities are to . . . be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society.” (Rawls, 2005, p. 6)
I am aware that strictly speaking, Rawls’s use of the difference principle is
primarily presented as an economic concept dealing with the distribution of basic goods
as presented in A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1999a, p.65). I have, however, taken his
broader view of goods as all the things necessary to build a just and equitable society
(Rawls 1999b, p. 361). Thus, the call for disproportionate educational resource
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allocations for the least advantaged is squarely within the intent of the Rawls’s difference
principle.
Though Kant and Locke both supported the proposition that it was government’s
role to support the poor (Freeman, 2007, p. 86), Rawls takes this further by his concept of
an obligation to all the least advantaged, not just the poor (Rawls, 1999a, p. 83). Rawls
calls it background justice when the systems are created to increase the likelihood of a
just outcome of procedural justice (Rawls, 2001, §14). The levers in this area are
designed to measure the policy’s commitment to providing disproportionate resources to
the least favored children.
Lever: Ongoing Assistance for Least Advantaged Students.
The revised lever.
Rawlsian distributive justice requires that children who are least advantaged and
are not progressing to their maximum potential should be given assistance for as long as
needed. This includes assistance for both physical and mental obstacles to reaching the
child’s potential. The policy stipulates that measure of success cannot be “average” but
rather the maximum of the individual child’s ability. This lever is not measuring
resources directed at needy schools but to individual children.
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Table 20: Ongoing Assistance for Least Advantaged Students Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document requires identification of and compensatory
assistance for the least advantaged children who are performing
below their maximum capability. The policy should require this
assistance to be provided for as long as needed to reach and
maintain that level of functioning.
The policy document requires identification of and compensatory
assistance for the least advantaged children who are performing
below their maximum capability. The policy does not require
individualized assessment for maximum ability but rather uses
generic benchmarks to cut off compensatory services.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy addresses student performance but makes no effort to
disaggregate to identify the least advantaged children or does not
require compensatory assistance for such children.
The policy document addresses student performance and either (1)
allows disproportionate resources for the most advantaged
children, or (2) forbids disproportionate resources allocated to the
least favored.
Policy Evaluation

Title I has a great deal of text that cycle one coding related to this lever (36
pages). That provided an early indicator that this would be well covered, and it was. In
particular, Title I includes a great deal of specific guidance for ensuring the needs of very
vulnerable students, such the children of migrant workers. Second cycle coding found a
total of six themes that once I reanalyzed, I was able to collapse into the three below:
assessment/identification, coordination and continuation.
Axial theme 1: Assessment/identification.
§1115(2) CHILDREN INCLUDED- (A) IN GENERAL- Children who are
economically disadvantaged, children with disabilities, migrant children or
limited English proficient children, are eligible for services under this part on the
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same basis as other children selected to receive services under this part. (D)
NEGLECTED OR DELINQUENT CHILDREN- A child in a local institution for
neglected or delinquent children and youth or attending a community day
program for such children is eligible for services under this part. (E) HOMELESS
CHILDREN- A child who is homeless and attending any school served by the
local educational agency is eligible for services under this part.
§1301(3) ensure that migratory children are provided with appropriate educational
services (including supportive services) that address their special needs in a
coordinated and efficient manner; (4) ensure that migratory children receive full
and appropriate opportunities to meet the same challenging State academic
content and student academic achievement standards that all children are expected
to meet; (5) design programs to help migratory children overcome educational
disruption, cultural and language barriers, social isolation, various health-related
problems, and other factors that inhibit the ability of such children to do well in
school, and to prepare such children to make a successful transition to
postsecondary education or employment; and
§1414(c)(2) provide an assurance that in making services available to children
and youth in adult correctional institutions,
This axial theme deals with the importance of actually identifying the least
advantaged children. Title I does an excellent job of specifically identifying the types of
children that are clearly least advantaged, but might not be immediately visible to
schools: homeless children, migrant children, children who are incarcerated; children in
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protective custody and children with limited English skills. By specifically adding these
groups to those children identified as disabled under IDEA and those who are
economically disadvantaged, Title I is able to rate Highly Just on the efforts to identity
the least advantaged.
Axial theme 2: Coordination.
§1112(b) PLAN PROVISIONS- (1) IN GENERAL- In order to help lowachieving children meet challenging achievement academic standards, each local
educational agency plan shall include (D) a description of the strategy the local
educational agency will use to coordinate programs under this part with programs
under title II to provide professional development for teachers and principals, and,
if appropriate, pupil services personnel, administrators, parents and other staff,
including local educational agency level staff in accordance with sections 1118
and 1119; (E) a description of how the local educational agency will coordinate
and integrate services provided under this part with other educational services at
the local educational agency or individual school level, such as (i) Even Start,
Head Start, Reading First, Early Reading First, and other preschool programs,
including plans for the transition of participants in such programs to local
elementary school programs; and (ii) services for children with limited English
proficiency, children with disabilities, migratory children, neglected or delinquent
youth, Indian children served under part A of title VII, homeless children, and
immigrant children in order to increase program effectiveness, eliminate
duplication, and reduce fragmentation of the instructional program;
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The requirement of planned coordination of services for the least advantaged is a
key component to the continuing portion of this lever. The coordination required by this
lever is twofold. One is coordination with other legislations such as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical
Education Act of 1998, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, and other Acts
(§1112a1). As evidence of this priority there were forty-two references in Title I to
coordination, thirteen of those to the IDEA. The other intent is to coordinate with other
agencies and programs such as Head Start.
The lever was written specifically with the intent to emphasis the broad scope
ongoing nature of support to the child (as opposed to limited scope measures). The clear
requirements for coordination on a variety of fronts give this a Highly Just rating on this
axis.
Axial theme 3: Continuation.
Despite sections like §1414(c)(2) which focus on adolescents in correctional
facilities and §1802 for high school dropout prevention, I saw little evidence for
requirements for maintenance of support for children who are the least advantaged
through their school career. However, this does not mean it is not implied because as
previously noted there are many references to legislation like IDEA that has very
stringent requirements for maintenance of support. Thus it is very difficult to judge
whether the maintenance requirements were intended to be met via the associated
legislation.
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Conclusion.
I therefore conclude that on the measure of fostering the lever, Ongoing
Assistance for Least Advantaged Students, Title I is very successful; however, I reserve
the assessment of the Highly Just rating because Title I could have included language
reinforcing the need for maintenance, but it did not. Therefore I give this lever the rating
of Just.
Tool evaluation.
The explanatory portion of this lever was modified to make clear that this lever
would not include interventions for the least privileged students at the school level, but
only at the individual level. The rating scale’s indicators (Table 8) were modified
specifically to clarify the focus on the least advantaged. The data’s focus on
identification of those children was the reason for the addition of that language in Table
20.
Difficulties:
1) As noted in the evaluation section, a weakness of this lever lies in that, at least
in Title I, the active mechanisms of how the interventions will be applied are
in other laws. Conceivably with a homeless, migrant child with a learning
disability, several pieces of legislation come into play, all of which are called
upon specifically in Title I. This certainly confounds the assessment of Title I.
But as noted in my conclusion, this overlap does not absolve the writers of
this legislation from an obligation to call for maintenance of support. In fact,
the very fact many laws come into play would seem to necessitate some sort
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of blanket requirement to bridge the potential gaps between them. Thus,
though this presented a difficulty, it is in fact not a liability for the tool.
2) A second problem, that of separating called-for assistance for students from
calls for support of schools. Much of the support promised in Title I is geared
for schools to generally improve education, which in theory, improves the
condition of the individual child. The wisdom of this approach is beyond the
scope of this tool; however, the lack of clarity could be a problem. The
solution came by modifying the narrative to narrow the criteria of this lever to
specifically refer to the child, and to rewrite another of the levers to address
the school.
As revised, Table 20 operated as hoped to uncover the strengths and weakness of
Title I as it relates to ongoing assistance for least advantaged students.
Lever: Financial Adequacy.
The revised lever.
It is axiomatic that if schools are to achieve the compensatory goals envisioned by
Rawls, there must be adequate and equitable funding. Because Rawls valuates financial
liberties as secondary issues, the needs of providing a just education outweigh the
economic liberty rights of citizens, thus paving the way for sufficient taxation to achieve
equity. It could be argued, as the Committee for Economic Development CED does, that
provision of adequate funds for just education will achieve a net economic benefit
(Freeman, 2007, pp. 88-89); however, by making such an argument the case for the
primacy of justice is undermined.
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Table 21: Financial Adequacy Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Indicator
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for
execution of a just educational system as described in this tool with
differential spending for the least advantaged built in.
Just
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
justice needs of every student and in the eventuality of a shortfall,
at least as much money is spent on the children who are the least
advantaged as is spent on the most advantaged.
Not Addressed
The policy does not address finance.
Unjust
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
needs of every student but does not address equality of spending.
Highly Unjust
The policy document addresses funding but does not require
funding that is sufficient for the needs of every student nor does it
require equality of spending.
Policy Evaluation
In this lever, Title I is only partially applicable in that the funds for Title I are not
intended to be the base of finance for the schools, but rather to supplement state and local
funding. §1120A(b) states plainly, “A State educational agency or local educational
agency shall use Federal funds received under this part only to supplement the funds that
would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal sources
for the education of pupils participating in programs assisted under this part, and not to
supplant such funds.” Therefore on its face Title I cannot be used to judge the overall
adequacy of spending within schools and all schools do not get funding from Title I.
Interestingly, the entirety of §1125AA is a review of the use of Title I monies in the past
including (a)(3) that states, “Fifty-eight percent of all schools receive at least some
funding under this part, including many suburban schools with predominantly well-off
students. (4) One out of every 5 schools with concentrations of poor students between 50
and 75 percent receive no funding at all under this part.” This text indicates that the
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writers of NCLB were aware that the moneys were not always going to the neediest
schools and (a)(9) states strongly that “Congress has an obligation to allocate funds under
this part so that such funds will positively affect the largest number of economically
disadvantaged students.”
However, neither this nor §1125A provides grants for states that meet the certain
funding targets based on per capita income, and national spending targets actually
provide funding guarantees as envisioned by this lever. This does not mean Title I is
unjust according to this lever, but rather minimal funding guarantees are not addressed.
Notwithstanding this fact, I address the axial themes discovered as part of the
evaluation of the measurement tool.
Axial theme 1: Rewarding just educational spending.
§1125A(b) Distribution Based Upon Fiscal Effort And Equity-(2)(B), the effort
factor for a State shall be determined in accordance with the succeeding sentence,
except that such factor shall not be less than 0.95 nor greater than 1.05. The effort
factor determined under this sentence shall be a fraction the numerator of which is
the product of the 3-year average per-pupil expenditure in the State multiplied by
the 3-year average per capita income in the United States and the denominator of
which is the product of the 3-year average per capita income in such State
multiplied by the 3-year average per-pupil expenditure in the United States.
The provisions of §1125A call for both adequacy and equity of school spending
based on formulas based on both the relative wealth of the region and the patterns of
national spending on schools. The reward for meeting these baselines is additional federal
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funds to supplement state funds. The problem with this approach is that it rewards those
children in well-funded school systems with more money and provides nothing for
children who live in underfunded school systems. Thus, the law punishes the victims.
This approach is on its face unjust.
Axial theme 2: Specific compensatory spending targets.
§1124 9(a)(4) PUERTO RICO (A) For each fiscal year, the grant that the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be eligible to receive under this section shall
be the amount determined by multiplying the number of children counted under
subsection (c) for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico by the product of (i) subject
to subparagraph (B), the percentage that the average per-pupil expenditure in the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is of the lowest average per-pupil expenditure of
any of the 50 States; and (ii) 32 percent of the average per-pupil expenditure in
the United States.
The above language is mirrored with calls for funding in §1117(c)(4) for high
poverty areas and in §1121(d) for Native Americans. Less comprehensive language is
given for migratory children in §1308(b)(3) and for children in government custody in
§1423. By providing specific language to ensure inclusion of children that might
otherwise be left out of receiving benefits of Title I, the overarching goal of this arena,
disproportionate resources for the least advantaged, has been addressed. Therefore this
axial lever rates Highly Just.
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Conclusion.
I therefore conclude that on the measure of ensuring Financial Adequacy, Title I
has a mixed review in the axial levers; however, by its nature Title I is supplementary and
therefore cannot be expected to guarantee adequate funding. Therefore I rate it Not
Addressed.
Tool evaluation.
The fact that this legislation does not get a positive or negative rating on justice
does not reflect badly on the tool. On the contrary, the very fact even a piece of
legislation with the reach of Title I does not hit all 14 levers helps make the point that just
because a policy does not meet all forms of justice it does not make it unjust. Rather the
lack of direct reference draws attention to the parts of the educational policy milieu not
covered by the legislation under review.
The second axial theme brought to the fore the advantages of using the arena and
lever model. In the analysis I showed how the arena goals can be brought to bear on the
axial theme even if not clearly laid out in the rating scale indicators. This helps to provide
unity in analysis and instruction to future users of this tool.
Neither the explanatory portion of this lever, nor the rating scale’s indicators
(Table 10) were modified from the proposal. The original wording worked well without
modification.
Difficulties:
1) The most difficult issue, as noted above, was in deciding how to deal with the
fact that Title 1 is supplementary. Because the primary purpose of this project
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was to create and test the evaluation tool, it was problematic to simply state
why this lever does not apply. That is why I chose to present two axial themes
even though I had already decided on the conclusion. I would not think this
would be necessary in the usage of this tool outside this dissertation.
2) A second difficulty arose with the sheer volume of themes presented. My
second cycle of coding came up with 8 distinct themes with limited ability to
collapse them. In considering the themes individually, I concluded that most
were too far outside the goals of this lever. For instance, one theme was on
fiscal controls. The legislation repeatedly sets limits on how much money the
State educational authority can take from Title I before forwarding the money
to LEA’s. In other types of reviews, this might be significant, but for this
measure of justice I did not think such topics were sufficiently germane to this
lever.
Table 21 did not operate as hoped. The Not Addressed conclusion showed the
limits of Title I’s reach and the usefulness of the tool.
Lever: Early Childhood Measures.
The revised lever.
Building on the evidence cited in chapter two regarding the significant deficit
faced by low income children when they enter school, the application of the difference
principle requires that the concept of publicly funded education be extended for the least
advantaged to just after the child’s birth. Drawing from Rawls’s expansive view of “least
advantaged” this vision would include those children with physical challenges as well as
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those children born into impoverished homes where educational and emotional resources
are insufficient for school readiness. In this instance, the primary caregiver (i.e. parent) is
part of the educational system and is also a recipient of educational services in order to
succeed at their societal task as primary teacher. It is beyond the scope of this study to
specify what type of intervention is most effective, but the acceptance of the social
obligation to intervene must be explicit.
Table 22: Early Childhood Measures Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed

Unjust
Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document explicitly stipulates that the process to
provide educational equity and compensatory services to the least
advantaged children begins at birth.
The policy document suggests or otherwise encourages the process
to provide educational equity and compensatory services to the
least advantaged children begins at birth
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Policies exclusively targeted narrowly at children beyond the
preschool age (i.e. high school) would not be applicable to this
measure.
The policy is broad enough in scope to include early intervention
language, but does not include any.
The policy explicitly denies the responsibility for early childhood
intervention.

Policy evaluation.
The evaluation of this lever is made in part with the specific focus on the use of
early-childhood programs as a compensatory effort for those who are the least fortunate.
Title I has a significant focus on this area, and the legislations provided more than just a
few axial themes.
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Axial theme 1: Least favored young children focus.
§1115(b)(1)(A)(ii) children who are not yet at a grade level at which the local
educational agency provides a free public education.
§1115(b)(2)(A) Children who are economically disadvantaged, children with
disabilities, migrant children or limited English proficient children, are eligible for
services under this part on the same basis as other children selected to receive
services under this part.
The basis of the difference principle is that those who are least favored have
access to additional resources. To meet the justice requirement for this theme Title I must
make efforts to target the early childhood program toward those children who have
additional needs. The above section is tied to the sub-part 1 “Basic Program
Requirements.” As such §1115(b) does directly address the identification of those
children who have additional needs. In §1238(a)(1)(B) the definition of need is
expanded to include not only children and families “as indicated by high levels of
poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, limited English proficiency,” but also schools with a
high number or percentage of parents who have been victims of domestic violence and
parents who are legally disabled. Similar language is found in §1222(b), §1231(1) and
§1236. As such Title I scores Just on this axial theme.
Axial theme 2: Coordination of service.
§1112(b)(1) In order to help low-achieving children meet challenging
achievement of academic standards, each local educational agency plan shall
include (E) a description of how the local educational agency will coordinate and
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integrate services provided under this part with other educational services at the
local educational agency or individual school level, such as — (i) Even Start,
Head Start, Reading First, Early Reading First, and other preschool programs,
including plans for the transition of participants in such programs to local
elementary school programs;
Title I makes 32 references to Head Start and 28 references to Even Start (both
early childhood pre-school programs) being included in educational planning by LEA’s
or the state. The above citation from §1112(b)(1) is mirrored in other sections such as in
§1118(a)(2) where LEA’s are required to “coordinate and integrate parental involvement
strategies under this part with parental involvement strategies under other programs, such
as the Head Start program, Reading First program, Early Reading First program, Even
Start program, Parents as Teachers program, and Home Instruction Program for
Preschool Youngsters, and State-run preschool programs.”
I believe this requirement of coordination of LEA’s with other agencies’ early
childhood programs indicates that Title I is designed to positively impact coordination
between K-12 schools as early childhood programs. Thus this axial theme rates Just.
Axial theme 3: Family inclusive approach.
§1201 The purposes of this subpart are as follows (5) To strengthen coordination
among schools, early literacy programs, and family literacy programs to improve
reading achievement for all children.
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§1202 (i) Humanities-based family literacy programs (which may be referred to
as Prime Time Family Reading Time) that bond families around the acts of
reading and using public libraries.
Title I makes 47 references to Family Literacy as crucial to the overall success of
the neediest children. The texts often link these references to family literacy in general, or
the Even Start program in specific, to early preschool efforts such as Head Start such as
in §1112(b)(1)(E)(i), §1112(b)(1)(K) or §1114 (b)(1)(G). This linkage indicates a
recognition that school/center based early childhood compensatory programs are
inextricably linked to family based interventions. Though Title I does concentrate this
family focus on literacy development, it does reflect the intent of this lever; thus I rate
this axial theme as Just.
Axial theme 4: Quality of efforts.
§1119 (c) (1) . . . all paraprofessionals hired after the date of enactment of the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and working in a program supported with funds
under this part shall have (A) completed at least 2 years of study at an institution
of higher education; (B) obtained an associate's (or higher) degree; or (C) met a
rigorous standard of quality and can demonstrate, through a formal State or local
academic assessment
§1235(5(A)(i) a majority of the individuals providing academic instruction (I)
shall have obtained an associate's, bachelor's, or graduate degree in a field related
to early childhood education, elementary school or secondary school education, or
adult education; and (II) if applicable, shall meet qualifications established by the
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State for early childhood education, elementary school or secondary school
education, or adult education provided as part of an Even Start program or another
family literacy program (iii) paraprofessionals who provide support for academic
instruction have a secondary school diploma or its recognized equivalent; and (B)
all new personnel hired to provide academic instruction (i) have obtained an
associate's, bachelor's, or graduate degree in a field related to early childhood
education, elementary school or secondary school education, or adult education;
The requirements for the education and qualifying of staff are significant in that
they counter the trends in early childhood education that indicate there is low level of
education in preschool education and that it is getting lower as time goes on (Bradley,
Price & Herzenberg, 2005). The requirements in Title I to have professional staff in
programs for low income young children indicate a commitment to justice as envisioned
by this lever. This axial theme rates Just.
Conclusion.
On each of the axial themes found in the data, I found high levels of agreement
with this lever’s intent. Title I provides for a coordinated community wide effort to
benefit the least advantaged children, however, much of the programming discussed is of
a voluntary nature by LEA’s and schools and thus does not reach the level of Highly Just.
Title I succeeds in reaching the Just rating on this lever.
Tool evaluation.
The explanatory portion of this lever was modified to clarify that programs geared
to improve family literacy and other parenting support programs fit within the scope of
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this lever. The rating scale’s indicators (Table 7) were only changed in minor ways to
improve clarity.
Difficulties:
1) The difficulty in applying the tool to Title I lies in the fact that this section
relies on knowledge of Head Start and other programs not covered directly
in Title I. Thus to make judgment on this lever an evaluator needs to either
have prior knowledge of these programs or do extensive research. In my
case this was not a problem given my 15 years in early intervention and a
familiarity with current literature; however, this might make this lever
more difficult for some others.
Table 22 operated as hoped to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of Title I as
it relates to its focus on early intervention for the least favored.
Lever: Compensation for Low Social Capital.
The revised lever.
The concern was raised in chapter one that children from low income homes often
do not have parents with sufficient social capital to ensure the system works to their best
advantage. Sacks (2007) showed how parental influence and knowledge of the
educational system skewed the outcomes in favor of wealthier children. Ideally,
educating and empowering the parents is a solution to this problem; however, absent the
larger social changes that would allow all parents to have the social capital to foster their
children’s success, the just educational policy will include not only efforts to educate and
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empower but also provisions for independent advocates to act in loco parentis to mimic
the positive effects of social capital.
Table 23: Compensation for Low Social Capital Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document requires measures for parent education and
empowerment and independent advocates for low SES children
and other children who lack effective familial advocates with
authority to act in loco parentis if the parent and/or child wish.
The policy document requires mechanisms and/or procedures to
ensure proactive efforts to compensate for the lack of social capital
of low SES and other marginalized children.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy covers or creates systems that involve procedural
processes that could reasonably be seen to favor families with high
social capital, but fails to provide proactive efforts to ensure equal
access to those who do not have such social capital. Note: this
would include issues involving language barriers.

The policy creates or supports systems that can be reasonably
foreseen to make significant decisions about a child’s education
without a requirement of meaningful parental consultation.

Policy evaluation.
The call for social capital compensation for those children who do not have
caregivers with the resources to efficiency advocate for their best interests is one of the
levers I have the most difficulty approaching dispassionately given my years doing this
very work. Though leaving all too many holes, Title I still is laced with meaningful
policy sections in this lever.
Axial theme 1: Coordination of services.
§1112(b)(1)(E) a description of how the local educational agency will coordinate
and integrate services provided under this part with other educational services at
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the local educational agency or individual school level, such as (i) Even Start,
Head Start, Reading First, Early Reading First, and other preschool programs,
including plans for the transition of participants in such programs to local
elementary school programs; and (ii) services for children with limited English
proficiency, children with disabilities, migratory children, neglected or delinquent
youth, Indian children served under part A of title VII, homeless children, and
immigrant children in order to increase program effectiveness, eliminate
duplication, and reduce fragmentation of the instructional program;
Sec. 1120B(b)(2) establishing channels of communication between school staff
and their counterparts (including teachers, social workers, and health staff) in
such Head Start agencies or other entities carrying out early childhood
development programs such as the Early Reading First program, as appropriate, to
facilitate coordination of programs;
Title I calls for two different levels of coordination. There are many calls for
agency cooperation. §1114(b)(1)(J) calls for “coordination and integration of Federal,
State, and local services and programs.” The other, less common, call for coordination is
of services for individual children, such in the above two sections. This requirement for
coordination is essentially a call to take the necessary steps to ensure a complete and
seamless provision of service in loco parentis. Thus on this axis, Title I has met their
justice obligation.
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Axial theme 2: Advocacy.
§1302(C)(6) to the extent feasible, such programs and projects will provide for
(A) advocacy and outreach activities for migratory children and their families,
including informing such children and families of, or helping such children and
families gain access to, other education, health, nutrition, and social services;
The language in §1302(C)(6) is excellent and exactly what I intended when I
penned the indicators in Table 23. It calls for advocacy for both the child and family who
prima facie are examples of being lest favored, i.e. migrants. However, this strong
language acts as evidence of Title I’s injustice because it is only included with reference
to migratory children. The inclusion of this language establishes that such requirement
for advocacy is possible for all least advantaged children, but has been omitted.
Therefore, on this axis I rate Tile I Highly Unjust.
Axial theme 3: Outreach.
§1112(g)(4) PARENTAL PARTICIPATION - Each local educational agency
receiving funds under this part shall implement an effective means of outreach to
parents of limited English proficient students to inform the parents regarding how
the parents can be involved in the education of their children, and be active
participants in assisting their children to attain English proficiency
Although the word “outreach” is only used 3 times in Title I, the principle of
reaching into the community to assist parents in acquiring their own social capital is
throughout Title I. For instance, Subpart 2: Early Reading First and Subpart 3: William
F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs are both programs that build social

173

capital for the families. Additionally, §1118: Parental Involvement is also designed in
such a way as to build parental social capital. Because of this, I rate this axial theme as
Highly Just.
Conclusion.
Title I is inconstant when it comes to Social Capital Compensation as addressed
by the indicators in Table 22. While scoring just on both coordination of services and on
outreach to build social capital in families, it scores unjust on advocacy. The texts of
Table 22 requires advocacy for a Highly Just rating, but not for a Just rating; therefore,
the rating of Just is appropriate.
Tool evaluation.
This lever, as spelled out in chapter 3, is designed to measure how well Title I
addresses the inequitable distribution of social capital. I was pleased with how well the
revised tool worked in the process in highlighting the strengths and weakness of Title I.
The explanatory portion of this lever was modified to better explain the goals in light of
becoming more acquainted with the way legislation is written. The lever indicators were
revised to fully include the concept of building social capital in the parents as a goal on
par with providing external support for children.
Difficulties:
1) In the first cycle of coding I had not identified as many sections of Title I as I
came to believe applied while I worked on the second cycle of coding for
other levers. Therefore, I used the search functions of MS Word to look for
phrases that were relevant to this lever, words such as coordination and
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advocacy. In doing so I significantly increased the number of sections that
appeared relevant to this lever.
Table 23 operated as I had hoped to uncover the strengths and weakness of Title I
as it relates to the lever Compensation for Low Social Capital.
Lever: Differential School Resources.
The new lever.
Note: This is an entirely new lever, not a revision of a lever from the first version
of the tool.
Children are not generally educated one by one (U.S. Department of Education,
2009); they are educated in schools. Though Rawlsian political liberalism is predicated
on the individual human, he does stipulate that basic institutions also are governed by the
difference principle (Rawls, 1999a, §16). In this the basic unit in the measure of
educational program justice would be the school. As such, Rawls’s requirement that in
the presence of inequalities, a just society will ensure the most benefits be directed to the
least advantaged (Rawls, 1999a, p. 68) should be applied to individual schools. When
Rawls defines “least advantaged” he gives three domains: social status, wealth and
unfortunate circumstance (Rawls, 1999a p. 83). All three are applicable at the school
level. For this lever resources include, but are not limited to, facilities, equipment,
circular materials, extra-curricular opportunities and faculty/administrative quality.
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Table 24: Differential School Resources Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document explicitly lays out the principle and/or
practice that those schools that are characterized by students who
are from homes that of the lowest income or social status should be
provided proportionally more resources.
The policy document recommends or otherwise favors that those
schools that are characterized by students who are from homes that
are of low income or social status should be provided
proportionally more resources.
The policy does not deal with resource allocation.
The policy document deals with resource allocation but does not
favor disproportionate resource allocation to schools characterized
by students who are from homes of low income or social status.
The policy forbids disproportionate resource allocation to schools
characterized by students who are from homes of low income or
social status. Or, the policy provides disproportionate resource
allocation to schools for reasons other than those addressed in this
lever.

Policy evaluation.
Differential School Resources is the heart of Title I. There was more text on how
additionally funds were to be targeted for the neediest schools and how this was to be
determined than any other topic. Though there was a great deal of text, much was
technical in nature dealing with formulas and such, leaving just two axial themes:
targeting schools from the poorest communities and targeting schools with the least
resources
Axial theme 1: Targeting schools from the poorest communities.
§1113. ELIGIBLE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AREAS (a)DETERMINATION
(3) RANKING ORDER- If funds allocated in accordance with subsection (c) are
insufficient to serve all eligible school attendance areas, a local educational
agency shall (A) annually rank, without regard to grade spans, such agency's
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eligible school attendance areas in which the concentration of children from lowincome families exceeds 75 percent from highest to lowest according to the
percentage of children from low-income families;
In determining the allocation of funds in the core section of Title I, there are
repeated calls to target the schools serving students from the lowest income homes. The
language above is mirrored in §1113(b)(1) and in §1113 (c)(1). Then later in 10 different
cases reference is made for use of the methods to determine schools with the poorest
population using the formulas in §1113. This section represents exactly what is intended
in this lever in identifying those schools with the highest concentrations of least
advantaged students. Therefore I rate this axial theme Highly Just.
Axial theme 2: Targeting schools with the least resources.
§1003(c) PRIORITY - The State educational agency, in allocating funds to local
educational agencies under this section, shall give priority to local educational
agencies that — (1) serve the lowest-achieving schools; (2) demonstrate the
greatest need for such funds; and (3) demonstrate the strongest commitment to
ensuring that such funds are used to enable the lowest-achieving schools to meet
the progress goals in school improvement plans under section 1116 (b)(3)(A)(v)
In §1003 and §1116 the intent is to bring additional scrutiny and resources to
those schools with the least successful students. Although the justice of the methods Title
I uses to remedy the low achievement is addressed in other levers, this lever focuses on
identifying that children who attend low performing schools are less advantaged than
those in high performing schools. Therefore, Title I rates Just on this axial theme in that
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there is significant effort made to identify those low performing schools for additional
resources.
Conclusion.
I therefore conclude that on the measure of fostering differential school
resources, Title 1 meets the standard laid out in by the indicators on Table 24 for a
judgment of Highly Just. The legislation explicitly lays out how to identify schools
characterized by students who are from homes of the lowest income or social status and
provides for additional resources for those so identified.
Tool evaluation.
As noted above, this is an entirely new lever. After conducting the first cycle
coding on approximately half of Title 1, it became evident that I had not included
anything that addressed school level resource allocation. This had been deliberate in my
effort to keep the focus on the individual; however, as I read the text of Title I it became
clear that while that resource allocation can be given to individuals (i.e. in an IEP), the
school is the basic unit of educational funding and thus should be considered in a new
lever.
Difficulties:
1) Once I had decided I needed to create a new lever, I had to go back to Rawls
to ensure justification and then to repeat first cycle coding on the first part of
Title I before moving forward.
2) The text of Title I gives a great deal of rather arcane directives in §1125A
dealing with what is labeled the Equity Factor. The language deals with
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formulas about dividing monies within a state. Although appearing to be
significant to a justice analysis, in the end it was simply the application of
§1113. This type of interconnected policy is why Title I needed to be
addressed as an entire unit, not in pieces.
Table 24 operated as hoped to uncover the strengths and weakness of Title I as it
relates to the justice need of providing differential school resources.
Fair Equality of Opportunity: Does this policy promote equal freedom of life goals?
“Social and economic inequalities are to . . . be attached to positions and offices
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 2005, p. 6).
The first arena was to provide background for justice, and the second for resource
justice. This last arena is for actual outcome goals. To Rawls the entire purpose of
publicly funded education was to produce empowered citizens able to take their place as
equals no matter what their career or financial status. To Rawls economic disparities are
only justified when there is a background guarantee of practical political equality. It is to
that end Rawls believed publicly funded schools were to be focused.
Lever: Liberal Educational Goals.
The revised lever.
To Rawls, the goal of a just society is first and foremost to have citizens who have
respect for themselves and equal respect for others. Using the Aristotelian concept of
maximum utilization of innate talent being the greatest good, a Rawlsian view would see
the end of successful education as the preparation for self-fulfillment (Rawls, 1999a,
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§65). Thus, educational policy should reflect maximization of self as a goal as an end in
itself as opposed to utilitarian economic goals.
Table 25: Liberal Educational Goals Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document specifically identifies bringing natural
capacities to fruition in each student’s life as the end goal of the
publicly funded educational process. Policy should equally
privilege skills/talents that promote the goal of entering adulthood
on a path to personal fulfillment.
The policy document identifies the student’s bring natural
capacities to fruition as the end goal of the publicly funded
educational process, but skills related to financial gain are
privileged over non-economic skills.
The policy does not have language that relates to the goals of the
educational process.
The policy document calls for the narrowing of the school mission
to functional or economically valuable skills at the expense of a
program designed to enhance a broad range of natural capacities
and/or privilege skills related to financial gain over non-economic
skills.
The policy document only specifically identifies monetary rewards
or economic benefit as the end goal of the publicly funded
educational process and actively suppresses or forbids a pursuit of
skills not related to economic gain.

Policy evaluation.
Although there were three themes developed, the one dealing with so called
“Core” curriculum was the most far reaching and most often repeated of the three. It
showed up in many contexts and was tied to strong coercive language. I had considered
only discussing this one theme; however, decided that some discussion of Vo-Tech and
AP classes needed to be made even if they, in themselves are not critical to this lever.
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Axial theme 1: “Core” curriculum.
§1116(b)(3)(A)(i) incorporate strategies based on scientifically based research
that will strengthen the core academic subjects in the school and address the
specific academic issues that caused the school to be identified for school
improvement, and may include a strategy for the implementation of a
comprehensive school reform model that includes each of the components
described in part F; (ii) adopt policies and practices concerning the school's core
academic subjects that have the greatest likelihood of ensuring that all groups of
students specified in section 1111(b)(2)(C)(v) and enrolled in the school will meet
the State's proficient level of achievement on the State academic assessment
described in section 1111(b)(3) not later than 12 years after the end of the 20012002 school year;
Ten times in Title I the term core academic content is used to emphasis the
primacy of what §1705(c)(4) spells out to be English, mathematics, and science. In other
places such as §1118(b)(1) these three areas are specified by name and the states are to
set specific standards for these three privileged subjects.
Title I then goes on in §1118(b)(3)(A) to state:
Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State educational agency, in
consultation with local educational agencies, has implemented a set of highquality, yearly student academic assessments that include, at a minimum,
academic assessments in mathematics, reading or language arts, and science that
will be used as the primary means of determining the yearly performance of the
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State and of each local educational agency and school in the State in enabling all
children to meet the State's challenging student academic achievement standards,
except that no State shall be required to meet the requirements of this part relating
to science assessments until the beginning of the 2007-2008 school year.
It is significant that the requirement for standards in these three areas are backed
up by a requirement for testing to ensure these three subjects are given paramount
importance with the corresponding effect of reducing the importance of all other parts of
the curriculum (Ravitch, 2010). This is precisely the type of narrowing the curriculum
that this lever is designed to identify as unjust. Thus in this axial theme Title I is rated
Unjust.
Axial Theme 2: Vo-tech.
§1414 (a) (2) CONTENTS - Each such State plan shall (A) describe the program
goals, objectives, and performance measures established by the State that will be
used to assess the effectiveness of the program in improving the academic,
vocational, and technical skills of children in the program;
Title I makes 16 references to vocational education and not one reference to arts
education. In particular, Part D of Title I targets children who are at risk with vocational
training. The implication is that these children are in need of income generating skills
rather than the higher level self-actualization skills. Such prioritization runs counter to the
entire concept of liberal education for all children. As a result this axial theme also
reflects negatively on the justice of Title 1.
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Axial theme 3: The special case of Advanced Placement courses.
§1705(c) PRIORITY- In awarding grants under this section, the Secretary shall
give priority to an eligible entity that submits an application under subsection (b)
(2) provides for the involvement of business and community organizations in the
activities to be assisted . . . (4) demonstrates a focus on developing or expanding
advanced placement programs and participation in the core academic areas of
English, mathematics, and science;
Part G, known as the 'Access to High Standards Act' deals with increasing the
access of Advanced Placement courses (AP) to low income students. The legislation
spells out the many advantages accrued by students taking AP courses and exams and
then provides incentives to make them more widely available. All this reflects highly in
the Difference Principle arena, and could have fostered a broad curriculum in poor high
schools. There are 34 AP courses offered (College Board, 2013), and 21 of those courses
are outside “core” curriculum, including art, music, foreign language, history and other
humanities. However, as noted in §1705(c)(4), the act deliberately prioritizes those AP
programs in the core curriculum, and thus, this opportunity to broaden the high school
curriculum for low income children once again narrows it. Thus in this third axial theme,
I find Title I to rate poorly on this justice lever.
Conclusion.
I therefore conclude that on the measure of fostering liberal educational goals,
Title I is Unjust in that it systemically narrows the curriculum. Though it does not state
that the intent of this narrowing is to prioritize the monetary value of the educational
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process, it effectively reduces the range of human optimization to those skills dealing
with verbal mechanics, math and science. The justice lever indictor of Unjust is
warranted for the lever Liberal Educational Goals.
Tool evaluation.
This lever was renamed from Valuation of Non-Monetary Goals in the
dissertation proposal (Figure 1) to Liberal Educational Goals. This change was made to
bring to the fore that liberal educational goals in their broader form are indeed the
outcomes of a liberal conception of a just educational system. By liberal educational
system, I include the concept of non-monetary goals and the broad goals of universal
cultural literacy similar to what is advocated by W. T. Harris at the turn of the 20th
Century and E. D. Hirsch at the turn of the 21st Century (Ravitch, 2000; Hirsch, 1996).
Like Harris & Hirsch, a Rawlsian vision for educational curriculum would be universal
and focused on the student as a human and citizen, not as a worker or manager.
The explanatory portion of this and the rating scale’s indicators (Table 3) lever were
modified to increase the clarity of the distinction between economic oriented goals and
liberal goals.
Difficulties:
1) In conducting the first and second cycle coding, I found sections of the
legislation directly applicable, but some supported liberal type goals, and
others clearly favored a narrow curriculum and/or monetary type educational
goals. To differentiate the positive and negative goals, in the second cycle of
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coding, I adopted a method of changing the text color in the .doc file
containing all the files I decided were relevant to this lever.
2) There was one entire section that dealt with life preparation (sub-part 2);
however, the entire subpart was dealing exclusively with students who were in
correctional facilities. While this is relevant for other levers, I concluded it
was not applicable for this lever.
Table 25 operated as hoped to uncover the strengths and weakness of Title I as it
relates to liberal educational goals.
Lever: Social Capital Development.
The revised lever.
Rawls argued, “Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not
depend upon one’s class position and so the school system, whether public or private,
should be designed to even out class barriers” (emphasis mine) (Rawls, 1999a, p. 64).
This is as strong as any statement Rawls ever wrote about education. For him the
importance of this lies in the fact that the ability to participate in the sociopolitical world
is an integral part of having a fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 54 -55). The
ability to do this is part of social capital, the development of which can be facilitated in
the school setting (Farrell, Taylor, & Tennent, 2004; Terrion, 2006); and in a Rawlsian
system of justice is requisite.
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Table 26: Social Capital Development Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document explicitly acknowledges the value of the
social capital amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic
homes and the communities’ obligation to provide compensatory
experiences to children from low SES and other marginalized
homes.
The policy indirectly acknowledges the value of the social capital
amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic homes and the
communities’ obligation to provide compensatory experiences to
children from low SES and other marginalized homes.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy is relevant to compensatory education, poverty or
achievement gap but fails to acknowledge the impact of social
capital.
The policy actively reduces the social capital of low income
children through creating barriers such as financial cost of
participation or transportation to low income students without
addressing and correcting this equality of access issue.

Policy evaluation.
The case of this lever is particularly interesting given Title I’s expressed purpose
to ensure all children have an opportunity to find success in public schools and beyond.
Though there are few positive sections in the legislations, the overall approach is that
mastery of English, math and science is sufficient for later success in the larger society or
even the larger economy. As such this might be the most telling of all the levers as to the
vision of the writers of ESEA/NCLB.
Axial theme 1: Piecemeal efforts.
§1301(5) design programs to help migratory children overcome educational
disruption, cultural and language barriers, social isolation, various health-related
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problems, and other factors that inhibit the ability of such children to do well in
school, and to prepare such children to make a successful transition to
postsecondary education or employment;
§1418 (a)(2)(C) essential support services to ensure the success of the youth, such
as (i) personal, vocational and technical, and academic, counseling; (ii) placement
services designed to place the youth in a university, college, or junior college
program; (iii) information concerning, and assistance in obtaining, available
student financial aid; (iv) counseling services; and (v) job placement services.
Title I, Part C, Education of Migratory Children; Part D, Prevention and
Intervention Programs for Children and Youth Who Are Neglected, Delinquent, or AtRisk; Part G, Advanced Placement Programs; and Part H, School Dropout Prevention can
all be seen as having the intent of building the social capital of students, or at least
designed to give students access to social capital building experiences. Though the text
even in these sections falls short of acknowledging the need for social capital equity, in
several parts, as noted above, there are oblique references to providing the kinds of things
that build social capital.
However, the very fact that these provisions are on a narrow scale and, while
recognizing certain groups of children are likely to be underserved, draws attention to the
fact that the writers did not address all children or specifically address social capital
needs. Therefore, these piecemeal efforts reflect negatively on Title I’s overall justice.
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Axial theme 2: Narrow school focus.
The discussion regarding the narrowing of the academic curriculum in Lever
Liberal Educational Goals is directly related to this lever. As noted in that analysis, it
was concluded that the school curriculum had been sufficiently narrowed as to crowd out
the liberal curriculum components. In this lever, the narrowing of the curriculum relates
as it draws attention to the lack of a similar textual focus on the social development of
students in publicly funded schools. Thus, this axial theme focuses on the omissions in
the text rather than things found in the text. This narrowing of focus by Title I relates
negatively to justice in this lever.
Axial theme 3: School choice.
§1116(b)(8) (A) FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS – If,
after 1 full school year of corrective action under paragraph (7), a school subject
to such corrective action continues to fail to make adequate yearly progress, then
the local educational agency shall (i) continue to provide all students enrolled in
the school with the option to transfer to another public school served by the local
educational agency, in accordance with paragraph (1)(E) and (F);
§1501(a)(2) (I) State educational agencies and local educational agencies to
improve the academic achievement of students in low-performing schools, and
the effectiveness of the implementation of such actions, including the following:
(iii) The number of parents who take advantage of the public school choice
provisions of this title, the costs (including transportation costs) associated with
implementing these provisions, the implementation of these provisions, and the
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impact of these provisions (including the impact of attending another school) on
student achievement.
The text of Title I does not link the provision that allows children of “failing
schools” to attend other schools within the same LEA jurisdiction to the issue of social
capital. I find such an omission interesting and reflective of the intent of the framers of
this legislation when it would be so very simple to list social capital or even a more tepid
comment about the potential positive effects to students of moving from a school with a
high concentration of poor students to a middle class school. This divorce by omission of
social capital and academic success is troubling in my overall analysis of Title 1.
As this assessment is not about the actual effectiveness of, but the justice of, the
text and stated intent, the practical issues of school choice that Ravitch (2010) and others
bring up regarding the net effect of choice are not germane. What is significant is the
privileging of test results in core academic subjects over the student’s ability to function
in society. This leads me to measure this axial theme as uncovering injustice in Title I.
Conclusion.
I therefore conclude that on the measure of fostering social capital development
Title I fails to meet the basic standard of acknowledging the value of the social capital
amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic homes and communities or to offer
any reference to the publically funded educational system to provide compensatory
experiences to children from low SES and other marginalized homes. Therefore, using
the indicators in Table 26, I rate Title I Unjust on the indicators for this lever.
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Tool evaluation.
Both the title of this lever and the explanatory portion of this lever were modified
during the course of cycle two coding; however, the rating scale’s indicators in Table 11
were not changed. I concluded that the first title and explication could be confused with
the lever of Compensation for Low Social Capital. Despite this rewrite, the intent of the
lever was not changed.
Difficulties:
1) The primary difficulty in this lever was the fact I was dealing mostly with
omission of language that seemed to be called for. What made this lever more
difficult than prior levers was the fact that so much appeared to be related, but
no linkage was drawn in the legislation to the justice issue. After a good deal
of analysis, I decided this was not a weakness of the tool at all, but rather it
brought to the fore an unexpected strength. By bringing attention to sections
of Title I that at once could have been justified as an effort at liberal justice,
but instead limiting the justification of such sections as a kind of economic
utilitarianism, this lever provides evidence that the authors of Title I did not
have in mind the kind of justice envisioned by Rawls.
Table 26 operated better than had been hoped to uncover the strengths and
weaknesses of Title I as it relates to social capital development. It appeared to work in an
unexpected way to give evidence that the framers of Title I did not seek to make it a tool
of liberal justice. The analysis in this lever will prove instrumental in making a final
overall judgment as to the level of Rawlsian justice in Title I.
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Lever: Differentiated Instruction and Testing.
The revised lever.
Rawls’s least advantaged category includes students with learning disabilities,
mental health and/or physical challenges, as well as those students who have social or
economic disadvantages. Rawls’s liberal conception of education prioritizes the student’s
academic and the student’s civic (social) success as valuable. Therefore a just educational
policy must include measures within the learning environment to ensure these students
have equal standing with other students via differentiated instruction. Educational policy
should be written to allow flexibility to both classroom teachers and to administration so
as to allow for students who are the least advantaged to be a full part of the larger school
community and to allow the student to maximize their own potential.
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Table 27: Differentiated Instruction and Testing Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy requires instruction and testing to be adapted to for
those students who are the least advantaged as to allow those
students to experience full participation in the social milieu of the
school. Testing requirements must be psychometrically valid in
method so as to be both informative as to the student’s real
progress in the discreet subject matter while accommodating for
non-subject specific disadvantage.
The policy provides room for instruction and testing to be adapted
for those students who are the least advantaged as to allow those
students to experience full participation in the social milieu of the
school (but does not require it for all types of disadvantage).
Testing requirements are required to be psychometrically valid in
method so as to be informative as to the student’s real progress in
the discreet subject matter while accommodating for non-subject
disadvantage.
The policy does not touch on any issues related to the needs of
disabled students or defers to other applicable policy on this issue.
The policy provides limited flexibility in instructional methods and
highly limits special assistance options for disadvantaged students
that will likely lead to a lack of success or exclusion from the
social milieu of the school; and/or testing requirements have
limited flexibility sometimes requiring disadvantaged students to
abide by procedural rules that put them at a further disadvantage
and/or create artificially low test scores.
The policy requires inflexible instructional methods and highly
limits special assistance options for disadvantaged students that are
likely to lead to a lack of success or exclusion from the social
milieu of the school; and/or testing requirements forbid flexibility
that requires disadvantaged students to abide by procedural rules
that put them at a further disadvantage and/or create artificially low
test scores.

Policy evaluation.
Title I was not created in a vacuum, but rather was written as a part of the larger
NCLB legislation that works in concert with other legislation. For this analysis of Title I
of NCLB, the relevant legislation is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of
1990 (IDEA) and its successor IDEA of 2004 passed after NCLB. Title I makes 13
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specific references to IDEA which collectively tie the implementation of Title I to the
rules of IDEA. Therefore this evaluation of justice for differentiated instruction and
testing for children with mental or physical disabilities will defer to IDEA; however,
Rawls’s conception of the least advantaged encompassed a broader view including those
who are socially and economically disadvantaged as well as those who fit the category of
disabled.
Axial theme 1: Disabled students.
§1111(b)(3)(C)(ix)(II) the reasonable adaptations and accommodations for
students with disabilities (as defined under section 602(3) of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act) necessary to measure the academic achievement of
such students relative to State academic content and State student academic
achievement standards; and (III) the inclusion of limited English proficient
students, who shall be assessed in a valid and reliable manner and provided
reasonable accommodations on assessments administered to such students under
this paragraph, including, to the extent practicable, assessments in the language
and form most likely to yield accurate data on what such students know and can
do in academic content areas, until such students have achieved English language
proficiency as determined under paragraph (7);
As noted before, the text of Title I clearly allows the resource allocations to abide
by the stringent guidelines contained in IDEA. Though technically unnecessary as the
rules for IDEA are binding, it is important that Title I makes a number of specific
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references that allow the evaluator to clearly see this form of justice as the intent of this
legislation. On this axial theme, I rate Title I as Highly Just.
Axial theme 2: Other least advantaged students.
§1114 (b) (1) A schoolwide program shall include the following components: (A)
A comprehensive needs assessment of the entire school (including taking into
account the needs of migratory children as defined in section 1309(2) that is based
on information which includes the achievement of children in relation to the State
academic content standards and the State student academic achievement standards
described in section 1111(b)(1). (B) Schoolwide reform strategies that (i) provide
opportunities for all children to meet the State's proficient and advanced levels of
student academic achievement described in section 1111(b)(1)(D);
In Theory, Title I does what the act’s title says “Improving the Academic
Achievement of the Disadvantaged”; however, in this process little is done to address
differentiated instruction and testing apart from the requirements of IDEA. The one
exception is for migratory children.
In the evaluation of previous levers I have noted that Title I has, in certain cases,
provided an excellent example of how legislation can address the needs of populations
that have historically been left out of consideration. The best representative of this is how
the needs of migratory children are addressed. Title I, part C, §1301-1309: Education of
Migratory Children, provides a model of how Title I could have been written to provide
for the special needs for the success of other types of least advantaged children; however,
the legislation does not do so. §1111(a)(1) makes reference to the McKinney act for
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homeless children as a parallel piece of legislation in the same way Title I does for
IDEA; however, it does not then go on to build upon those protections for homeless
children as it does for disabled children. . §1306(b) very specifically requires flexibility
and assessment for unmet needs to “ensure that the State and its local operating agencies
identify and address the special educational needs of migratory children (§1306(b)).”
Thus the very presence of this language for one group of least advantaged, but a lack of
corresponding language for other groups of least advantaged children points out the
deficiency of Title I. Thus for the axial lever Other least advantaged students, I must
judge Title I to be deficient.
Conclusion.
Due to multiple issues this lever has proven the most difficult for which to make a
judgment. The fact that Title I is strongly liked to strong legislation (IDEA) that requires
differentiated instruction and testing and the fact it would be reasonable to assume a large
percentage of the least advantaged children might well fall into other least advantaged
categories (such was low income) that would be covered by IDEA makes this lever more
difficult to measure. The indicator of Just does not require all forms of disadvantaged to
be addressed; therefore that condition applies in this case, so the lever is rated as Just.
Tool evaluation.
The explanatory portion and the Table 13 indicators were both modified after
cycle one coding. I realized that several changes were necessary. First was the inclusion
of testing in the title. The extensive use of the testing in Title I helped me to see that for
any current policy document, testing will be a factor. Second was to change the language
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in the narrative from “least-well off”, and the language in the indicators of “special
needs” to the Rawlsian term “least advantaged”. Not only did this help bring more
lexical continuity to the tool, but it helped keep the focus on Ralls’s vision of justice.
Difficulties:
1) This lever proved to have the most difficult evaluation of the 14 due to the
complex mix of external legislation drawing into question whether it should
not just simply be judged to be “not addressed”. I found need to partially
repeat first cycle coding to find more textual examples dealing with both
IDEA and of other special populations in order to pull out the details needed
to fully accomplish second cycle coding using the revised lever. The real
challenge was how to position the children with the IDEA label of disabled
within the group of children who would fit under the Rawlsian conception of
least advantaged. In the end I did not have to fully make that separation
because the indicator for Just states that the policy “does not require it
(adaption) for all types of disadvantage”.
Table 27 operated as hoped to uncover the strengths and weakness of Title I as it
relates to differentiated instruction and testing. In specific this lever showed that even
difficult overlapping policy issues can be addressed with this tool.
Lever: Adequate Educational System.
The new lever.
The term educational adequacy and what that entails is an entire field unto itself
beyond the scope of this study. What is important in this measure of justice is that the
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goal of adequacy is clearly stated and the clarification is made as to adequacy for what?
To Rawls the purpose of an educational system is twofold: to even out class barriers and
to allow “natural capacities (to) develop and reach fruition” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 63-64).
Thus a just educational system must be adequate to the job of developing those natural
capacities.
The indicators below use the word resources to include curriculum, staff and
facilities because all three are intrinsic to educational adequacy; however, the details of
what defines adequacy are left out because this tool is about intent not methods. That is
why this lever is left intentionally vague as to sidestep the debates of methods. Also not
covered in this lever will be financial adequacy for the programs put forth because that
topic is covered in a separate lever.
Table 28: Adequate Educational System Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust

Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document requires schools to provide an educational
system that is committed to providing every student the resources
necessary to allow them to reach their full natural capacities in a
broad range of self-directed domains.
The policy document requires schools to provide an educational
system that is committed to providing every student the resources
necessary to allow them to reach their full natural capacities in a
limited range of domains.
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
The policy allows for some students (or groups of students) to be
provided less than adequate resources that makes it less likely
some students will be able to reach their full natural capacities.
The policy document actively denies at least some children from
an educational system with the resources necessary for them to
reach their full natural capacities.
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Policy evaluation.
In this lever, Title I has a lot to offer for a just educational system. The three axial
themes reflect the positive thrust of the legislation: teacher quality, research and
standards as goals. Though hampered by issues of a narrow curriculum as discussed
earlier, Title I’s writers did much to forward educational justice according to this lever.
Axial theme 1: Teacher quality.
§1111(b)(8)(C) the specific steps the State educational agency will take to ensure
that both schoolwide programs and targeted assistance schools provide instruction
by highly qualified instructional staff as required by sections 1114(b)(1)(C) and
1115(c)(1)(E), including steps that the State educational agency will take to
ensure that poor and minority children are not taught at higher rates than other
children by inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers, and the measures
that the State educational agency will use to evaluate and publicly report the
progress of the State educational agency with respect to such steps;
The term highly qualified in reference to teachers is made 26 times in Title I. The
requirements for teaching qualifications include ongoing training. §1001(10) calls for
“significantly elevating the quality of instruction by providing staff in participating
schools with substantial opportunities for professional development.” The call for
ongoing professional development is repeated 66 times in the legislation. In many of
these cases there is, as in §1111(b)(8)(C), specific references to ensuring that the least
advantaged children are provided with full qualified teachers.
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This focus on teacher quality for all students including the least advantaged is
highly indicative of a just policy regarding education adequacy. Therefore this axial
theme is rates high in justice.
Axial theme 2: Research.
1112(c)(1) (F) take into account the experience of model programs for the
educationally disadvantaged, and the findings of relevant scientifically based
research indicating that services may be most effective if focused on students in
the earliest grades at schools that receive funds under this part;
§1221 (a) (1) To support local efforts to enhance the early language, literacy, and
prereading development of preschool age children, particularly those from lowincome families, through strategies and professional development that are based
on scientifically based reading research.
SEC. 1207(a)(1) disseminate information on scientifically based reading research
pertaining to children, youth, and adults; (3) support the continued identification
and dissemination of information on reading programs that contain the essential
components of reading instruction as supported by scientifically based reading
research, that can lead to improved reading outcomes for children, youth, and
adults
The most common of all the words and phrases I analyzed in Title I was
research, which shows up 94 times. From this I conclude that the writers of this
legislation see research as very important to improving the quality of education.
The word research is used in three primary ways. First, as in §1115(c)(1)(C)
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where current methods are to be based on current research findings. Second, as in
§1241 & §1503 where Title I authorizes and funds research into educational
practice, and third, as in §1207(1) where several agencies are required to
“disseminate information on scientifically based reading research pertaining to
children, youth, and adults”.
This focus on funding, using and disseminating educational research gives every
appearance to have the highest quality educational system possible. In addition to the fact
that Title I is subtitled Improving The Academic Achievement Of The Disadvantaged,
many of these references to research are attached to Parts B, C & D which deal with
children who are easily described as the lest advantaged. Such a focus on improving the
education of the least advantaged via the most current educational research deserves a
high justice rating.
Axial theme 3: Standards as goals.
§111(b)(1)(A) Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State has adopted
challenging academic content standards and challenging student academic
achievement standards that will be used by the State, its local educational
agencies, and its schools to carry out this part, except that a State shall not be
required to submit such standards to the Secretary
§111(b)(1)(D) Standards under this paragraph shall include (i) challenging
academic content standards in academic subjects that — (I) specify what children
are expected to know and be able to do; (II) contain coherent and rigorous
content; and (III) encourage the teaching of advanced skills; and (ii) challenging
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student academic achievement standards that — (I) are aligned with the State's
academic content standards;
Although the justice concerns of a narrow curriculum where addressed in the
lever Liberal Educational Goals, I felt it necessary to address this issue in this lever as
well as adequacy implies the idea of adequacy of what. The indicators for this lever in
Table 28 are very specific in that in a highly positive system the requirement is that
young people should be able to decide for themselves in what domain they wish to
achieve their maximum potential by the end of their publicly funded education.
It is quite clear from the analysis in the prior lever that the nearly 70 references to
standards in Title I refer to narrow curriculum of reading, math and science. Thus even if
Title I is focused on all children achieving their maximum capacity, the legislation
provides little room for capacity development outside that core curriculum.
Conclusion.
As noted before, Title I is designed as a voluntary adjunct to local and state
educational efforts. Therefore it is difficult to say that this legislation can require
anything like an adequate educational system. However, within those constraints, Title I
does appear to promote local educational systems that meet the needs of the least
advantaged children. While there is plenty of room for improvement, I conclude that on
the measure of fostering an adequate educational system, Title I is Just.
Tool evaluation.
This lever did not exist in the original version of the tool. It was added after I had
completed half of the first cycle coding when I stopped and did a review of what I had
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found in the first 150 pagers of Title I coding. What I found was that I had not included
the simple concept of having an expectation of an adequate educational system. In
considering the other justice levers, I realized that minimal adequacy is foundational to a
just educational policy because none of the other goals are engaged unless the base
system is adequate. This concept would fall under the Rawls’ category of principle
institutions (Rawls, 1999a, p. 83) which are assumed to be operating efficiently for the
common good. At the same time I felt it important to keep this tool out of the many
debates about what constitutes adequacy (or efficiently). It was for that reason the
indicators deal with a commitment to adequacy, not the methods by which that is
achieved.
The axial themes I chose furthered this approach by looking at teacher quality and
the use of current research which, while having some ground level applicability, are more
theoretical than practical. The third theme of how NCLB measures adequacy by
performance standards could have devolved into issues about the role of tests and testing;
however, I limited the discussion to the narrow nature of the standards, again to keep the
tool in the high level view.
Difficulties:
1) The creation of indicators that did not overlap other levers was particularly
difficult. Several of the existing levers deal in part with the issue of adequacy;
however, not in the broad sense. For instance the lever Financial Adequacy on
the surface appears to be very relevant; however that lever is part of the
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Difference Principle arena, and as such was intended to focus on the relative
distribution of resources, not the general availability of resources.
The final version of the indicators has two main components: universally,
i.e. all students not just selective students; and, resources sufficient for the
reaching of the students natural capacities. In practice, I understand that this
lever might well be the most difficult of the 14 to achieve. The practicalities
of providing every student all the resources to reach their own potential could
be an open-ended financial drain; however, when dealing with justice, it is
sometimes not as important that the goal can ever be met, but rather that the
goal provides a fixed point upon which practical policy can be aimed. Much
of Rawls’s writing can be seen in this light.
2) The size and scope of my analysis came to the fore in the fact I had missed a
great deal of the sections I’d identified in first cycle coding and had to go back
through all 300 pages and pull out the things from my first cycle but had
failed to transfer to the document contacting all the references. This leads me
to the conclusion that when I take this tool out of the trial phase to the next
phase of full scale policy analysis, a team rather than an individual will be
needed to look at large policies.
I conclude that Table 28 did operate as hoped to uncover the strengths and
weakness of Title I as it relates to an adequate educational system.
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Lever: Fair Civic Opportunity Curriculum.
The revised lever.
Since the ultimate aim of the publicly funded school is to allow each graduating
student to take an equal and active part in civil society (Rawls, 2001, p. 56), the skills to
do so must be integral to the academic program. Civics, policies theory, rhetoric and
community life would not be “extras” in a Rawlsian system but would have equal footing
with reading and math skills. The Rawlsian model of liberal democracy hinges on a
citizenry that has the verbal and political skills to engage one another.
Table 29: Fair Civic Opportunity Curriculum Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just

Just

Not Addressed
Unjust
Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document directly addresses the primacy of the
sociopolitical life of citizens. The academic core of curriculum is
in effective citizen production. Systematic coursework that leads to
civic competence are given equal weight with reading and math.
The policy document recognizes the importance of the
sociopolitical life of citizens. Effective citizen production is one of
the prime goals of the academic curriculum. Systematic
coursework that leads to civic competence, including government,
civics and rhetoric are given significant weight throughout the
student’s educational career.
The policy does not address curriculum or goals of publicly funded
education.
The policy that governs curricular content gives little emphasis to
civic education but requires some civic coursework.
The policy crowds out all civic oriented coursework in favor of
dominated-by-business functional classes.

Policy evaluation.
In Title I the sole reference to civic competencies is §1504 that provides funding
for the Close Up Foundation. This foundation’s goal is to promote the very civic
competencies that Rawls envisions as core to the mission of publicly funded education.
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Their mission is stated as “Close Up informs, inspires, and empowers young people to
exercise the rights and accept the responsibilities of citizens in a democracy.” The
statement goes on to state, “We believe that a strong democracy requires active and
informed participation by all citizens; therefore we seek to reach participants of every
race, creed, geographical community, socio-economic level, and academic standing”
(Close Up Foundation, 2013). §1504 specifically goes on to target monies granted to this
foundation be targeted to the least advantaged.
This civic focus would suggest that Title I is highly just in promoting a civic
competency goal for publicly funded education if it were not limited to appropriating
between 1.5 and 2 million dollars a year to this one foundation that provides
extracurricular civic programs to a very limited number of students for a limited range of
activities (Close Up Foundation, 2013). The lever Liberal Educational Goals showed
how Title I was shown to promote active measures to narrow the curriculum to the areas
of reading, math and science. Measures to promote curriculum to develop the civic
competencies of students are not mentioned once outside §1504.
For this reason, I conclude there is not sufficient textual content to justify any
axial themes on this lever. On the lever of fostering Fair Civic Opportunity Curriculum,
Title I rates Highly Unjust.
Tool evaluation.
This last lever is the first with no applicable text to analyze. The only change
made from the lever as presented in chapter 3 is that the title was changed to clarify the
intent and to improve the continuity of the lever titles.
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Difficulties:
1) The positioning of §1504 and its funding for a foundation that clearly is in line
with a Rawlsian view of the primacy of civic duty within the larger context of
Title I took a good deal of thought. I did not think it right to dismiss it
entirely, but when reading about the nature of the Up Close foundation’s
excellent activities it was clear that this foundation does not meet the core
criteria of being curricular in nature. Thus I excluded it from the final
judgment.
2) The utter lack of textual reference to civic preparation or civic education in
the school curriculum created the one time in this project that I could not find
any basis for axial themes. After consultation with peers I chose to not put
forth any axial themes for this lever.
Table 29 operated as hoped to uncover weaknesses in Title I in that if failed to
emphasize the primacy of civic education of young citizens in order to prepare them to
exercise their fair and equal voice in society.
Conclusion of Lever Analysis
In this chapter I have systemically used the proposed tool to evaluate Title I for
the 14 levers of educational justice. The tool worked well to focus the analysis and lead
to the analyst (me) to ask questions of substance in seeking an answer to the question of
intrinsic justice. In chapter 5 these conclusions to both the justice of Title I and the
efficacy of the tool will be discussed.
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CHAPTER 5
Structure of this Chapter
This chapter is divided into two distinct parts. The first is a discussion of the
analysis of Title I of Elementary and Secondarily Education Act of 2001, better known as
No Child Left Behind. This analysis will be based on the three arenas presented in
chapter 3 using the data generated in chapter four. I will then make summary conclusions
about the justice of Tile I based on Rawlsian justice and what implications that might
have. This part will also have the limitations and recommendations for future research as
if the evaluation of Tittle I were a stand-alone study.
The second half of this chapter will be the discussion of the tool itself, which is
the stated primary goal of this dissertation. I will summarize the revisions made between
original and final version of the tool and will summarize and review the challenges and
conclusions I developed for the usability of the 14 levers. I will then write my
conclusions about the creation of this tool, its limitations, and finally my implications of
how this tool might be used with a vision for the future use and development of this tool.
Title I Discussion
As noted in chapter 4 there were changes in the number and order of the levers.
This is reflected in the revised diagram of the levers and arenas (Figure 2). Additionally
the arena questions, presented in chapter 4 have been added to diagram to further clarify
how the arenas work with the levers when considering the discussion of Title I
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Figure 2: Arenas and Levers: Revised Version
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Basic Liberties: Does this Policy Promote Democratic Process & Citizen Liberty?
Title I was found, in this analysis, to be consistently unjust in that is centralizes
decision making authority away from the citizenry and fails to provide safeguards to
prevent this centralized authority from undermining the fair equality of each citizen’s
voice. Though there were bright spots where Title I has very clear guarantees for specific
subgroups, these guarantees only served to highlight the failure to do so for all.
Table 30: Basic Liberties
Lever
Democratic Educational System
Overlapping Consensus
Equality of the Person
Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach

Indicator Rating
Highly Unjust
Unjust
Unjust
Unjust

The failure of this arena is particularly catastrophic because of the lexical priority
that Rawls puts on this “first principle” of basic political liberties (Rawls, 1999a, p. 52)
over all other values (Freeman, 2007). Therefore, even if the other ten levers showed
Title I as Highly Just, the policy as a whole would still be unjust due to the failure in this
arena. Therefore, to reform Title I to make it more just, the first priority must be in this
arena. Specific language should be added to actively promote policy and practice
influence by all strata of local citizens. The policy should also explicitly limit the ability
for bureaucratic entities to usurp the value of local elected bodies by issuance of
compulsory edits to such bodies. Finally, the policy should provide clear limits on the
power of the majority (citizens or elected officials) to favor a particular comprehensive
doctrine via the funds made available via Title I.
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Given the current gridlock in Congress I put forth that bureaucratic governance of
schools is more efficient; however, Rawls makes it clear that efficiency is never an
excuse to violate basic democratic rights.
It should be noted that I make no claim that if the language of Title I were to be
amended to incorporate all these recommendations there would be fair democratic school
systems. Title I is just one part of one piece of one Congressional act in a complex mix
relevant to policy text and a larger mix of implementation methods; however, this fact
does not reduce the responsibility to strive for the most just policy possible.
The Difference Principle: Does this policy provide for disproportionate resource
allocation to the Least Advantaged Children?
Title I was found to be very successful at implementing the difference principle of
justice. This is not surprising because Title I’s official title is “Improving the Academic
Achievement of the Disadvantaged” and §1001 states, “The purpose of this title is to
ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a highquality education.” §1002 stipulates that monetary grants to needy schools will be the
means to achieve that end. It could be fairly said that the espoused purpose of Title I is to
provide for disproportionate resource allocation to the least advantaged children. This
assessment was to ascertain whether the text lives up to the promise.
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Table 31: The Difference Principle
Lever
Ongoing Assistance for Least Favored Students
Financial Adequacy
Early Childhood Preventive Measures
Social Capita Compensation
Differential School Resources

Indicator Rating
Just
Not Addressed
Highly Just
Just
Highly Just

Table 31 summarizes the result of the analysis and shows a clear pattern of
justice. The only lever not showing as just is financial adequacy because Title I is not
base financing to schools, but additional funding that only goes to the neediest schools.
Thus Title I is not a school funding policy per se. Of particular note are the ratings of
Highly Just on the levers of early childhood efforts and differential school resources.
This reflects the fact that Title I has language that specifically targets money to be given
to schools with the highest concentration of disadvantaged children and that programs to
impact children before the reach school age are robust and integral to Title I. The rating
of Just for the lever of providing compensatory social capital for the least advantaged is
particularly laudable as social capital support could easily have been omitted if Title I had
been approached as strictly about physical recourses.
This lever is openly about redistributing financial resources to the least
advantaged based on need, and Title I is designed to do just that. It has been argued that
NCLB has been underfunded since its passage (Darling-Hammond 2010) which, if true,
would impede the effectiveness of the redistribution aspects of Title I; however, the issue
of later funding is part of this analysis of the policy texts. This highlights once again that
just policy documents do not guarantee just results. It also highlights that this tool, as I
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am proposing it, cannot be used to measure just implementation by assessing only the
governing legislation.
Fair Equality of Opportunity: Does this Policy Promote Equal Freedom of Life Goals?
Fair equality of opportunity represents a classic liberal vision of the purpose of
education. Title I does not embrace that vision; however, the justice tool found this
legislation to have points on which just policy is proposed even if the intent is not liberal.
Thus in this arena, unlike the other two, Title I showed a mix of Just and Unjust ratings.
Table 32: Fair Equality of Opportunity
Lever
Liberal Educational Goals
Social Capital Development
Differentiated Instruction & Testing
Fair Civic Opportunity Curriculum
Adequate Educational System

Indicator Rating
Unjust
Unjust
Just
Highly Unjust
Just

On the levers of Adequate Educational System and Differentiated Instruction &
Testing, Title I showed to be a just policy. This appears to relate to the consensus interest
in both having adequate schools and special help for those in need. The congressional
commitment to those in need is reflected in other legislation such as IDEA and ADA.
The commitment of this legislation to adequacy cannot be taken too far, as Title I is
explicitly a supplemental program which encourages and rewards actions taken to
provide adequate schools; however, it cannot be confused with legislation that require
adequate schools. Once again the reader must not confuse just intentions and just
outcomes.
Three of the five levers in this area rate Title I as Unjust or Highly Unjust. This
pattern reflects that the text of Title I does not promote Rawlsian liberal educational
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goals. Title I goes to great length to promote a very narrow vision of publicly funded
education that is focused on employability first and foremost. It is argued by authors from
a wide range of viewpoints such as Ravitich (2010), Darling Hammond (2010) and
Hirsch (2007) that NCLB has narrowed the curriculum via the testing mandates in
particular to the detriment of those people Rawls described as the least advantaged. The
ability to read, write and do basic mathematics might well be how to gain employment;
however, Rawls (and I) would contend that simple employability is not enough to make
an empowered citizen and a more egalitarian society. The question for this arena is: Does
this policy promote equal freedom of life goals? I conclude that the text of Title I does
not take adequate measures to promote the equal freedom of life goals, though it could
have been written to do so without changing the purpose of the legislation.
Implications
Title I is the premier piece of federal legislation promoting educational justice for
the least advantaged children in the United States. There is a good deal of excellent and
just policy written into the 75,000 word document. In particular Part C (§1301-1309),
which deals with Education of Migratory Children , provides a road map on how Title I
could have been written with language which could have provided a more just
educational environment for all children had such language been used for other groups of
least advantaged children. However, the protections and support for migratory children
were not included for children who live in high poverty communities, or are in poverty
themselves, or come from families with limited English proficiencies. Thus the just
protections for the one group throws a glaring light on the choice law makers made to not
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provide the same supports for those other groups. The positive thing about this
inconsistency is there is ready-made language within Title I itself that could be
appropriated to improve the justice of Title I with little major revision.
While on balance, the two arenas that deal with the execution of education within
Title I (The Difference Principle and Fair Equality of Opportunity) show operationally
that Title I is generally just. The gross affront to the basic democratic liberties as
identified by the lever Basic Liberties ultimately undermines the entire legislation’s
justice. The methods used in Title I to centralize power and decision making away from
the messiness of democratic process might well seem logical. This is especially true
today in an era of congressional gridlock; however, Rawls makes it quite clear that that
efficiency is not what makes up justice (Rawls 1999a, p. 62). To choose an efficient
educational system over one that promotes the political equity of each citizen is
ultimately a utilitarian approach: the end of quality education justifies the means of
making the process beyond the reach of the local communities. Such utilitarianism is
precisely what Rawls contrasted to his vision of justice as fairness (Freeman, 2007, p.
146). Even if NCLB were widely acclaimed to be a resounding success 10 years after its
passage, that success at the expense of democratic liberties would not be justified.
Limitations
It was mentioned several times in this chapter and in chapter 4 that Title I is a
voluntary supplementary program. As part of the general rules of Title I, §1905
specifically states:
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Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize an officer or employee of the
Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational
agency, or school's specific instructional content, academic achievement
standards and assessments, curriculum, or program of instruction. Similarly, no
state is limited to the protections of the least advantaged by what is proscribed in
the text. It is always possible to do more.
This means any conclusions made to the justice or lack of justice of the text of
Title I must be qualified by the fact that no state is required to abide by any of the policy
stipulations contained therein.
A second limitation, also previously mentioned, is that of funding. §1125AA
(g)(3) spells out the procedures for how the Secretary of Education proceeds if Title I is
not fully funded. Though this is not a study on effectiveness, it is important to note that
§1002(a)(4) calls for $25 billion for Title I Part A in 2007 (the last year for which a figure
was set in the legislation), but the actual appropriation was $12,838,125,280 and in 2011
that figure was only up to $14,463,416,198 (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). Thus,
it would be incorrect to equate the program goals set out in Title I with the actual
programs on the ground.
Finally, this study does not ever consider the actually effectiveness of any of the
program initiatives or protections laid out in the legislation. This study was never
intended for that purpose. It is recognized that a policy such as Title I goes through many
hands and levels of bureaucracy before it directly impacts a least advantaged child. At
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each and every level it is subject to the influence of whoever is implementing the
program. At any level the justice could be negatively impacted.
Therefore considering these three limitations, it is important to note that any
extrapolation of the justice to actual children would be inappropriate. The intent of this
inquiry was to establish the level of justice with which Title I begins its journey to the
local level.
Recommendations for Future Research
I would suggest that the remainder of ESEA/NCLB should be evaluated by this
tool, along with IDEA and the other smaller federal legislation that make up the
patchwork of laws that govern all the nation’s schools. Only as this project is completed
can a fair evaluation of federal policy be made.
Tool Development Discussion and Conclusions
In chapter 1 two research questions were presented:
#1 What constitutes a just educational policy?
#2 Does the proposed instrument provide a useful measure of policy justice?
I believe I have been able to answer both of the questions. The first research
question was primarily addressed in chapters two and three where I presented an
overview of John Rawls’s vision of political liberalism and then parsed out how that
translated into educational policy justice in chapter 3. I concluded based on Rawls’s
writing that a just educational policy has three components: basic liberties, the difference
principle and fair equality of opportunity. An educational policy that respects basic
liberties requires that the background institutions that make up a publicly funded
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educational system promote the fair and equal value of each citizen’s voice and that they
provide protections for local governance of local schools from dominion by the
bureaucracy, as well as protections for minority culture and belief systems from the
majority. Just educational policy will actively promote and protect these liberties through
clear language whenever the policy touches topics related to school system governance.
While the background institution must preserve basic liberties, the most active
component in achieving a just educational policy is the difference principle. I
appropriated the word from Rawls who mostly used it to discuss the just distribution of
basic goods. I concluded in the realm of education its application was the call for the
disproportionate resource allocation to those children Rawls called the least advantaged.
Social justice in education recognizes that all children do not begin life on an even
footing. Some children are born with biological handicaps while others are born into
circumstances that create educational handicaps. A just educational policy will explicitly
acknowledge that fact and will provide additional active resources to remediate the
disadvantages these students face.
The third component of a just educational policy is an overarching commitment to
fair equality of opportunity for every student. While the difference principle focuses on
educational inputs, this arena of justice focuses on output goals. The goal of a just
educational system is that each and every student has been fully prepared to fully and
fairly participate in democratic civil society and has received the resources needed to
equip them to pursue their chosen live goals as far as their talent and interests take them,
regardless of their socioeconomic circumstances. There are many skills needed in the
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pursuit of these goals; however, the policy must position these goals as means to the more
important ends.
I also believe I found a solid conclusion for the second research question: Does
the proposed instrument provide a useful measure of policy justice?
This tool was created in order to make a way to systematically evaluate
educational policy documents against the Rawlsian vision of justice. The initial tool as
proposed in chapter 3 was drawn from Thorn’s model and the writings of John Rawls.
The initial cycle of coding indicated that the lever indicators were, in general, effective at
identifying sections of Title I that were applicable. The second effort of the first cycle,
using the additional two levers and some rewrites of both narratives and lever indicators
appeared to have improved this identification process.
The second cycle of coding and the development of the axial themes within the
different levers brought about a second cycle of revision of the tool. These revisions were
less in basic substance but in nuance to help clarify what the real question was. It was
only after the second cycle of coding was nearly complete that the need to revise the
rating scale became apparent. At the same time, the rating scale took on its final general
pattern where the rating Highly Just/Unjust represented active measures while the ratings
of Just/Unjust represented passive measures. This came from the pattern that emerged
after 10 of the 14 levers.
The final change to the tool as a whole was to rearrange the order in which the
levers were presented within each arena. This came from a logical progression of
concepts on Title I. I would not necessarily blanket stipulate the use of the same order in
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evaluating other policy documents because there is no lexical priority among the levers as
there is among the arenas.
Two of the levers were not sufficiently addressed in Title I to draw axial themes.
The reader will note, however, that only one was rated Not Addressed. The reason the
other was given a rating, despite almost no applicable text, was due to the wording of the
indicator. A lack of protections does not mean the topic is not addressed, but rather it was
not sufficiently addressed, thus it was assigned an Unjust rating. Thus, it will not be
possible to make a blanket statement for a need for axial themes to be able to make rating
judgments.
In general, I was extremely pleased by the tool’s ability to pull out themes and
identify patterns. A review of chapter 4 will show that many of the questions and themes
generated during the process could be pursued as an independent study. I believe this
reflects the strength and practical usefulness of the tool. I found the process to be selfguiding which is an indicator that the tool could be used by researcher or policy makers
without the guidance of the author.
Limitations
The earlier conclusion about Title I that positive results in education would be
entirely trumped by the damage to democratic processes might be difficult for some to
accept. This leads to a final but important theme that the evaluation of Title I highlighted
a theme that could be seen as a major limitation to this tool. There appears to a natural
and unavoidable tension between giving the full value to the democratic value of each
citizen over the local schools system and the need to guarantee justice and equity to those
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who are in the minority. When I lauded Title I for the guarantees of service and advocacy
for the children of migrant workers as a model for justice, I did so knowing full well that
in order to achieve real execution of these services there are mandates put upon LEAs.
These mandates do not allow for local citizens to abridge the rights bestowed upon the
children of migrants, even if 100% of the local citizens oppose. This clearly devalues the
power of the local citizens. Rawls recognized this tension (Rawls, 1999a, p. 174-175) and
responded with advocating a constitutional democracy that guaranteed the basic liberties.
However, would the details of a just educational policy, like providing a migrant child
with an advocate rise to the level of a constitutional right? Barry Bull (2008) addresses
this issue in one of the few book length applications of Rawlsian liberalism to public
schools and justifies a certain level of intrusive mandates as part of guaranteeing the fair
liberty of the generation of children within the school system. This analysis, while it does
not give a path to resolve this problem, does bring to light that inherent conflict.
A second potential limitation of this tool has to with its scope. It worked very well
on ESEA/NCLB Title I in large part because the text came to 300 pages, single spaced.
There was a lot of text for me to evaluate and thus I believe I came to strong conclusions.
However, the question must be raised about the usefulness of the tool, as written, in less
voluminous policy documents. For instance, for a different project, I am attempting to use
the tool on the 1965 ESEA Title I. At 11 pages, it is not possible to developed the axial
themes that made the analysis of this dissertation compelling. Thus, it would be fair to
raise questions about the tool’s usefulness in smaller policy documents.
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On the other hand, evaluating a large policy documents with this tool was time
consuming. It was not a simple review process. Title I is only a portion of ESEA/NCLB,
and even so the review and analysis took many hours. For that reason, I would say that
this tool is more appropriate for teams than for individuals. Further, I know that the
credibility of the conclusions would be greatly enhanced if each lever were addressed by
more than one rater. Had this project been explicitly to evaluate Title I, the use of a single
rater would have been less than optimal.
As noted in the discussion about Title I, it is important that any use of this tool be
carefully positioned to emphasize that it is not about what works in education, but about
the justice of the text’s intent. I list this as a limitation (and it is); however, it is also a
strength if the target audience is policy makers who have little expertise at
implementation and methods. The most they can often hope to do is create policy that is
on its face just and good for society. This tool could be used in the policy process for just
that purpose.
Implications and Recommendations for Future Work
When I wrote chapter 2, near the beginning of this dissertation process, I said
“This study is ultimately about showing how his (Rawls’s) vision of social justice is both
relevant and applicable to 21st century educational policy.” I was writing in a hopeful
sense. I was hoping to find a way to define educational justice that could point the way
forward both for me in my new career in the academy as well as to the larger society.
Over half a year later, I am more than a little pleased because my hopes have been more
fully realized than I imagined possible. I am fully convinced that political liberalism can
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provide a roadmap toward a more just society in the next century. Closer to home, it can
provide for me a way to connect my unique set of experiences and values which I brought
with me to academia to my future career as a scholar.
There are three domains of implications for the use of this justice tool: for
researchers, for policy makers and for leadership preparation. As noted in the literature
review, I found several gaps in current research that I sought to fill. I noted that while
there are justice measurement tools available, such as the Equity Audits (McKenzie &
Skrla, 2011; Skrla et al., 2009; Skrla et al., 2004), and there are tools to measure the
effectiveness of schools reforms, such as presented by Tharp (2008), I did not find any
tools to measure the justice of legislative intent when it comes to educational policy. A
tool to systemically evaluate the justice intentions of policy documents is a valuable
contribution.
I also found very little current research and academic writing on the use of an
enlightenment type liberal version of social justice. Beyond a handful of current writers
such as Barry Bull & Catherine Audard, the liberal conception of justice represented with
force and vigor by Rawls in the 1970’s and 1980’s has been eclipsed to the point that the
term social justice is equated with crucial theory (Applebaum, 2009; Sensoy & DiAngelo
2011).Thus, to present (or re-present) a liberal conception of individual educational
justice (as opposed to group justice) is of value to the research community.
This tool and the evaluation of Title I is not the envisioned end of my work on
this subject. I would like to work with a team over the next few years to apply this tool to
the rest of ESEA/NCLB and to the other primary federal legislation governing schools,
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such as IDEA. Upon completion of such a project a composite summary of the justice of
US educational policy can be made. I believe such a project would be of benefit to
society as a whole in addition to researchers, educators and policy makers.
In addition to the assessment of current educational policy, this tool can be used
to assess historical policy documents to study the changes of policy justice over time.
Appendix B is an excerpt from just such a study (Thompson & Brewer, 2013) as
evidence of the tool’s usefulness.
A second strand of expansion I would like to pursue as I move into my career in
the academy is to create a second set of lever indicators to measure the justice of policy at
the implementation level. Once again, there are measures of equity and measures of
effectiveness for education; however, I was not able to find tools to measure the policy
justice in education. The Equity Audits (McKenzie & Skrla, 2011; Skrla et al., 2009;
Skrla et al., 2004) are designed to measure equity of outcomes, but does not attempt to
look at policy intent. A second version of this tool could be designed to look at district
and state level policy targeted at individual schools and even individual students. Such an
approach could inform the same three groups of researchers, policy makers and
practitioners as does the current tool.
The implications for policy makers could conceivably be the most important. In
chapter 1, I highlighted the need for common ground upon which many parties can agree
to move forward with educational reforms. I propose here that the liberal ideas of the
enlightenment are the best place to find that common ground. As noted in chapter 1,
liberal values have been called the “American Creed” (Stark, 2011, p. 78), due to the fact
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a commitment to individual human rights and opportunity are still the touchstones of
mainstream political discourse in the US. It has been argued that the perceived great
divide in US politics is almost entirely illusionary and that the U.S. public
overwhelmingly believes in a similar core set of values (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope, 2010),
and I would propose that the values Firoina, et. al. found consistently reflect
enlightenment liberalism. Thus policy makers (or policy advocates) on both sides of the
isle could look to this tool to evaluate how their proposed policies align with classical
liberalism.
I recognize that some of Rawlsian liberalism would be hard for some to grasp,
especially the concept that schools are about building citizens not getting a job; however,
it would be fair to take Rawls’s vision and this tool as an ideal to which to strive rather
than a blueprint for actual policies. Additionally, there are unresolved (possibly
unresolvable) issues within Rawls’s liberal vision that also suggest that this tool is an
ideal not an achievable goal. The theme noted earlier of the conflict between the fair
value of the local citizen’s political rights and the just policy guarantee of support and
services for a small minority of least advantaged children is an example of how it might
be impossible to score Highly Just on all the levers. This does not invalidate the tool. On
the contrary, I propose that this high standard can promote policy documents that are as
just as practically possible.
The final implication is for the use of this tool to me (and hopefully others) in the
preparation of the next generation of school leaders. The use of the tool begins with the
simple but profound mental exercise of Rawls’s veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1999a) to help
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the middle-school leaders develop a mindset that looks at policy and procedures from the
standpoint of children and parents with very different backgrounds than their own. The
teachers in U.S. schools are almost entirely from middle class homes (Bennett, 2008) and
since the early 1990’s the ranks of teachers in training have become ever more uniformly
white (Hodgkinson, 2002). Further, the efforts to raise the academic standards of teacher
training programs as advocated by Darling-Hammond (2010) raises the specter of further
reducing the pool of educators with backgrounds outside the white-middle class norm.
(Fisch, 2009). The tool can provide structure to the veil of ignorance exercise ensuring
that the different domains (arenas) of educational justice are considered as well as their
practical considerations (levers).
Thus I look forward to using this tool as a way to help my future students develop
a systematic and internalized method for assessing justice when faced with
implementation of the policies of superiors and/or developing policies under their own
purview. What would hope to happen is that those emerging school leaders will make
justice, not convenience, efficiency or personal benefit the touch stone of their decision
making practice. There will be no way for me to prepare my students for every
eventuality; however, the primacy of justice as fairness for the individual child will never
become obsolete.
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Appendix A: A Rawlsian Instrument for the Evaluation of Justice in Educational Policy
Documents
Purpose:
To assess policy documents for their intrinsic justice based on the political
liberalism of John Rawls.
Structure:
As noted in figure 1, Rawlsian education justice is divided into three arenas. Each
arena has an overarching question and 4-5 individual levers by which justice is measured
for that arena.
Procedure:
1st Cycle Coding:
The entire document to be evaluated should be coded by sections or
phrases according to their relevance to one or more of the 14 levelers.
2nd Cycle Coding


All sections or phrases rating to one lever should be collected and
analyzed for patterns that could reveal a theme.



In robust documents themes may develop during the analysis process. If
so, each theme should be assessed for its individual justice, as described in
the narrative section of the lever.



The full body of data for that lever should be assessed and compared to the
indicator in the rating scale table.



A conclusion should be made regarding the how the data aligns to the
lever indicator statements.
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Not all policies will have language related to every lever. However, that
does not necessarily indicate a Not Addressed rating. If the evaluators
conclude that the overall policy document covers areas of educational
policy that reasonably could be linked with one or more levers that are not
addressed, the evaluator my conclude that the omission was that of a
justice duty and rate the lever as unjust.

Criteria Rating Scale
Rating Level
Highly Just
Just
Not Applicable
Unjust
Highly Unjust

Indicator
The policy document actively addresses this justice lever in a way
that supports Rawlsian justice.
The policy passively addresses this justice lever in a way that
supports Rawlsian justice.
The policy does not have control over this lever of Rawlsian
justice.
The policy indirectly addresses this justice lever in a way that
passively opposes Rawlsian justice.
The policy document directly addresses this justice lever in a way
that actively opposes Rawlsian justice.

Conclusions
Conclusions are made for each of the three areas independently. The overall
theme and stated intent of the policy should be considered as well as its relationship to
other policies that might cover duties not addressed in the policy document under
consideration. Conclusions should be primarily based on the individual lever conclusions.
It should, however, be noted that it is entirely possible that a particular policy document
might, using the tool, warrant a rating of Unjust in due to omissions; but, in practice the
omission has no effect when another policy document covers the area omitted. It is for
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that reason, to find the true justice of policy, all relevant policy documents should be
assessed and their interaction considered.
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Arena: Basic Liberties
Arena Question: Does this Policy Promote Democratic Process & Citizen Liberty?
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for
all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties,
are to be guaranteed their fair value (Rawls, 2005, p. 6).
This arena reflects the primacy that Rawls puts on the equal access to political
life. Rawlsian liberalism places the ability to not only have theoretical equality of
political voice but for that voice to have the fair value of political liberty means every
citizen has equal opportunity to participate in the process; and, equally important, equal
opportunity to influence policy (Rawls, 1999a). Rawls saw that the procedural justice has
a tendency to erode over time due in large part to the problematic tendency for political
power and wealth to concentrate. Thus, in considering a Rawlsian evaluation of
educational policy, this evaluation must include a serious look at whether the policy
supports or inhibits the fair value of the individual citizen’s voice, especially when
compared to the structural power of the bureaucratic system.
Because Rawls laid out the principle that it is the collective good that necessitates
collective action based on the scale of the need (Rawls, 1999a), so too does the scale of
democratic institution need to be scaled to the size of action. I believe this is a fair
interpretation of Rawls’s concept of distributive justice (Rawls, 1999b). National issues
like the military need national leadership, but local social institutions should be governed
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locally. Only by this can the fair value of the citizen’s voice be preserved. This concept of
local democracy will color all the levers in this arena.
Democratic Educational System
The right to democratic participation in the basic governmental structures is
foundational to all other rights (Rawls, 1999a, p. 53); as such, the first characteristic of
educational policy must be its democratic nature. Political access cannot be based on
income, social status or professional status; however, those issues are addressed in the
Equality of the Person lever. The larger the institutional size or political unit, the more
concern must be given to preserving political access; institutional efficiency cannot
justify exclusion (Rawls, 1999a, p. 56). Just policy measures must provide sufficient
meaningful and inclusive citizen input so as to support the individual’s sense of efficacy.
Democratic Educational System Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document explicitly requires meaningful local citizen
involvement in the decision making process, implementation and
review of the policy.
Just
The policy document requires local citizen involvement in at least
one of the processes of decision making, implementation or review.
Not Addressed
The policy does not require citizen involvement, nor does it create
bureaucratic barriers to the citizen involvement.
Unjust
The policy places large portions of the policy decision making,
implementation and/or review out of reach of local citizen impact.
It is largely governed by bureaucratic/professional processes.
Highly Unjust
The policy places large portions of the policy decision making,
implementation and/or review out of reach of citizens or local
elected officials. It is highly governed by bureaucratic/professional
processes.
Overlapping Consensus
Rawls describes a comprehensive doctrine as “the culture of everyday life, of its
many associations: churches, and universities, learned and scientific societies and clubs
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and teams to mention a few” (Rawls, 2005, p. 14). Civil society relies on an overlapping
consensus, the space where we all agree on basic conceptions of justice (Rawls, 1999, p.
340). A stable democratic government depends on the mutual agreement that we need
only to have agreement on the most basic conceptions of justice; in all other matters
citizens may reasonably disagree (Rawls, 2005, p. 39). Therefore, basic government
institutions, including educational systems, cannot endorse or inhibit comprehensive
doctrines unless they directly imperil basic liberties of citizens (Freeman, 2007, pp. 328330).
Furthermore, educational policy that infringes on the family and/or undermines
the comprehensive doctrine taught at home is only acceptable if such actions pose a direct
threat to the more basic liberty of self-determination (Rawls, 1999b, p. 596).
Comprehensive doctrines include both religion and systematic secular systems that
provide an overarching meaning of life and basic questions of values (Rawls, 2005, p.
13). These systems cannot invade the educational space by excluding or privileging
citizens in their political access or influence.
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Overlapping Consensus Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document explicitly forbids educational officials
and/or elected officials to use the educational system to
undermine the families’ comprehensive doctrine or culture,
except when it clearly is in support of basic liberties. The policy
actively supports the doctrine of overlapping consensus by
actively requiring or encouraging a variety of voices from
various comprehensive doctrines in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy as well as in the
operations of the educational system governed by the policy.
Just
The policy document implicitly forbids educational officials
and/or elected officials to use the educational system to
undermine the families’ comprehensive doctrine or culture,
except when it clearly is in support of basic liberties. The policy
supports the doctrine of overlapping consensus by encouraging a
variety of voices from various comprehensive doctrines in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy as
well as in the operations of the educational system governed by
the policy.
Not Addressed
The policy does not have language that addresses any
comprehensive doctrine.
Unjust
The policy does not implicitly or explicitly limit the ability of
community majority and/or the bureaucratic structure to favor
and/or disfavor a particular comprehensive doctrine in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy nor
does the policy implicitly or explicitly limit the ability of schools
to favor/disfavor a particular comprehensive doctrine in
curricular materials or in providing access to students in
execution of the policy.
Highly Unjust
The policy actively opposes the doctrine of overlapping
consensus by explicitly empowering the community majority
and/or the bureaucratic structure to favor and/or disfavor a
particular comprehensive doctrine in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy; or, the policy explicitly
favors/disfavors a particular comprehensive doctrine in curricular
materials or in providing access to students in execution of the
policy.
Equality of the Person
The equality of the individual when dealing with governmental entities must be
preserved. Basic institutional policy must take steps to compensate for the tendency to
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move away from equality (Rawls, 2005, p. 268). This lever is best understood as the
“fair” part in his conception of “fair value of political liberties” (Rawls, 2005, p. 357).
Rawls envisioned an ideal where “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an
equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of
authority irrespective of their economic and social class” (Rawls, 2005, p. 358). Though
the practical effectiveness is predicated on the prior lever which measured the ability of
the public at large to influence educational policy, this lever will operate on the
assumption that the prior standard was met and will measure the efforts to ensure equal
influence on policy by all citizens.
Equality of the Person Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document has explicit measures to ensure
representation by all social groupings within the local community
(with an emphasis on the families of children enrolled) in the
decision making, implementation and review of the policy. The
policy requires active measures to ensure inclusion of traditionally
voiceless groups.
Just
The policy document has measures to promote representation by
all social groupings within the local community (with an emphasis
on the families of children enrolled) in the decision making,
implementation and review of the policy indirectly.
Not Addressed
The policy measure does not address inclusion, nor does it favor
certain groups by education, profession or income.
Unjust
The policy indirectly favors certain individuals by favoring certain
credentials (education, license or affiliation) or group identities in
the decision making, implementation and review of the policy
process.
Highly Unjust
The policy document explicitly excludes the citizenry in the
decision making, implementation and/or review of the process via
credential requirements (education, license or affiliation) or
requirements of official status.
Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach
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The educational system is a basic institution in society, and as such, Rawls’s
principle of participation applies to its management (Rawls, 1999a, p. 196-197). Rawls
believed that a society is a fair system of cooperation among equally empowered citizens
(Rawls, 2005, p. 16-17) and that even expressly guaranteed political rights can lose their
fair value by regulation over which the citizen has no control (Rawls, 2005, p. 358). In
some ways this is the inverse of the Democratic Educational System lever; however, the
focus is different, i.e. the prior lever had a focus on empowering the citizen, but the focus
of this lever is the restraint of power by the bureaucracy. Another way to distinguish the
two is that this lever is concerned with the power vested in non-democratic systems while
the prior lever was about the power vested in the citizenry.
Limitation of Bureaucratic Reach Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document explicitly limits the power of the bureaucracy
to exercise control over local elected representatives, local
appointed educational personnel and private citizens in the
operation of local educational institutions to those circumstance
where such control is clearly required to maintain more basic
liberties.
Just
The policy document implies limits in its authorization to federal
or state bureaucracy to exercise control over local elected
representatives, local appointed educational personnel and private
citizens in the operation of local educational institutions where
such control is intended to maintain more basic liberties.
Not Addressed
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Unjust
The policy document implicitly empowers federal or state
bureaucracies to exercise control over local elected representatives,
local appointed educational personnel and private citizens in the
operation of local educational institutions in order to meet state or
national objectives.
Highly Unjust
The policy document explicitly authorizes or otherwise empowers
state and local bureaucracy to fully control local educational
institutions without oversight or input of local elected
representatives, locally appointed educational personal and private
citizens.
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Arena: The Difference Principle
Arena Question: Does this policy provide for disproportionate resource allocation to the
Least Advantaged Children?
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 2005, p. 6)
This arena addresses the second component of this, Rawls’ second principle of
justice. He refers to this as the difference principle (Rawls, 1999a, p. 65).
Though Kant and Locke both supported the proposition that it was government’s
role to support the poor (Freeman, 2007, p. 86), Rawls takes this further by his concept of
an obligation to all the least advantaged, not just the poor (Rawls, 1999a, p. 83). Rawls
calls it background justice when the systems are created to increase the likelihood of a
just outcome of procedural justice (Rawls, 2001, §14). The levers in this area are
designed to measure the policy’s commitment to providing disproportionate resources to
the least favored children.
Ongoing Assistance for Least Advantaged Students
Rawlsian distributive justice requires that children who are least advantaged and
are not progressing to their maximum potential should be given assistance for as long as
needed. This includes assistance for both physical and mental obstacles to reaching the
child’s potential. The policy stipulates that measure of success cannot be “average” but
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rather the maximum of the individual child’s ability. This lever is not measuring
resources directed at needy schools but to individual children.
Ongoing Assistance for Least Advantaged Students Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document requires identification of and compensatory
assistance for the least advantaged children who are performing
below their maximum capability. The policy should require this
assistance to be provided for as long as needed to reach and
maintain that level of functioning.
Just
The policy document requires identification of and compensatory
assistance for the least advantaged children who are performing
below their maximum capability. The policy does not require
individualized assessment for maximum ability but rather uses
generic benchmarks to cut off compensatory services.
Not Addressed
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Unjust
The policy addresses student performance but makes no effort to
disaggregate to identify the least advantaged children nor does not
require compensatory assistance for such children.
Highly Unjust
The policy document addresses student performance and either (1)
allows disproportionate resources for the most advantaged
children, or (2) forbids disproportionate resources allocated to the
least favored.
Financial Adequacy
It is axiomatic that if schools are to achieve the compensatory goals envisioned by
Rawls, there must be adequate and equitable funding. Because Rawls valuates financial
liberties as secondary issues, the needs of providing a just education outweigh the
economic liberty rights of citizens, thus paving the way for sufficient taxation to achieve
equity. It could be argued that provision of adequate funds for just education will achieve
a net economic benefit (Freeman, 2007, pp. 88-89); however, by making such an
argument the case for the primacy of justice is undermined.
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Financial Adequacy Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for
execution of a just educational system as described in this tool with
differential spending for the least advantaged built in.
Just
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
justice needs of every student and in the eventuality of a shortfall,
at least as much money is spent on the children who are the least
advantaged as is spent on the most advantaged.
Not Addressed
The policy does not address finance.
Unjust
The policy document requires funding that is sufficient for the
needs of every student but does not address equality of spending.
Highly Unjust
The policy document addresses funding but does not require
funding that is sufficient for the needs of every student nor does it
require equality of spending.
Early Childhood Measures
Building on the evidence cited in chapter two regarding the significant deficit
faced by low income children when they enter school, the application of the difference
principle requires that the concept of publicly funded education be extended for the least
advantaged to just after the child’s birth. Drawing from Rawls’s expansive view of “least
advantaged” this vision would include those children with physical challenges as well as
those children born into impoverished homes where educational and emotional resources
are insufficient for school readiness. In this instance, the primary caregiver (i.e. parent) is
part of the educational system and is also a recipient of educational services in order to
succeed at their societal task as primary teacher. It is beyond the scope of this study to
specify what type of intervention is most effective, but the acceptance of the social
obligation to intervene must be explicit.
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Early Childhood Measures Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document explicitly stipulates that the process to
provide educational equity and compensatory services to the least
advantaged children begins at birth.
Just
The policy document suggests or otherwise encourages the process
to provide educational equity and compensatory services to the
least advantaged children begins at birth
Not Addressed
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Policies exclusively targeted narrowly at children beyond the
preschool age (i.e. high school) would not be applicable to this
measure.
Unjust
The policy is broad enough in scope to include early intervention
language, but does not include any.
Highly Unjust
The policy explicitly denies the responsibility for early childhood
intervention.
Compensation for Low Social Capital
The concern was raised in chapter one that children from low income homes often
do not have parents with sufficient social capital to ensure the system works to their best
advantage. Sacks (2007) showed how parental influence and knowledge of the
educational system skewed the outcomes in favor of wealthier children. Ideally,
educating and empowering the parents is a solution to this problem; however, absent the
larger social changes that would allow all parents to have the social capital to foster their
children’s success, the just educational policy will include not only efforts to educate and
empower but also provisions for independent advocates to act in loco parentis to mimic
the positive effects of social capital.
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Compensation for Low Social Capital Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document requires measures for parent education and
empowerment and independent advocates for low SES children
and other children who lack effective familial advocates with
authority to act in loco parentis if the parent and/or child wish.
Just
The policy document requires mechanisms and/or procedures to
ensure proactive efforts to compensate for the lack of social capital
of low SES and other marginalized children.
Not Addressed
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Unjust
The policy covers or creates systems that involve procedural
processes that could reasonably be seen to favor families with high
social capital, but fails to provide proactive efforts to ensure equal
access to those who do not have such social capital. Note: this
would include issues involving language barriers.
Highly Unjust
The policy creates or supports systems that can be reasonably
foreseen to make significant decisions about a child’s education
without a requirement of meaningful parental consultation.
Differential School Resources
Children are not generally educated one by one (U.S. Department of Education,
2009); they are educated in schools. Though Rawlsian political liberalism is predicated
on the individual human, he does stipulate that basic institutions also are governed by the
difference principle (Rawls, 1999a, §16). In this the basic unit in the measure of
educational program justice would be the school. As such, Rawls’s requirement that in
the presence of inequalities, a just society will ensure the most benefits be directed to the
least advantaged (Rawls, 1999a, p. 68) should be applied to individual schools. When
Rawls defines “least advantaged” he gives three domains: social status, wealth and
unfortunate circumstance (Rawls, 1999a p. 83). All three are applicable at the school
level. For this lever resources include, but are not limited to, facilities, equipment,
circular materials, extra-curricular opportunities and faculty/administrative quality.

241

Differential School Resources Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document explicitly lays out the principle and/or
practice that those schools that are characterized by students who
are from homes that of the lowest income or social status should be
provided proportionally more resources.
Just
The policy document recommends or otherwise favors that those
schools that are characterized by students who are from homes that
are of low income or social status should be provided
proportionally more resources.
Not Addressed
The policy does not deal with resource allocation.
Unjust
The policy document deals with resource allocation but does not
favor disproportionate resource allocation to schools characterized
by students who are from homes of low income or social status.
Highly Unjust
The policy forbids disproportionate resource allocation to schools
characterized by students who are from homes of low income or
social status. Or, the policy provides disproportionate resource
allocation to schools for reasons other than those addressed in this
lever.
Arena: Fair Equality of Opportunity
Arena Question: Does this policy promote equal freedom of life goals?
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; (Rawls, 2005, p. 6)
The first arena was to provide background for justice, and the second for resource
justice. This last arena is for actual outcome goals. To Rawls the entire purpose of
publicly funded education was to produce empowered citizens able to take their place as
equals no matter what their career or financial status. To Rawls economic disparities are
only justified when there is a background guarantee of practical political equality. It is to
that end Rawls believed publicly funded schools were to be focused.
Liberal Educational Goals
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Rawls had an expansive view of government’s role in education. His concept of
fair equality of opportunity (FEO) is promising for an evaluation of justice in educational
policy. It is important to also note that his call for fair equality of opportunity is tied to
the preceding phrase “positions and offices” which clearly sets a social and political
priority (over economic) in the quest for equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999a, § 16).
This is likely because Rawls (2003) privileges a person’s self-respect in regard to their
occupation and personal fulfillment over income (§ 17.3). This simple concept of selfrespect and personal fulfillment over earning power has significant ramifications when
evaluating the goals of public educational policy.
To Rawls, the goal of a just society is first and foremost to have citizens who have
respect for themselves and equal respect for others. Using the Aristotelian concept of
maximum utilization of innate talent being the greatest good, a Rawlsian view would see
the end of successful education as the preparation for self-fulfillment (Rawls, 1999a,
§65). Thus, educational policy should reflect maximization of self as a goal as an end in
itself as opposed to utilitarian economic goals.
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Liberal Educational Goals Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document specifically identifies bringing natural
capacities to fruition in each student’s life as the end goal of the
publicly funded educational process. Policy should equally
privilege skills/talents that promote the goal of entering adulthood
on a path to personal fulfillment.
Just
The policy document identifies that students bring natural
capacities to fruition as the end goal of the publicly funded
educational process, but skills related to financial gain are
privileged over non-economic skills.
Not Addressed
The policy does not have language that relates to the goals of the
educational process.
Unjust
The policy document calls for the narrowing of the school mission
to functional or economically valuable skills at the expense of a
program designed to enhance a broad range of natural capacities
and/or privilege skills related to financial gain over non-economic
skills.
Highly Unjust
The policy document only specifically identifies monetary rewards
or economic benefit as the end goal of the publicly funded
educational process and actively suppresses or forbids a pursuit of
skills not related to economic gain.
Social Capital Development
Rawls argued, “Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not
depend upon one’s class position and so the school system, whether public or private,
should be designed to even out class barriers” (emphasis mine) (Rawls, 1999a, p. 64).
This is as strong as any statement Rawls ever wrote about education. For him the
importance of this lies in the fact that the ability to participate in the sociopolitical world
is an integral part of having a fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 54 -55). The
ability to do this is part of social capital, the development of which can be facilitated in
the school setting (Farrell, Taylor, & Tennent, 2004; Terrion, 2006); and in a Rawlsian
system of justice is requisite.
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Social Capital Development Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document explicitly acknowledges the value of the
social capital amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic
homes and the communities’ obligation to provide compensatory
experiences to children from low SES and other marginalized
homes.
Just
The policy indirectly acknowledges the value of the social capital
amassed by children raised in high socioeconomic homes and the
communities’ obligation to provide compensatory experiences to
children from low SES and other marginalized homes.
Not Addressed
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Unjust
The policy is relevant to compensatory education, poverty or
achievement gap but fails to acknowledge the impact of social
capital.
Highly Unjust
The policy actively reduces the social capital of low income
children through creating barriers such as financial cost of
participation or transportation to low income students without
addressing and correcting this equality of access issue.
Differentiated Instruction and Testing
Rawls’s least advantaged category includes students with learning disabilities,
mental health and/or physical challenges, as well as those students who have social or
economic disadvantages. Rawls’s liberal conception of education prioritizes the student’s
academic and the student’s civic (social) success as valuable. Therefore a just educational
policy must include measures within the learning environment to ensure these students
have equal standing with other students via differentiated instruction. Educational policy
should be written to allow flexibility to both classroom teachers and to administration so
as to allow for students who are the least advantaged to be a full part of the larger school
community and to allow the student to maximize their own potential.
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Differentiated Instruction and Testing Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy requires instruction and testing to be adapted to for
those students who are the least advantaged as to allow those
students to experience full participation in the social milieu of the
school. Testing requirements must be psychometrically valid in
method so as to be both informative as to the student’s real
progress in the discreet subject matter while accommodating for
non-subject specific disadvantage.
Just
The policy provides room for instruction and testing to be adapted
for those students who are the least advantaged as to allow those
students to experience full participation in the social milieu of the
school (but does not require it for all types of disadvantage).
Testing requirements are required to be psychometrically valid in
method so as to be informative as to the student’s real progress in
the discreet subject matter while accommodating for non-subject
disadvantage.
Not Addressed
The policy does not touch on any issues related to the needs of
disabled students or defers to other applicable policy on this issue.
Unjust
The policy provides limited flexibility in instructional methods and
highly limits special assistance options for disadvantaged students
that will likely lead to a lack of success or exclusion from the
social milieu of the school; and/or testing requirements have
limited flexibility sometimes requiring disadvantaged students to
abide by procedural rules that put them at a further disadvantage
and/or create artificially low test scores.
Highly Unjust
The policy requires inflexible instructional methods and highly
limits special assistance options for disadvantaged students that are
likely to lead to a lack of success or exclusion from the social
milieu of the school; and/or testing requirements forbid flexibility
that requires disadvantaged students to abide by procedural rules
that put them at a further disadvantage and/or create artificially low
test scores.
Adequate Educational System
The term educational adequacy and what that entails is an entire field unto itself
beyond the scope of this study. What is important in this measure of justice is that the
goal of adequacy is clearly stated and the clarification is made as to adequacy for what?
To Rawls the purpose of an educational system is twofold: to even out class barriers and
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to allow “natural capacities (to) develop and reach fruition” (Rawls, 1999a, p. 63-64).
Thus a just educational system must be adequate to the job of developing those natural
capacities.
The indicators below use the word resources to include curriculum, staff and
facilities because all three are intrinsic to educational adequacy; however, the details of
what defines adequacy are left out because this tool is about intent not methods. That is
why this lever is left intentionally vague as to sidestep the debates of methods. Also not
covered in this lever will be financial adequacy for the programs put forth because that
topic is covered in a separate lever.
Adequate Educational System Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document requires schools to provide an educational
system that is committed to providing every student the resources
necessary to allow them to reach their full natural capacities in a
broad range of self-directed domains.
Just
The policy document requires schools to provide an educational
system that is committed to providing every student the resources
necessary to allow them to reach their full natural capacities in a
limited range of domains.
Not Addressed
The policy is too far removed from this issue to be relevant.
Unjust
The policy allows for some students (or groups of students) to be
provided less than adequate resources that makes it less likely
some students will be able to reach their full natural capacities.
Highly Unjust
The policy document actively denies at least some children from
an educational system with the resources necessary for them to
reach their full natural capacities.
Fair Civic Opportunity Curriculum
Since the ultimate aim of the publicly funded school is to allow each
graduating student to take an equal and active part in civil society (Rawls, 2001,
p. 56), the skills to do so must be integral to the academic program. Civics,
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policies theory, rhetoric and community life would not be “extras” in a Rawlsian
system but would have equal footing with reading and math skills. The Rawlsian
model of liberal democracy hinges on a citizenry that has the verbal and political
skills to engage one another.
Fair Civic Opportunity Curriculum Rating Scale
Rating Level
Indicator
Highly Just
The policy document directly addresses the primacy of the
sociopolitical life of citizens. The academic core of curriculum is
in effective citizen production. Systematic coursework that leads to
civic competence are given equal weight with reading and math.
Just
The policy document recognizes the importance of the
sociopolitical life of citizens. Effective citizen production is one of
the prime goals of the academic curriculum. Systematic
coursework that leads to civic competence, including government,
civics and rhetoric are given significant weight throughout the
student’s educational career.
Not Addressed
The policy does not address curriculum or goals of publicly funded
education.
Unjust
The policy that governs curricular content gives little emphasis to
civic education but requires some civic coursework.
Highly Unjust
The policy crowds out all civic oriented coursework in favor of
dominated-by-business functional classes.
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Appendix B: Excerpt from A Rawlsian Justic Critique of Past Educational Movements in
the United States
The following paper was written by Ronald Thompson and Curtis A. Brewer and
presented at the annual meeting of American Educational Research Association May 1,
2013.
ESEA 1965 Analysis
The original ESEA of 1965 is a very different document from the one in force
today. Though the expressed aims are the same, using federal money to help lowincome/low-achieving children, the way it is expressed is very different. Title I 1965 runs
only 7 pages, and of that the majority is taken up with the formulas for funding.
However, the authors’ tool for measuring justice is still useful because not addressing an
issue, in some ways, is as telling as addressing an issue. Due to the very limited text
available, we concluded the best way to report the findings is in a table for levers in each
arena, then a discussion of the arena implications.
Lever
Democratic educational
system

Assessed Justice
Not addressed

Equality of the person
Overlapping consensus

Applicable Section (s)
§203(a)(2)(B)
§203(b)(3)
§206 (a)
§203(a)(1)
§205(a)(2)

Limitation of bureaucratic
reach

§206(a)(3)
§211

Just

Not addressed
Just

The arena of Basic Liberties asks if the policy promotes a fair democratic society
& citizen liberty. Title I 1965 does not strongly address the democratic process or citizens
liberties. While it did increase the power of the federal Office of Education by giving the
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Commissioner of Education a number of stipulated powers, these powers appear to be
general oversight to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out by the money provided.
The decision to rate the lever Democratic Educational System Not Addressed was due to
the wording of the lever indicator that says no new rights or barriers are created to citizen
empowerment; this is the appropriate scoring. The Equality of the Person was similarly
judged not to be impacted. Overlapping consensus was judged as Just, based on
§205(a)(2) that ensured equal treatment for impoverished children in private (religious)
schools; however, it must be noted, this evidence was very minimal for the finding.
Similarly §211 provides a clear path to appeal the federal Office of Education decisions
via the courts, thus allowing a marginal report of Just in Limitation of Limitation of
bureaucratic reach. In summary Title I 1965 has only the slightest relevance to the liberal
conception of basic liberties.
Lever
Ongoing assistance for least
favored students

Financial adequacy
Early childhood preventive
measures
Compensation for low social
capital
Differential school resources

Applicable Section (s)
§201
§203(a)(2)
§203(a)(4)
§205(a)(1)
§205(a)(5)
§201
§204
N/A

Assessed Justice
Just

§205(a)(7)

Just

N/A

Just

Unjust
Not Addressed

Title I 1965 was specifically titled “Financial Assistance to Local Educational
Agencies for the Education of Children of Low-Income Families.” Our examination of
the text from a Rawlsian liberal lens reveals the policy did exactly what it intended to do:
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provided funds to LEA’s. Liberal justice is individual justice and demands justice be
focused at the individual. The tool makes an exception for school wide interventions
because the school environment is an indivisible unit. The language in §201 spell out
support for programs “which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational
needs of educationally deprived children” and §205(a)(1) states:
That payments under this title will be used for programs and projects (including
the acquisition of equipment and where necessary the construction of school
facilities) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of
educationally deprived children in school attendance areas having high
concentration of children from low-income families.
This, on its face, supports the levers Ongoing Assistance for Least Favored
Students and lever Differential School Resources so these levers are found to be Just.
The injustice comes in when the legislation does not stipulate the moneys are not to be
fungible. The lever Financial Adequacy expects a just policy to ensure educational
adequacy to all students. Given the circumstances in 1965, particularly in the Deep South,
this omission makes a mockery of the justice aims of Title I. The brightest spot is
§205(a)(7) which links Title I programs to other programs to help the poor created by the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This holistic approach of linking educational
legislation to anti-poverty legislation models Rawlsian liberal justice in action. While
mixed in the justice of the five levers, Title I 1965 is on balance just.
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Lever
Liberal educational goals
Social Capital Development
Differentiated instruction &
testing
Adequate educational system

Fair civic opportunity
Curriculum

Applicable Section (s)
N/A
N/A
N/A

Assessed Justice
Not Addressed
Not Addressed
Not Addressed

§205(a)(1)
§205 (a)(5)
§205 (a)(8)
§212
N/A

Just

Not Addressed

The Rawlsian conception of Fair Equality of Opportunity is largely unaddressed
in Title I 1965. This is not necessarily a criticism in that the curricular decisions are not
being dictated which allows for local decisions to be made that would promote FEO. The
one lever that is addressed is Adequate Educational System. The texts in §205(a)(1) state
that the Title I funds can be used on a host of basic needs; §205 (a)(5) focuses on finding
empirical ways to help the least advantaged children to succeed; and, §205 (a)(8)
encourages professional research and training. All of these reflect a commitment to the
justice of an adequate educational system. On balance; however, we conclude that Title
I 1965 does not address this lever.
Conclusion
Policy is an artifact of a specific time and place. The analysis above does not
provide us with insight into how a policy came to be written as it was written. The
politics of the moment often lead to discursive crystallizations in policy that reflect social
regularities that are unfolding on multiple time scales (Brewer 2013). However, the
analysis above does provide the reader a place from which to understand the similarities
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and differences between two crystallizations that were undertaken (at least partially) due
to a concern for social justice.
Title I of ESEA in 1965 was by all accounts ground breaking for its day (Davies,
2007); however, we find it largely tepid on the measures of liberal justice. In our analysis
the most common lever result was Not Addressed, and of the levers rated just, only the
levers of funding were robust. This legislation is ultimately of very narrow intent. This
judgment should not be read to be a criticism; rather, it could be seen as a model of how
to create policy with a specific justice focus that does not create injustices in one place
while it creates justice in others. In addition this narrowness was possible due to the fact
that it was linked to other legislation such as the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA).
By 2001 however, the EOA had been repealed and Title I of ESEA had become
the premier piece of federal legislation promoting educational justice for the least
advantaged children in the United States. Our analysis indicates that there is a good deal
of excellent and just policy written into the 75,000 word document. In particular Part C
(§1301-1309) which deals with Education of Migratory Children, provides a road map on
how Title I could have been written in language which could have provided a more just
educational environment for all children, had such language been used for other groups of
least advantaged children. However, the protections and support for migratory children
were not included for children who live in high poverty communities, or are in poverty
themselves, or come from families with languages other than English. Thus the just
protections for the one group throws a glaring light on the choice law makers made to not
provide the same supports for those other groups. The positive thing about this
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inconsistency is there is ready-made language within Title I itself that could be
appropriated to improve the justice of Title I with little major revision.
While on balance, the two arenas that deal with the execution of education within
Title I (The Difference Principle and Fair Equality of Opportunity) show operationally
that Title I is generally just, the gross affront to the basic democratic liberties as identified
by the lever Basic Liberties ultimately undermines the entire legislation’s justice. The
methods used in Title I to centralize power and decision making away from the messiness
of democratic process might well seem logical. To choose an efficient educational system
over one that promotes the political equity of each citizen is ultimately a utilitarian
approach: the ends of quality education justify the means of making the process beyond
the reach of the local communities. Such utilitarianism is precisely what Rawls contrasted
to his vision of justice as fairness (Freeman, 2007, p. 146). Even if NCLB was widely
acclaimed to be a resounding success 10 years after its passage, that success at the
expense of democratic liberties would not be justified.
Indeed our evaluation of both versions of this legislation shows that there has
been a growing focus on efficiency and accountability at the federal level over and above
fighting the War on Poverty. Our analysis above should imply that need to think carefully
about the balance between two strong U.S. cultural values, accountability and social
justice, as we attempt to reauthorize ESEA.
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